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PREFACE
The starting-point of the thesis is the idea that conflict may be
endemic and even functional. However, the question remains whether
man is inherently aggressive and violent. It is assumed in the thesis
that every theory of conflict and conflict resolution consists of an
image of human 'being' and human nature, and that one of the most
seminal analyses a conflict analyst can engage in deals with these
images.
John Burton is one of the leading figures in the field of conflict
and conflict resolution theory who introduced the notion of 'problem-
solving workshop conflict resolution' to International Relations in
the late 1960s. The thesis focuses on how Burton applies human
needs thinking to conflict and conflict resolution theory. It examines
also what kind of 'model of man' is included in his theory. It is argued
that Burton's biologically-based image of human 'being' leads him to
deny culture its constitutive role in conflict and conflict resolution.
In other words, Burton's conception of universal human needs which
function as motives of behaviour offers a potent way to defuse
contextualism. As a consequence, problem-solving workshop conflict
resolution is thought by Burton to be essentially the same for all
peoples of all cultures.
In the second half of the thesis a social constructionist image of
human 'being', which clearly challenges Burton's views, is introduced.
It studies how social groups and institutions distribute knowledge,
define reality through shared typifications and use language.
Moreover, it is argued that reality as well as needs and identities are
socially and culturally constructed. Given this notion of human
existence, the thesis claims that problem-solving workshop conflict
resolution can be best understood to be an attempt to find a shared
reality between the parties in conflict.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND METHOD
Over the past ten years 1 .5 million children have died in wars and 4
million have been injured. In Bosnia-Herzegovina alone, thousands of
children have died since the outbreak of the all-out war in 1992. A
cease-fire has just broken out in Angola between Angola's
government and Unita rebels bringing to a halt one of the longest and
cruellest civil wars of the world leaving more than half a million
deaths. In April, May and June 1994 one of the most horrifying
conflicts in Africa took place in Rwanda, when somewhere between
500,000 and a million people died either in massacres or as a result
of disease, starvation and exhaustion in refugee camps. These are
figures I have gathered from the media over a week. The list could be
longer. It is hardly an overstatement to claim that conflict, war and
violence are among the most pressing issues that men and women of
the twentieth century have had to face.
Are these figures a testimony of our inability to manage conflicts in
constructive ways? Answers reveal often just the degree of
pessimism or optimism of the person who entertains the question.
However, statistics show that, for example, mediation has been used
in a majority of the wars fought since 1945 involving at least 100
fatalities. The most active mediating body, the United Nations, has
offered good offices or mediation assistance in over 100 disputes.1
For example, the Angolan peace process was mediated at least by four
different types of mediating bodies since 1989. Zaire's President
Mobutu succeeded in bringing the rival leaders together for the first
time in Zaire, in June 1989. Zimbabwe played a regional role in the
context of African initiatives through a series of summit meetings in
1989-1990. The period from April 1990 to May 1991 was one of
active Portuguese mediation, which resulted in the Bicesse Peace
Accords. After the September 1992 general elections UN special
representatives Margaret Anstee and Alioune Blondin Beye mediated a
new round of peace talks on the war which followed the collapse of
1. Bercovitch, Jacob, "International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies and
Conditions of Successful Outcomes", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 21, No.3, 1986, pp.
155-1 68.
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the Bicesse Accords. The most recent peace agreement, signed in
November 1994, was mediated by Beye.2
Yet, there is a feeling that we do not understand war and conflict, let
alone the mechanisms of productive conflict management and
resolution. For example, John Vasquez argues that "much has been
written on the causes of war; little has been learned about the
subject". 3 Marc Ross, on the other hand, claims that our institutional
practices for addressing conflicts are often deficient and yielding
partial and inadequate solutions, because "theories of conflict tell us
too little about how to manage conflicts, while conflict management
theories fail to consider many underlying sources of conflict that
conflict theories have identified".4
The study of conflict and war is not a new phenomenon, and conflict
and war have been the subject of, for example, courses in
International Relations (IR) from the time of the establishment of the
discipline. However, it is only over the last four decades the field has
obtained an independent academic identity. Now this area of study is
called 'conflict studies', 'peace research' and 'conflict analysis'. It
involves scholars in an interdisciplinary approach to investigate the
causes of conflict, war and violence as well as the problems of
achieving and maintaining a condition of peace. Many of the most
recent attempts to theorise conflict, at least in the Anglo-American
conflict analysis tradition, are based on the notions that conflict as
such is endemic, and that conflict can be functional. It is, thus,
2. Anstee, Margaret, "Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy, A Test Case for U. N. Peacekeeping",
International Relations, Vol. Xl, No. 6, 1993, PP. 495-511. Hamill, James, "Angola's
Road from under the Rubble", The World Today, Vol. 50, No. 1, 1994, pp. 6-11. Patel,
Hasu, "Zimbabwe's Mediation in Mozambique and Angola", in Mediation in Southern
Africa, Stephen Chan and Vivienne Jabri (eds.), London and Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1993, pp. 117-141. Simpson, Chris, "Peace or War?", African Report, Vol. 39, No, 2,
1994, pp. 55-57. United Nations, "The United Nations and the Situation in Angola, May
1991-June 1994", New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1994,
pp. 6-8 and pp. 10-11. Venancio, Moises and Macmillan Carla, "Portuguese Mediation of
the Angolan Conflict in 1990-1991", in Mediation in Southern Africa, Stephen Chan and
Vivienne Jabri (eds.), London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993, pp. 100-116. Iii
Independent, 26 November 1994.
3. Vasquez, John, The War Puzzle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 3.
4. Ross, Marc, The Management of Conflict, interpretations and Interests in Comparative
Perspective, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 2.
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violent conflict behaviour which is a matter of the greatest concern
for scholars in the field.5
Although we may accept the view that conflict is endemic, the
question remains whether human beings are inherently aggressive and
violent. It is often assumed that man 6 was, and still is, tied to the
game of survival in which the "more complacent, lazy, indifferent,
non-aggressive man was less likely to come out alive". 7 The fact that
human beings are capable of cooperation does not, according to this
approach, break the power of the competitive and aggressive drives
inherent in man. The concept of person evident in the view is founded
on a conception of human nature. In fact, every theory and
understanding of conflict includes, often implicit, assumptions of
human nature and 'being'. Moreover, these assumptions and images
shape the types of conflict resolution interventions the theories
suggest. For example, a conflict resolution attempt would look quite
different in the world of 'rational', 'calculating' and 'cost-benefit'
oriented persons than in the world of actors determined by 'irrational
drives'. 8 Thus, one of the most seminal theoretical analyses a
conflict analyst can engage in deals with the images of human 'being'
conflict and conflict resolution theories postulate.
1. THE PURPOSE OF THE THESIS
There has been a growing interest in conflict analysis and resolution
over the past five years. However, it would be an overestimation to
claim that the main impetus of this interest can be found in those on
5. For the development of conflict and peace research see, for example: Lawler, Peter,
"Peace Research and International Relations: From Divergence to Convergence",
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1986, pp. 367-390. Nobel,
Jaap (ed.), The Coming the Aae of Peace Research. Studies in the Development of p
Discipline, Groningen: Styx Publications, 1991. Olson, William and Groom, A.J.R.,
International Relations Then and Now. Ori g ins and Trends in Interpretation, London:
HarperCollins Academic, 1991, pp. 287-296.
6. The unsatisfactory word 'man' refers in this thesis to both women and men.
7. Isard, Walter, Understanding Conflict and the Science of Peace, Cambridge and Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992, p. 2.
•	 8. See: Avruch, Kevin and Black, Peter, "Ideas of Human Nature in Contemporary Conflict
Resolution Theory", Ne gotiatin g Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1990, pp. 221 -228.
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average 50 armed conflicts which have taken place per year during
the period. 9 Rather, the field has witnessed a substantial input from
ex-strategic theorists, military security experts, Sovietologists and
area specialists who now claim to exercise conflict research. 1 0
Thus, it is not a surprise that there is no agreement on the
terminology of international conflict analysis. For example, the term
'problem-solving workshop conflict resolution' has come to denote
any form of cooperative conflict resolution. When the concepts of
'workshop', 'problem-solving workshop' and 'controlled
communication' were introduced to IR in the late 1960s and early
1970s by such scholars as John Burton, Herbert Kelman and Leonard
Doob, they referred to international conflict resolution attempts
which brought together representatives of nations or ethnic groups in
an active conflict. The talks were designed to contribute directly to
the resolution of an international conflict. Now, for example, conflict
resolution training seminars are often confused with problem-solving
workshops. The purpose of a training seminar is to train people in
conflict resolution skills by teaching them theories, approaches and
practices of conflict resolution. 1 1 Although there is an element of
training in problem-solving workshop conflict resolution too, it is
oriented toward carrying out a concrete task, toward the resolution
of a particular conflict.
Problem-solving workshop conflict resolution as a means of
constructive conflict management takes place in problem-solving
workshops which are academically-based unofficial small group
discussions. Workshops bring together representatives of parties in
9. Wallensteen, Peter and Axell, Karin, "Conflict Resolution and the End of the Cold War,
1989-93", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1994, PP. 333-349. An armed
conflict is considered to result in at least 25 battle-related deaths in Wallensteen's and
Axell's data which deals with the period 1989-93.
10. Mitchell, C. R., "Conflict Research", in Contemporary International Relations: A Guide
to Theory, A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), London and New York: Pinter
Publishers, 1994, p. 128.
11. For conflict resolution training seminars and their principles see, for example:
International Alert, "Conflict Resolution and Training in the North Caucasus and Georgia",
a report of the Piatigorsk seminar (June 6-19 1993), London: International Alert,
1993. International Alert, "Conflict Resolution and Training in the North Caucasus and
Georgia", a report of the Nalchik seminar (November 14-27 1993), London:
International Alert, 1993. Rothman, Jay, "Bringing Conflict Resolution to Israel: Model-
Building, Training and Institutionalization", in Practisina Conflict Resolution in Divided
•	 Societies, Jay Rothman (ed.), Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International
Relations, Hebrew University, 1993, Pp. 1-15.
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conflict for direct communication. A panel of scholars which
facilitates and promotes communication between the parties is an
essential part of this type of conflict resolution. However, the role of
the third party differs from that of the traditional mediator. Unlike
many mediators, facilitators do not propose or impose solutions.
Rather, the function of the third party in the problem-solving
workshop is to create an atmosphere where innovative solutions can
emerge out the interaction between the parties themselves. The
objective of the workshop is both to create analytical communication
and to generate inputs into political processes. Although problem-
solving workshop conflict resolution is not meant to be negotiations,
it is often in practice a complementary and parallel process to them.
As mentioned above, John Burton is one of the pioneering scholars and
practitioners of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution, and
his ideas have influenced widely academic works in the field of
conflict and conflict resolution.1 2 His theory of the relationship
between basic human needs and the development of protracted
conflict brought in a set of new issues and evoked a lively theoretical
debate among conflict analysts. 13 Even for scholars who do not share
Burton's enthusiasm for the idea of universal human needs, his
theories or, rather, critiques of them have provided fruitful starting-
points for the development of 'alternative' approaches and issues. 1 4
Burton's contribution to IR and international conflict analysis is not
limited to his version of human needs theory. For example, a variant
of 'world society' approaches owes much to the thought and influence
of Burton. In Burton's world society model the emphasis is put on
transactions to the extent that the basic unit of analysis is
considered to be a set of patterned interactions. It follows, that the
level of analysis (e.g. interstate ) intrastate, individual) varies
12. One of the most recent works clearly influenced by Burton's thinking is: Sandole,
Dennis and van der Merwe, Hugo (eds.), Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice.
Integration and Application, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press,
1993.
13. See, for example: Burton, John (ed.), Conflict: Human Needs Theory, London:
Macmillan, 1990.
14. See, for example: Avruck and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature...". Avruch, Kevin and
Black, Peter, "The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution", Peace and Change, Vol. 16,
No. 1, 1991, pp. 22-45. Merry, S. "Disputing Without Culture", Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 100, No. 8, 1987, pp. 2057-2073.
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according to the issue. 1 5 Similarly, the topic of altering world
environment and the need of governments for adapting policies to
changing circumstances have been largely discussed by Burton. 1 6
Functionalism both at the regional and international level is studied
in many of his works. In Burton's view, functional institutions play a
positive role in conflict resolution. They encourage the growth of
webs of interaction, which expand from specific areas of interests to
political spheres.1 7
This thesis aims at studying John Burton's conflict and conflict
resolution theory and its relationship to his version of human needs
theory. His ideas of these issues are studied from World Society1 8 to
his most recent works. One could postulate a continuity in Burton's
thinking and argue that there is a tentative notion of human needs in
his earlier works too. However, there is a shift from the systemic
framework to the human needs framework which is evident
particularly in Deviance. Terrorism and War. 19 More precisely, a
purpose of the study is to examine the image of human 'being' and
nature underlying Burton's needs theory which forms, as it will be
demonstrated, the very core of his conflict resolution theory during
the period chosen to be studied.
15. See: Burton, John, Systems. States. Diplomacy, and Rules, London: Cambridge
University Press, 1968. Burton, John, World Society, Lanham: University Press of
America, 1987 (originally published Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
Burton, John, "International Relations or World Society?", in Classics in International
Relations, John Vasquez (ed.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990 (2nd ed)
(originally in Burton, John et al., The Study of World Society: A London Perspective,
Pittsburgh: International Studies Association, Occasional Paper No. 1, 1974). See also a
book by a group of scholars which is associated with Burton: Banks, Michael (ed.),
Conflict in World Society. A New Perspective on International Relations, Brighton:
Wheatsheaf, 1984.
16. See: Burton, John, Peace Theory . Preconditions of Disarmament, New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1962. Burton, John, International Relations. A General Theory, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1965. Burton, John, "Conflict as a Function of Change", in
Conflict in Society, Anthony de Reuck and Julie Knight (eds.), London, J. & A. Churchill,
1966, pp. 370-401. Burton, John et al., Britain Between East and West, Aldershot:
Cower Press, 1984.
17. See, for example: Burton, John, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and the United
Nations", Australian Outlook, Vol., 15, No. 1, 1961, pp. 73-87. Burton, John,
"Functionalism and the Resolution of Conflict", in Functionalism. Theory and Practice in
International Relations, A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), London: University of
London Press, 1975, pp. 238-249.
18. Burton, John, World Society, Lanham: University Press of America, 1987
•	 (originally published Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
19. Burton, John, Deviance. Terrorism and War, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.
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Another purpose of the thesis is to identify unexplored and under-
studied areas of problem-solving conflict resolution as a means of
international conflict resolution, and to create an 'alternative'
language for the study of problem-solving workshops. Alfred Schutz's
phenomenology and social constructionist theories of human 'being'
are employed in order both to criticise Burton's views of human
nature and establish a conceptual framework which does not arise
from human needs thinking. By applying phenomenological concepts an
understanding of conflict and conflict resolution can be gained which
differs in many respects from Burton's theories. The most important
point of departure is the fruitful account of culture, which Schutz's
theories, unlike Burton's biologically based views, can provide for
conflict and conflict resolution theory.
William Connolly's description of a 'nontotalist' theory helps to grasp
the aims of the thesis. Connolly writes:
"One might seek, not to impose one reading on the field of
discourse, but to elaborate a general reading that can contend
with others by broadening the established terms of debates;
not to create a transformation of international life grounded in
a universal project, but to contribute to a general perspective
that might support reconstitution of aspects of international
life; not to root a theory in a transcendental ground, but to
problematize the grounding any theory presupposes while it
works out the implications of a particular set of themes; not
merely in invert hierarchies in other theories (a useful task),
but to construct alternative hierarchies that support
modifications in relations between identity and difference."2°
The phenomenological approach introduced in the second part of the
thesis broadens the established terms of problem-solving conflict
resolution theorising which derive mainly from socio-biological,
socio-psychological and psychological discourses. By doing this, it
contributes to a general perspective of conflict resolution which is
an aspect of international life. The approach questions the ground of
Burton's version of human needs theory and its relation to conflict
20. Connolly, William, Identity/Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox,
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991, pp. 56-57.
—7----.
resolution theory by suggesting an 'alternative' image of human
existence. Similarly, it constructs alternative hierarchies (e.g.
society/nature, dialogue/strategic action) and new domains of study
(e.g. socially constructed identity, discursive rationality).
In sum, the purposes of the thesis are:
(1) to study John Burton's conflict resolution theory from ttr
perspective of basic human needs;
(2) to reveal the logic of argument and the image of human
nature and human 'being' underlying his problem-solving
conflict resolution theory;
(3) to suggest a social constructionist view of human
existence and establish a critique of Burton's 'model of man'
from that viewpoint;
(4) to study conflict and conflict resolution in the light the
social constructionist ideas and with the help of the language
they offer, and
(5) to uncover and discuss under-theorised areas of problem-
solving workshop conflict resolution.
An overview of the mediation literature is given in the next chapter
in order to locate problem-solving workshop conflict resolution in
the context of peaceful third party involvement. Points of
convergence and departure between traditional approaches to
mediation and the 'third party consultation model', as problem-
solving workshop conflict resolution is also called, are pointed out.
In that chapter three pilot international problem-solving conflict
resolution approaches are compared and their underlying theoretical
assumptions studied. The third chapter discusses Burton's version of
human needs theory and its relation to his conflict and conflict
resolution theory. The chapter gives examples of human needs
thinkirjg and examines the similarities between these and Burton's
thinking. The logic of Burton's argument is studied by means of
metaphor analysis, by analysing the metaphors which can be found in
his human needs theory. The study of metaphors broadens the area of
discussion to other social sciences and, in particular, to the issues of
political theory.
-8
The fourth chapter studies further the image of human 'being' in
Burton's problem-solving workshop conflict resolution theory. It is
argued that every theory of conflict and conflict resolution includes a
theory of action and a notion of rationality. The chapter examines
Burton's views of action and rationality at the stages of behaviour
outside the workshop context, entry decision and behaviour within
the workshop structure. In other words, it is asked what mode of
behaviour and form of rationality Burton assumes when he explains
conflict and conflict resolution. The chapter studies also what type
of behaviour and rationality Burton considers the facilitator to have.
The summary of the chapter comes out with a model of explanatory
layers included in Burton's conflict resolution theory.
The fifth chapter of the thesis moves into phenomenology. Alfred
Schutz's philosophy is studied in order to develop an alternative
ontological basis and conceptual framework for the study of conflict
and conflict resolution. Burton's biologically based ontology is
challenged by discussing the social construction of reality, needs and
identity. Similarly, culture is given such an account that it can be
placed in the centre of the study of conflict and conflict resolution.
The sixth chapter presents a phenomenological understanding of
conflict and problem-solving conflict resolution. It argues that
problem-solving workshop conflict resolution can be best understood
to be an attempt to find a shared reality between the parties in
conflict. In order to justify the claim, the discussion started in the
previous chapter on relevance structures, typifications and
discursive rationality is continued. In the sixth chapter a great deal
of attention is paid also to the role of the facilitator, and a new




The thesis analyses texts and suggests interpretations of them. Thus,
the method is clearly textual and interpretative. The hermeneutical
question an interpretative approach poses is how to understand texts,
speech, culture or objects 'alien' to us. In addition to the
interpretative approach to read texts, the thesis advances,
particularly in the fifth and sixth chapter, a hermeneutically-
oriented understanding of conflict and conflict resolution.
What is it, then, about an interpretative approach that distinguishes
it from the traditional, positivist-inspired one? One of the main
ideas of the positivist tradition is that of the methodological unity
of science. It is assumed that there is no fundamental difference
between the social world and the natural world; both of them contain
regularities independent of time and place. The ways to conduct
scientific analysis in the natural world are, thus, thought to be
appropriate to the social world too. Interpretative approaches, on the
other hand, start with the understanding that the social world is
partly constituted by human self-interpretation. Human beings are
considered to be fundamentally self-interpreting and self-defining,
who live in the world of cultural meaning. As a consequence, the
object of study of social science must include the interpretations and
definitions of the human subjects whose interaction makes the social
world. Given this object of study, the methods and purposes of social
science are thought to be different from the methods and aims of
natural science. 2 1
21. Neufeld, Mark, "Interpretation and the 'Science' of International Relations, Review
of International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1993, PP. 39-44. For discussions on the
applicability of hermeneutical approaches to lR see, for example: ibid. Hollis, Martin and
Smith, Steve, Explaininçi and Understanding in International Relations, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1991, Pp. 68-91 and PP. 196-216. Price, Richard, "Interpretation and
Disciplinary Orthodoxy in International Relations", Review of International Studies, Vol.
20, No. 2, 1994, pp. 201-204.
—10-
The quest for hermeneutical understanding expressed by
interpretative approaches is not solely epistemological. 22 Rather, it
arises from certain ontological commitments. It is assumed that
human 'being' is a self-interpreting activity. This activity involves an
understanding of what 'being' means, and it is this understanding
which opens a clearing in which human beings can encounter objects,
institutions and other human beings. In other words, "understanding is
the original character of the being of human life itself". 23 Similarly,
so-called hermeneutical circle has an ontological significance. In
other words, the hermeneutical circle of understanding is not a
methodological circle, but implies an ontological structural element
of understanding itself. When interpreting the interpreter must begin
the analysis from within the practices he or she seeks to interpret.
The choice of phenomena to be interpreted is guided by a traditional
understanding of 'being' which has already made the interpreter what
he or she is. Interpretation begins with preconceptions that are
replaced by more suitable ones during the event of understanding.
Thus, understanding is ultimately an interplay between the movement
of tradition and the movement of the interpreter.24
The idea of the hermeneutical circle has been brought from ontology
to epistemological questions, and it has methodological applications
too. From the point of view of the method of this thesis it is
important to consider a text as a work of discourse, which cannot be
reduced to the sentences whereof it is composed. Moreover, it is vital
to recognise that, in the case of the written text, the intention of the
author does not coincide with the meaning of what is written. In
other words, the 'objective' meaning of the text is something other
than the 'subjective' intentions of its author and, therefore, the
problem of the right understanding cannot be solved by a simple
return to the alleged intention of an author. A common mistake when
describing interpretation is to confuse textual meaning with
psychological meaning. However, the text transcends its own socio-
22. The reference is here particularly to Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. For
a summary of their thinking see: Bleicher, Josef, Contemporary Hermeneutics.
Hermeneutics as Method. Philosophy and Critique, London and New York: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 98-103 and pp. 108-127.
23. Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and Method, London: Sheed and Ward, 1979 (2nd ed), p.
230.
24. ibid., pp. 230-240 and p. 261.
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psychological conditions of production and, thereby, opens itself to
an unlimited series of readings. The text, thus, 'decontextualises'
itself in such a way that it can be 'recontextualised' in a new
situation by the act of reading.25
Another feature of the text is that it creates a version of a world or,
rather, it 'makes a world': it does neither reflect nor represent a
world. A world is created by dividing, combining, emphasising,
ordering, deleting, filling in and filling out. Worlds are made not only
by what is said literally but also by what is said metaphorically as
well as what is exemplified and expressed. The 'truth' of a version of
a world produced by a text cannot be defined or tested against 'the
world', for not only do truths differ for different worlds but the
nature of the relationship between a version and a world apart from
it is nebulous. Moreover, the 'truth' of, for example, a theory is but
one special feature and is often overridden in importance by its
cogency, compactness, comprehensiveness, informativeness and
organising power. However, a version may be taken to be 'true'. For
example, within a frame of reference a version appears to be true.
There can also be a convention which takes certain types of versions
to be true.26
Given that the text creates a version of a world, a researcher
participates in a 'world-making' activity. Nelson Goodman describes
scientific	 activities:
"The scientist who supposes that he is single-mindedly
dedicated to the search for truth deceives himself. He is
unconcerned with the trivial truths he could grind out
endlessly; and he looks to the multifaceted and irregular
results of observations for little more than suggestions of
overall structures and significant generalizations. He seeks
system, simplicity, scope; and when satisfied on these scores
25. Ricoeur, Paul, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, John Thompson (ed.),
Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle, Metbourne and Sydney: Cambridge
University Press and Paris: Editions de Ia Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1981, pp.
131-140. Thompson, John, "Editor's Introduction", in Ricoeur, Paul, Hermeneutics and
the Human Sciences, John Thompson (ed.), Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle,
Melbourne and Sydney: Cambridge University Press and Paris: Editions de Ia Maison des
Sciences de l'Homme, 1981, pp. 1-26.
26. Goodman, Nelson, Ways of Woridmakino, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1978, pp. 1-19 and pp. 130-140.
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he tailors truth to fit. He as much decrees as discovers the
laws he sets forth, as much designs as discerns the patterns
he delineates."27
Metaphor participates in making versions of worlds. According to a
'cognitive approach to metaphor', metaphor is essential to human
understanding, and it is a mechanism for creating new meaning.
Language structures what we perceive, how we get around in the
world, and how we relate to other people. In other words, language
plays an important role in defining our everyday realities. Our
conceptual system is, in terms of which we both think and act,
fundamentally metaphorical by nature. Thus, metaphor should not be
thought to be transposing an unusual name. The essence of metaphor
(metaphorical concept) is, rather, "understanding and experiencing
one kind of thing in terms of another". 28 Since metaphor is vital for
understanding, it cannot be avoided in speaking 'objectively' or
'scientifically'.2 9
Such views of metaphor and 'world-making' clearly challenge an
extreme objectivist picture of the world. The extreme objectivist
position claims that there is an objective reality, and that we can
say things that are objectively, absolutely, and unconditionally true
and false about it. Science does not only provide us with a
methodology that allows us to rise above our subjective limitations
and to achieve understanding from an universally valid and unbiased
point of view, but it will, in course of its development, give us also a
correct and general account of reality. According to the objectivist
view, to describe reality correctly we need words whose meanings
are fixed, clear and precise. The ideas of metaphor and 'worlds-
versions' challenge, on the other hand, an extreme subjectivist image
of the world too. The extreme subjectivist position does not
recognise the existence of intersubjective and socially conditioned
frames of reference. The notions of metaphor and 'world-making'
27. ibid., p. 18.
28. Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark, Metaphors We Live By, Chicago and London: The
University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 5.
29. See more on metaphor: ibid. Dirven, René and PaparottO, Wolf, "Introduction", in Iii
• Ubiquity of Metaphor, René Din/en and World Paparotté (eds.), Amsterdam, Philadelphia:
John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1985, pp. vii-xix.
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introduced allow an interpretation according to which the
intersubjective frame of reference constrains the imaginative
understanding of the individual as well as his or her capability of
'creating worlds' and producing new meaning.3°
The act of interpretation culminates in an act of 'appropriation'. The
act of 'appropriation' does not seek to rejoin the original intentions
of the author, but rather to expand the conscious horizon of the
reader by actualising the meaning of the text. The 'distanciation' of
the text from the author is, thus, not abolished by 'appropriation'. On
the contrary, 'appropriation' is understanding at and through distance
which is inevitably between the author and the interpreter. However,
in 'appropriation' we do not impose our meaning to the text. Neither
do we leave ourselves aside. Rather, we use our preconceptions so
that the meaning of the text can be 'made to speak for us': we conjoin
a new discourse to the discourse of the text. Thus, interpretation can
be described to be a conversation with the text in which the horizon
of the interpreter and the horizon of the text amalgamate. 3 1
What is, then, looked for in interpretation? There are several
answers. It is suggested that what is ultimately 'appropriated' in
interpretation is the world the text proposes. 32 It is also thought
that interpretative hermeneutics is a dialogue with past ways of
understanding the world. 33 Anthropologist Clifford Geertz assumes
that the interpretative analysis of culture is an attempt in search of
meaning. 34 It is a search for meaning by sorting out the structures of
signification of the social actors and by determining their social
ground and import. The double task of the interpretative analysis is,
thus, to uncover the conceptual structures that inform actors in a
social world and to provide a vocabulary in which what symbolic
action has to say about itself can be expressed. 'Critical
30. For the objectivist and subjectivist views see: Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live
y, pp. 185-228.
31. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 273 and pp. 326-331. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and th
Human Sciences, pp. 142-144 and pp. 182-193.
32. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. 143.
33. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 431 -447.
34. Geertz, Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays, London: Fontana
Press, 1993, pp. 3-30.
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hermeneutics' 35 , on the other hand, suspects the claims to truth
contained in the text or in the tradition one is inhabiting. It assumes
the existence of 'ideological structures' which produce 'false
consciousness', and aims at criticising, by employing critical
interpretation, the misunderstandings of self and the reality that
give rise to them.
The aim of interpretation in this thesis is moderate. The purpose is
not to uncover the deep-structures of a tradition. Neither is it
thought to be a conversation with past understandings for the truth
they contain. The aim is, rather, to study the logic and underlying
assumptions of Burton's texts. The analysis of metaphors, carried out
in the third chapter, is considered to be one means of actualising this
type of research orientation. Interpretation means also linking the
texts with wider theoretical discussions. These are assumed both to
locate Burton's work in traditions of thinking and give new
perspectives. The interpretative approach used to understand the
texts of Schutz and 'social constructionists' is more instrumental.
Indeed, it includes interpretation, but it is employed in order to
construct a conceptual framework which is an alternative to the
framework suggested by Burton.
It should be emphasised that there are other ways of conducting
interpretative research. There are three approaches with which the
approach employed in this thesis should not be confused, namely,
'biographical', 'contextual' and 'critical' reconstruction. 'Biographical
reconstruction' aims at understanding the intended meaning of the
author, 'what the author said and meant', by constructing the
biographical and historical details of the author in relation to his or
her texts. As mentioned, this thesis takes a suspicious stance toward
the possibility and fruitfulness of this kind of approach. 'Contextual
reconstruction' 36 , on the other hand, sees the precondition for
understanding to be in an intellectual and social context within which
the text should be placed. In other words, it is assumed that past
35. Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics, pp. 143-174.
36. on 'contextual reconstruction' and particularly on R. C. Collingwood, W. C. Greenleaf
and Q. Skinner see: Lockyer, Andrew, "Traditions' as Context in the History of Political
Theory", Political Studies, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, 1979, pp. 201 -217.
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ideas should be studied in their historical contexts, in the context of
the circumstances in which they were written.
R. B. J. Walker's way to read Machiavelli exemplifies 'critical
reconstruction'. He challenges the way Machiavelli has come to
symbolise what the tradition of international theory is all about.
Walker argues that "Machiavelli can be read in ways that
problematise the most basic assumptions on which claims about the
tradition are based".37 For him, Machiavelli poses questions about
political community and practice that may still be pursued even
though Machiavelli's answers expose limited historical and
conceptual horizons. Walker's aim is not to make a claim about 'what
Machiavelli really said' nor to present an ahistorical reading of a
historical problematic. It is, rather, to identify some of the
discursive practices that have "turned a historical problematic into a
historical apology for the violence of the present" 38 and use
references to a tradition as a 'source of critical opportunity'.39
Neither should the interpretative approach employed in the thesis be
confused with semiotic research. There is a great diversity in the
current research of semiotics, but there is an agreement that
semiotics studies systems of signs. Several writers agree also with
C. S. Peirce's definition that a sign is something which stands to
somebody for something in some respect and capacity. Not only are
words signs, but also gestures, images, non-linguistic sounds, etc.
Some authors think that what semiotics has discovered is the fact
that there is a general social law, that this law is the symbolic
dimension which is given in language and that every social practice
offers a special expression of that. Semiotics suggests ways of
interpreting and, therefore, its basic ideology does not differ from
that of hermeneutics. However, semiotic research includes often
detailed, and almost technical, analyses of, for example, texts, in
which hermeneutical reading does not necessarily engage.4°
37. Walker, Fl. B. J., Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory,
Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, P. 31.
38. ibid., p. 31.
39. ibid., pp. 30-31.
40. See, for example: Sebeok, Thomas (ed.), The Tell-Tale Sign. A Survey of Semiotics,
Lisse: The Peter de Ridder Press, 1975.
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In sum, the method employed in the thesis is interpretative, and it
derives from the hermeneutical tradition. There are five main
assumptions underlying the approach. What is said about Burton's
texts applies to other authors too.
(1) John Burton is not considered to be a biographical person
whose intentions the author of this thesis is interested in. In
other words, the thesis is not an intellectual history of Burton.
(2) Burton's text are works of discourse.
(3) As works of discourse they create versions of worlds and
'distance' themselves from the intentions of the author.
(4) As an interpreter the author of this thesis approaches the
texts through her foremeanings and horizons of understanding.
However, these are bound to change in a hermeneutical circle
during the event of understanding.
(5) The analysis of metaphors is one means of conducting the
interpretative analysis which reveals the underlying logic and
assumptions of Burton's texts.
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CHAPTER II: PROBLEM-SOLVING AS A FORM OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
As Morton Deutsch maintains, there are two orientations to conflict
resolution: competitive and cooperative. According to him, these
orientations can be seen as a continuum with competitive on one end
and cooperative on the other. Within the continuum there are such
modes of conflict resolution as the use of deadly force (actual or
threatened), litigation, adjudication, arbitration, conciliation,
traditional mediation, facilitated problem-solving and unfacilitated
problem-solving. The continuum can be also conceptualised by
claiming that there are three procedures for dealing with opposing
preferences, namely, struggle, mediation and negotiation1
This chapter studies the cooperative end of the continuum and, more
precisely, the modes of international conflict resolution which
include third party intermediary activities. The scope is further
narrowed down to traditional mediation and facilitated problem-
so'ving. In the first part of this chapter an overview of the mediation
literature is given. The literature is reviewed from the point of view
of authors and seminal texts, not so much from the viewpoint of
issue areas. The main aim is to place the so-called 'third party
consultation model' into a wider context of mediation approaches.
Some new and alternative ways to study third party activities are
also introduced in order to locate this thesis among them. The
chapter moves, then, from this overview to a more detailed
discussion by comparing three pilot problem-solving workshop
approaches. It should be emphasised, that the comparison includes
only the pilot attempts. After those first workshops there have been
1. Deutsch, Morton, "Conflict and Its Resolution' in Conflict Resolution: Contributions of
the Behavioral Sciences, Clagett Smith (ed.), London: University of Notre Dame Press,
1971, PP. 39-49. See also: Carnevale, Peter and Pruitt, Dean, "Negotiation and
Mediation", Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 43, 1992, p. 532. Sandole, Dennis,
"Introduction", in Conflict Management and Problem Solving: From Interpersonal to
International Applications, Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.), London:
Frances Pinter, 1987, p. 3.
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several others (e.g. Edward Azar's 2 , A. M. Levi's and A. Benjamin's3,
Jay Rothman's4 and Berghof Research Centre's5 attempts) which are
not studied. In the last part of the chapter general philosophical and
theoretical .features which are common particularly to the pilot
international problem-solving conflict resolution approaches are
pointed out.
1. PEACEFUL THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION AS A FORM OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION
1. 1. Third party intermediary intervention
Third party activity has become the focus of an extensive amount of
scholarly literature. 6 Concepts and definitions vary a lot in the field.
Some guidelines for a reader could help him or her to see a text on
peaceful third party intervention in wider theoretical contexts and
debates of International Relations as weti as of conflict analysis. One
clue is the identification of the underlying theory of conflict. For
example, if conflict is defined as a subjective phenomenon, then
conflict resolution needs to be defined as a process which deals with
subjective elements, i.e. perceptions, attitudes and images. In this
view, third party roles are justified by third party activities which
aim at perceptual and attitudinal changes. An objectivist definition
of conflict, on the other hand, generates an idea of structural changes
as a precondition for termination of violent conflict. The
empowerment of a weaker party, which may take place in a mediation
2. Azar, Edward, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Aldershot: Dartmouth,
1 990.
3. Levi, A. M. and Benjamin, A., "Jews and Arabs Rehearse Geneva: A Model of Conflict
Resolution", Human Relations, Vol. 29, No. 11, 1976, PP. 1035-44.
4. Rothman, "Bringing Conflict Resolution...", pp. 1-15.
5. Berghof Research Center in Berlin organises problem-solving workshops on conflicts
in Eastern Europe. A private communication with the head of the institute Dr. Norbert
Ropers, July 1994.
6. For a bibliography see: Lakos, Amos, International Neaotiations: A Bibliography,
Boulder, London: Wesiview Press, 1989. See also: Journal of Social Issues, Special Issue
on the Mediation of Social Conflict, Kenneth Kressel and Dean Pruitt (eds.), Vol. 41, No.
2, 1985. Journal of Peace Research, Special Issue on International Mediation, Jacob
Bercovitch (ed.), Vol. 28, No. 1, 1991.
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process, is seen to provide a means of creating such preconditions.7
It can be also maintained that both psychocultural (subjective) and
structural factors are critical in shaping the level of conflict and
violence and in defining who the opponents will be. According to this
view, a successful conflict resolution process needs to address both
aspects.8
The identification of the assumed paradigmatic 9 context of third
party intervention may also help to understand the mediation
literature. For example, K. J. Hoisti criticises the ideology of
mediation, because it often forgets the reality of power politics.
According to him, there are conflicts which derive from great
ideological forces and which aim, for example, at the creation of
nations and states. Hoisti claims that these conflicts cannot be
settled "through the technical quick fixes of mediators and
conciliators". 1 ° Similarly, I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval
create a framework of cost-benefit calculations and power politics
"by taking mediation out of the realm of idealism and by bridging the
distinction between the 'disinterested faci'itator' and the 'interested
manipulator".1 1 Thus, Holsti as well as Zartman and Touval refer to
the paradigm of power politics as a legitimate general framework for
the study of third party mediation. John Burton, on the other hand,
7. For the subjectivistic and objectivistic definitions of conflict see: Mitchell, C. R.,
Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role, Westmead: Gower, 1981, PP. 12-42. Webb,
Keith, "Structural Violence and Definition of Conflict", in World Encyclopaedia of Peace,
Vol. 2, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986, pp. 431-434. For a strong objectivist argument
see: Schmidt, Herman, "Peace Research and Politics", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 5,
No. 3, 1968, pp. 217-232. For a discussion about empowerment see: Groom, A. J. R. and
Webb, Keith, "Injustice, Empowerment, and Facilitation in Conflict", International
Interactions, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1987, pp. 263-280.
8. Ross, The Management of Conflict, p. ix and p. 116.
9. There seemed to be a consensus on the existence of three competing paradigms in
International Relations (lR). However, this consensus has be challenged by post-
structural approaches to IR. For a traditional account see: Banks, Michael, "The Evolution
of International Relations Theory", in Conflict in World Society. A new perspective on
injern pti pn pl relations, Michael Banks (ed.), Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984, pp. 3-21. For
a post-modern point of view see: George, Jim, "International Relations and the Search for
Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate", nternationaI Studies Quarterly, Vol.
33, No. 3, 1989, pp. 269-279.
10. Holsti, K. J. , "Paths to Peace? Theories of Conflict Resolution and Realities in
International Politics", in International Conflict Resolution, Ramesh Thakur (ed.),
Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1988, p. 114.
11. Zartman, I. William and Touval, Saadia, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution
and Power Politics", Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1985, p. 43.
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employs the frame of cooperation. According to Burton, strategies of
conflict settlement inherent in power politics merely treat
symptoms of conflict rather than sources. In his view, the real
sources of conflict are dealt with in facilitated problem-solving
workshops. 1 2
Studies on third party intermediary intervention can be categorised
in several ways. The approaches do not exclude each other, and yet
they offer different starting points for theorising. Such writings as
Oran Young's Intermediaries. Third Parties in International Crisis1 3
and "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts" 14 study and theorise third
party interventions from the point of view of intermediary activities.
Young defines intermediary intervention to be "any action taken by an
actor that is not directly party to the crisis, that is designed to
reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining
relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis
itself". 15 The 'intermediary activities' approach leads Young to study
extensively third party tactics and identity. Since his work has
largely set the agenda of mediation studies, these questions still
dominate theoretical discussions about mediation. 1 6
There is also a body of literature which deals with international
conflict resolution in general, and places pacific third party
activities among other forms of conflict resolution. Examples of the
'general conflict resolution' approach include such writers as Paul
Wehr, Adam Curie and K. J. Holsti. Paul Wehr's Conflict Regulation1 7
discusses origins of conflict and models of conflict regulation.
According to Wehr, third party intervention is one form of conflict
12. Burton, John and Dukes, Frank, Ccrnflict: Practices in Management. Settlement &
Resolution, London: Macmillan, 1990, P. 9. Burton, John, "The Means to Agreement:
Power or Values?", in Perspectives on Negotiation. Four Case Studies and Interpretations,
Diane Bendahmane and John McDonald, Jr. (eds.), Center for the Study of Foreign
Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1986, pp. 229-241.
13. Young, Oran, The Intermediaries. Third Parties in International Crisis, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1 967.
14. Young, Oran, "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts", Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1972, pp. 51-65.
15. Young, The Intermediaries, p. 34.
16. On the 'intermediary activities' approach see also: Carnevale and Pruitt, "Negotiation
and Mediation", pp. 563-566.
17. Wehr, Paul, Conflict Regulation, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, pp. 28-
43.
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resolution among legal regulation, the deterrence model and
bargaining and negotiation. Adam Curie's Making Peace 1 8, on the other
hand, considers third party conciliation to be an element of peace
making. Curie distinguishes psychological settlement from material.
Conciliation deals primarily with subjective elements of conflict and
leads to psychological settlement, whereas bargaining is needed for
material settlement. K. J. Holsti claims that the purpose of pacific
third party intervention is in the realm of conflict abatement or war-
avoidance rather than conflict resolution. 1 9
A large amount of literature considers pacific third party
interventions to be a part of negotiation processes. Fred lklé's
seminal text How Nations Negotiate20 establishes bases for further
theorising, although it does not explicitly deal with third party
intermediary interventions. lklé defines negotiation as a "process in
which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose
of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realisation of a
common interest where conflicting interests are present".2 1
Following Iklè's definition of negotiation, Thomas Colosi argues that
mediation is simply an extension of the negotiation process. He
maintains that effective mediators rely on the same tools as
effective negotiators, namely, the creation and maintenance of
doubt. 22 Similarly, Peter Carnevale and Dean Pruitt see mediation to
be a "variation on negotiation in which one or more outsiders ('third
parties') assist the parties in their discussion".23 Jacob Bercovitch
states that "mediation is the continuation of negotiations by other
means".24
18. CurIe, Adam, Making Peace, London: Tavistock Publications, 1971, PP. 177-180.
19. Holsti, "Paths to Peace?", p. 111 and p. 114.
20. lklO, Fred, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper & Row, 1964 (reprinted
1985).
21. ibid., pp. 3-4.
22. Colosi, Thomas, "A Model for Negotiation and Mediation" in International Negotiation.
Art and Science, Diane Bendahmane and John McDonald, Jr. (eds.), Center for the Study of
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1984, p. 25. See
also: Druckman, Daniel, "Four Cases of Conflict Management: Lessons Learned", in
Perspectives on Ne gotiation. Four Case Studies and Interpretations, Diane Bendabmane
and John McDonald, Jr. (eds.), Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service
Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1986, PP. 263-288.
23. Carnevale and Pruitt, "Negotiation and Mediation", p. 532.
24. Bercovitch, Jacob, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International
Relations", in Mediation in International Relations. Multiple Approaches to Conflict
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Within the 'negotiation' approach, Zartman and Touval claim that
"mediation is a form of third-party intervention in a conflict with
the stated purpose of contributing to its abatement or resolution
through negotiation". 25 According to them, a mediator transforms the
bargaining structure from a dyad into a triad by promoting his or her
own interests. In the negotiation triad the mediator is accepted by
the parties not because of his or her neutrality but because of his or
her ability to produce an attractive outcome. 26 On the basis of
Zartman's and Touval's argument the notion of 'biased mediation' has
been developed. Especially Touval's article "Biased Intermediaries:
Theoretical and Historical Considerations" 27 has paved the way to
the recognition of the concept. For example, Vivienne Jabri uses and
develops the concept further in her study on the involvement of the
Western Contact Group in the conflict over Namibia.28
A subgroup of the negotiation approach can be found in 'cognitive'
approaches to negotiation. Daniel Druckman's texts exemplify the
approach where perceptions and information-processing procedures
of negotiators are discussed. Transferred to the study of mediation,
the cognitive approach is interested, for example, in the importance
of positive sentiments and enhanced understanding for willingness to
compromise in facilitated problem-solving workshops. Similarly, it
focuses on the conditions that lead to cooperation or competition and
their relation to the outcomes of mediation processes. 29 The
Manag ement, Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Rubin (eds.), Basirigstoke and London:
Macmillan Press, 1992, p. 3.
25. Zartman and Touval, "International Mediation: Conflict...", p. 31.
26. Touval, Saadia and Zartman, I. William, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory", in
International Mediation in Theory and Practice, Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman
(eds.), Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1985, p. 10. Zartman, I. William and Touval,
Saadia, "Conclusion: Mediation in Theory and Practice", in International Mediation in
Theory and Practice, Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman (eds.), Boulder, London:
Westview Press, 1985, pp. 255-256.
27. Touval, Saadia, "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations",
The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1975, pp. 51-69.
28. Jabri, Vivienne, "The Western Contact Group as Intermediary in the Conflict over
Namibia", in New Approaches to International Mediation, C. R. Mitchell and K. Webb
(eds.), Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 102-130. Jabri, Vivienne, Mediating
Conflict. Decision-Makin g and Western Intervention in Namibia, Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1990.
29. Druckman, Daniel, "Four Cases of Conflict Management...", pp. 263-288. Druckman,
Daniel, "An Analytical Research Agenda for Conflict and Conflict Resolution", in Conflict
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cognitive approaches have some points of convergence with 'social-
psychological' approaches, which, however, differ by placing the
emphasis on social interaction rather than cognitions of individual
actors.3°
Two other approaches to peaceful third party intervention can be
pointed out: a 'legal-normative' approach and a 'historical' approach.
The legal-normative approach studies peaceful third party
interventions in the context of international law. The basic
assumption is that international law works as a normative
framework for relationships between state actors. According to this
view, international negotiations and mediation can be most fruitfully
studied by using the normative framework. 31 The historical approach
studies mediation through historical case studies. An example is
Jean-Pierre Cot's International Conciliation 32 which offers detailed
case studies on bilateral conciliation and conciliation in
international organisations.
The legal-normative and historical approaches have different
epistemological foundations from the three approaches introduced
first. Although they establish some theoretical categories, they do
not aim at universal theorising. The historical approach will possibly
Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application, Dennis Sandole and Hugo van
der Merwe (eds.), Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993, pp.
25-42. Druckman, Daniel and Broome, Benjamin, "Value Differences and Conflict
Resolution, Familiarity or Liking?", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 4,
1991, pp. 571-593.
30. For the key notions of the social-psychological understanding of conflict and conflict
resolution see a summary: Deutsch, Morton, "Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution:
Psychological, Social and Cultural Influences", in New Directions in Conflict Theory.
Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, Raimo Vayrynen (ed.), London, Newbury
Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991, pp. 28-29. See also: Volkan, Vamik,
Montville, Joseph and Julius, Demetrios (eds.), The Psychodynamics of International
Relationships, Vol. 2, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991. Since many of the
problem-solving approaches of conflict resolution largely derive from social-
psychology, the elements of this approach will be discussed later in the chapter.
31. See, for example: Lachs, Manfred, "International Law, Mediation, and Negotiation", in
Multilateral Negotiations and Mediation. Instruments and Methods, Arthur Lall (ed.), New
York: Pergamon Press, 1985, pp. 185-195. Luard, Evan (ed.), The International
Regulation of Frontier Disputes, London: Thames and Hudson, 1970. von Mangoldt, Hans,
"Arbitration and Conciliation" in Judicial Settlement of International Disputes,
Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law, 1974, pp. 417-552.
32. Cot, Jean-Pierre, International Conciliation, London: Europa Publications, 1968.
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get more attention in the field of mediation studies. New post-
structural studies on international relations employ genealogical
methods and can be seen to be, thereby, 'historical'. 33 Most of the
studies under the categories of 'intermediary actions', 'general
conflict resolution theory' and 'negotiation', on the other hand,
proceed from hypotheses building to hypotheses illustration through
case studies.
All three main approaches to third party intermediary intervention
introduced discuss extensively third party roles, functions, qualities
and resources. The issues will be briefly examined in the next part
before moving to 'alternative and new' approaches.
1. 2. Third party: roles, functions, qualities and resources34
Deutsch's continuum of the orientations of conflict resolution can be
related to third party roles and functions. Roles and functions are
then considered to vary from active to passive. The third party can
involve in conflict actively by using deadly force, whereas the third
party facilitative role in the problem-solving workshop can be seen
to be passive. Although the dichotomy of active and passive third
party roles is entertained by many theorists, a simple postulation of
the continuum is highly problematic and has got only a heuristic
value. It is problematic, because it does not take into account the
context of third party activities. For example, in a stalemate
situation good offices carried out by a third party may prove to be
extremely 'active' action.
33. A sign of an interest in genealogy and in its 'historical' and interlextual methods is
James Der Derian's, On Diplomacy. A Genealogy of Western Estrangement, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1987. See also: Cobb, Sara and Rifkin, Janet, "Practice and Paradox:
Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation", Law and Social Inquiry - Journal of the
American Bar Foundation, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1991, pp. 35-62.
34. This part is written only from the point of view of the third party. However,
mediation can be considered as a process, where such topics as mediation tactics,
strategies, stages, objectives, procedures and outcomes are dependent on each other. For
an extensive account of these topics see: Moore, Christopher, The Mediation Process.
Practical Strateg ies for Resolving Conflict, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers,
1991.
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Several examples of the implicit use of the active/passive
distinction can be found in the mediation literature. Young
distinguishes between third parties which impose a settlement on
the original parties and intermediaries which facilitate a
settlement. 35 Zartman's36 and Laue's37 categorisations of roles
coincide with Young's categories. Zartman claims that there are
basically three third party roles, namely, manipulator, formulator,
and communicator, whereas Laue argues that there are five roles,
namely, activist, advocate, mediator, researcher, and enforcer.
Laue considers the roles to be founded predominantly on the base and
credibility of the intervenor. Thus, such questions as, whom does the
intervenor work for, who pays him or her, and consequently what are
the structured expectations for behaviour of the intervenor in that
role are vital in evaluating intermediary actions. According to Laue,
the role of an activist is characterised by organisational base and
relationship with at least one of the parties. The activist works
extremely closely with the parties and becomes almost one of them.
The role of an advocate, on the other hand, is based on an advbcation
of certain values and parties within the organisation. The role of a
mediator derives from the advocation of processes and interactions,
rather than any of the parties per se or of any particular outcomes.
The category of researcher includes such professionals as journalists
and social science researchers. At the active end of Laue's continuum,
the enforcer has formal power to sanction either or all of the
parties.3 8
The role of a communicator in Zartman's account coincides with the
role of a mediator in Laue's list. The communicator, like the
mediator, is interested in developing a process where parties can
35. Young, "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts", p. 52. See also: Touval, "Biased
Intermediaries: Theoretical...", p. 52.
36. Touval and Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in...", pp. 11-13. Zartman, I. William,
"Alternative Attempts at Crisis Management: Concepts and Processes", in New Issues in
International Crisis Management, Gilbert Winham (ed.), Boulder, London: Westview
Press, 1988, pp. 218-219.
37. Laue, James, "The Emergence and Institutionalisation of Third Party Roles in
Conflict", in Conflict Manaoement and Problem Solvin g : Interpersonal to International
Applications, Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.), London: Frances Pinter,
1987, pp. 26-28.
38. ibid., pp. 26-28.
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achieve at least some of their goals. 39 In Jeffrey Rubin's
terminology, the third party occupies a process-oriented role, i.e., the
third party is likely to do whatever is necessary in order to help the
principles to take charge of their own conflict.40 Zartman considers
the role of the communicator to be passive. A formulator who
redefines the issues in conflict or finds a format for its resolution
behaves more actively. Moreover, in Zartman's view, in some
situations a third party may have to use his or her position and other
available resources to manipulate the parties into agreement. The
third party as a manipulator may pressure or help the parties to
create a stalemate by strengthening the weaker or threatening the
stronger. 41 The third party acting as a manipulator can also be seen
to act as an enforcer, who occupies a directive and content-oriented
role. 42 If it is assumed that a conflict has a natural life-cycle, it is
justified to claim that during the cycle there can be many mediators
fulfilling a range of roles.4 3
The functions of intermediaries are closely related to roles. In sum,
third party functions include the facilitation of communication
between the parties and influencing parties towards changing their
positions in order to make agreement possible. By clarifying the
issues in conflict, by helping the parties to withdraw from
commitments, by reducing the cost of concessions and by offering
compromise formulae and substantive proposals, the intermediary
provides a framework within which concessions become possible.44
When the third party involvement is seen from the point of view of a
39. Touval and Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in...", pp. 10-11. Zartman,
"Alternative Attempts at...", pp. 218-219.
40. Rubin, Jeffrey, "Introduction", in Dynamics of Third Party Intervention. Kissinger
in the Middle East, Jeffrey Rubin (ed.), New York: Praeger, 1981, pp. 13-17. Pruitt,
Dean and Rubin, Jeffrey, Social Conflict. Escalation. Stalemate. and Settlement, New York:
Random House, 1986, pp. 166-169. For the notions of process intervention and content
intervention see: Bercovitch, Jacob, Social Conflicts and Third Parties. Strate g ies of
Conflict Resolution, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, pp. 121-142.
41. Touval and Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in...", p. 12. Zartman, "Alternative
Attempts at...", pp. 218-219.
42. Rubin, "Introduction", pp. 13-17. Pruitt and Rubin, Social Conflict. Escalation..., pp.
168-169. Louis Kriesberg lists four intermediary roles, namely, enforcer, fact finder,
trainer, and mediator. Kriesberg, Louis, Social Conflicts, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1982 (2nd ed), pp. 266-270.
43. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity...", p. 15.
44. Jabri, Mediatin g Conflict. Decision-Makin g and..., p. 8.
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negotiation process which changes a negotiation dyad into a triad,
such additional third party functions as bargaining and making
concessions emerge.
A part of the mediation literature suggests that the qualities of the
third party imply the acceptability of intermediary activities. Young
lists two basic qualities: impartiality and independence. He defines
both to be perceived qualities. An intermediary is independent when
he or she is perceived to be free from attachment to or dependence on
a political entity that has a stake in the outcome of the crisis at
hand. 45 The question of impartiality as it relates to the issue of
acceptance is contested by Touval. She claims that the "theory of the
impartial intermediary seems to be incompatible with historical
evidence of intermediaries who were considered 'biased' by at least
one of the parties, but were nevertheless accepted". 46 Touval's
observation has expanded the area of theorising from the roles,
functions and qualities of the intermediary to motivations, interests,
and three-cornered bargaining processes.47
Following the research agenda set by Young, several writers suggest
desirable third party attributes and characteristics. For example,
Bercovitch mentions such attributes as patience; sincerity;
friendliness; sensitivity; capability to accept others, to be non-
judgmental and to control self; compassion; and tactfulness. 48 In a
similar vein, C. R. Mitchell claims that salient third party qualities
include a high degree of professionalism and personal expertise, a
high level of independence from the case of conflict being considered,
and a lack of any formal and recognised political position. 49 Some
texts, on the other hand, shift the attention from qualities to
resources and maintain that the control of resources is a major
factor which contributes to the ability of the mediator to achieve a
favourable outcome or desired objectives. For example, Bercovitch
argues that the use of resources affects mediation strategy and
45. Young, The Intermediaries, pp. 81-83.
46. Touval, "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical..." p. 51.
47. For an expanded agenda see: C. R. Mitchell and K. Webb (eds.), New Approaches to
International Mediation, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1988.
48. Bercovitch, Social Conflicts and Third Parties, p. 53.
49. Mitchell, Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role, p. 120.
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behaviour as well as the course and likely outcomes of mediation.
Resources may include money, status, expertise and prestige.5°
A clue which helps to put the variety of definitions in a wider
context is the recognition that the traditional theorising on third
party roles, functions, qualities and resources is influenced by the
system-functional type of analysis. It is influenced in the sense that
the conflicting parties and the third party are considered to form a
system where the third party functions are understood as the
activities of an agent accomplishing a purpose within the system.
Third party roles, on the other hand, represent the behaviour expected
of the occupant of a given position or status in the system. Roles are
characterised by certain qualities and activities, and they change
according to changes in the system.
1. 3. Model of third party consultation
The fourth main approach to third party intermediary activities can
be found in problem-solving conflict resolution. Its roots are largely
in social-psychology which emphasises the relationships and
interactions between individuals, small groups and societies. The
'third party consultation model', as Ronald Fisher and Loraleigh
Keashly call the approach, is a distinctive approach from the
approaches introduced above and it can be seen to be an attempt to
create an alternative theoretical discourse on conflict resolution.
Fisher and Keashly do subsume various developments under the model
of third party consultation, but they particularly refer to such
writers as John Burton, Leonard Doob and Herbert Ketman.51
Despite the attempt to create an alternative discourse, the third
party consultation model overlaps with the traditional mediation
approaches introduced earlier, namely the 'intermediary actions',
'general conflict resolution theory' and 'negotiation' approaches. The
intermediary actions approach generates studies on third party
50. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity...", pp. 19-21.
51. Fisher, Ronald and Keashly, Loraleigh, "The Potential Complementarity of Mediation
and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention", Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1991, p. 29.
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tactics and identity, which are also central themes in the third party
consultation model. For example, John Burton's ResolvinQ Deep-Rooted
Conflict. A Handbook 52 is devoted to these questions. Seen from the
point of view of the general conflict resolution theory approach,
problem-solving approaches include or aim at developing a general
conflict and conflict resolution theory. However, distinctions from
the general conflict resolution theory approach are pointed out, for
example, by clarifying the terminology. It is claimed in the third
party consultation model that the terms 'settlement', 'management'
and 'regulation' refer to short-term so'utions. These processes may
be appropriate for those cases in which authoritative determinations
are required in order to preserve social norms, whereas resolution
processes are appropriate when any in-depth analysis of behaviours
and relationships is required.53
The third party consultation model does not accept the idea of a
three-cornered negotiation system as an adequate means for conflict
resolution. It is argued that negotiation processes and outcomes
reflect the relative power of the parties and, therefore, while there
may be a settlement, it is likely to be short-lived as it rests on
power relationships remaining static. 54 Similarly, the legal-
normative approach is rejected, because it is seen to be based on
historical and elite norms which do not reflect norms based on the
real needs of the individual.55
The third party consultation model discusses widely third party
roles, functions and qualities. In terms of third party roles, problem-
solving approaches support passive roles. They use the terms
'facilitator' and 'consultant' to refer to a panel which "seeks to help
the parties arrive at a common definition of their relationship, define
their separate goals clearly, and through facilitated analysis,
52. Burton, John, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict. A Handbook, Lanham: University Press
of America, 1 987.
53. Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Management..., p. 4.
54. Burton, John, Conflict: Resolulion and Provention, London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 191.
Kelman, Herbert, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner", in Mediation in
International Relations. Multiple Approaches to Conflict Manacement, Jacob Bercovitch
and Jeffrey Rubin (eds.), Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 1992, pp. 67-68.
55. Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Management..., p. 90.
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discover options which meet the needs of all". 56 The definition
comes close to Zartman's communicator and Laue's mediator which
are both characterised by process-oriented interests. Some writers
also emphasise the capacity of the facilitator to act as a trainer who
assists conflicting parties to learn to analyse their views about the
conflict and conflict resolution.
Mitchell gives the facilitator four basic functions. According to him,
one of the most important functions is simply to induce initially, and
then sustain a sufficiently high level of positive motivation from
both parties to confront their conflict with a problem-solving
attitude. Having established a sufficient level of motivation to
participate in a consultative programme, the next function is the
improvement of the communication between adversaries. The third
key function is to regulate in some manner the interaction between
the participants. The final function, which in all consultative
techniques is regarded as a central third party activity, is helping the
participants to diagnose their conflict.57
Fisher summarises third party qualities in the third party consultant
model by claiming that the third party has to have professional and
personal expertise, professional knowledge regarding conflict,
moderate knowledge regarding parties and their relationship, low
power over parties, control over the situation, and he or she has to be
impartiaL 58 These qualities differ clearly from the qualities of the
biased mediator in the mediated negotiation system. In the system
the mediator has something at stake in the negotiation process and
is, therefore, inclined to use power to control the situation.
Moreover, the mediator in the negotiation triad is not and does not
necessarily need to be perceived to be impartial. Fisher's summary
also hints at the source of the resources the facilitator possesses in
56. Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, p. 7.
57. Mitchell, Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role, pp. 122-1 28.
58. Fisher, Ronald, "Third Party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of
Conflict', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1972, p. 73.
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the problem-solving workshop: the resources derive mainly from his
or her professional knowledge and expertise.59
The third party consultation model can be summarised by identifying
some of its theoretical roots. Most importantly, the model relies on
the cooperative tradition in the study of peace and war and, thus,
rejects the power tradition. 6 ° Although many problem-solving
approaches challenge the legal-normative approach to conflict
resolution, a strong normative element can be found in them. Their
normativity does not arise from international law and its rule-
oriented ethics, it, rather, arises from the commitment to peace. This
commitment to peace, which is analogous to the commitment of the
medical profession to the value of health, leads to an utilitarian, or,
rather, instrumental and pragmatic relation to knowledge. In other
words, it is thought that knowledge drawn from all social sciences
should be fully utilised to deal with the intractable problems of the
contemporary world. Knowledge and theory are seen to have an
intimate as well as instrumental connection to reality.
1. 4. New approaches to conflict resolution and mediation
Even if we accept the view that the approaches to third party
intermediary interventions introduced set the agenda for academic
studies on mediation, and that the third party consultation model
tries to challenge the traditional agenda, still there are studies
which cannot be reduced to these categories. There are studies which
are different because they are founded on alternative, and often
sophisticatedly articulated, views of the nature of reality. At least
four types of approaches can be identified from the mediation
literature on the basis of their ontological claims. There are studies
which emphasise (1) the complexity, (2) the cultural constitution, (3)
the gendered nature or (4) the social and discursive construction of
59. See also: Banks, Michael and Mitchell, C. R., The Resolution of Conflict. A Handbook on
the Analytical Problem Solvin g Approach, Fairfax, Virginia: George Mason University,
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 1993, pp. 95-97.
60. See: Lawler, "Peace Research and International Relations". Smith, Steve, "Paradigm
Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a
Social Science", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1987, pp.
189-206.
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reality. Some of these approaches reflect the 'third debate' of IR
which challenges the positivist and foundationalist views of social
sciences and stresses social, historical, cultural and linguistic
constituents of knowledge and reality. Some, on the other hand, rely
on older philosophical views, but fruitfully transfer them from
philosophy to the field of mediation studies.
(1) The view which notes the complex nature of reality contributes to
the mediation literature by suggesting models to analyse dynamic and
changing conflict and conflict resolution processes. There are older
attempts of model-building (e.g. James Wall's 'mediation paradigm' 6 1
and Jacob Bercovitch's 'social-psychological framework for the
analysis of international mediation' 62 ) as well as more recent ones.
Among the new attempts Fisher's and Keashly's 'contingency model'
considers social conflicts to be processes which create opportunities
for different third party interventions. In the model they postulate
four stages of conflict escalation and claim that different
management and intervention strategies would be appropriate and
effective at different points.63 Similarly, Bercovitch suggests a
complex 'framework for the analysis of mediation strategy and
behaviour'. 64 Mitchell's process model bears some resemblance to the
contingency approach developed by Fisher and Keashly. Mitchell,
however, argues that "that some of the 'consultation', 'mediation', or
'coercive intervention' functions might well be carried out
concurrently by different third parties", not solely by single
institutions as Fisher and Keashly seem to argue.65
(2) Several writers desire to demonstrate the importance of culture
in conflict arid conflict resolution. Their texts differ from the
traditional mediation studies, because they do not consider culture to
be a secondary variable which influences conflictual and cooperative
61. Wall, James, Jr., "Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research", Journal
of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1981, pp. 157-180.
62. Bercovitch, Jacob, "A Case Study of Mediation as a Method of International Conflict
Resolution: the Camp David Experience", Review of lnternational Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3,
1986, pp. 43-65.
63. Fisher and Keashly, "The Potential Complementarity of...", pp. 29-42.
64. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity...", p. 20.
65. Mitchell, C. R., "The Process and Stages of Mediation, Two Sudanese Cases", in Makinci
War and Wag ing Peace, David Smock (ed.), Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of
Peace, 1993, p. 140.
behaviour. Rather, they see culture as constructing reality. Rayn-iond
Cohen's NeçiOtj ptinQ Across Cultures66 paves the way to this type Of
approaches. He challenges an 'universal paradigm of negotiation' by
pointing out differences in negotiation styles in different cultures. A
step further is taken by Kevin Avruch and Peter Black who argue that
culture is constitutive of human reality, and it offers a grammar for
acting in and interpreting the world. Since culture produces
understandings of conflict and conflict resolution, study of these is
an important feature of any fruitful analysis of conflict. 67 çjj.jç.I
Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives 68 is an example of case
studies where conflict analysis is understood to include an element
of cultural analysis. Marc Ross, on the other hand, claims that
"culture shapes what people consider valuable and worth fighting
over". 69 By using comparative methods, he examines conflict and
violence cross-culturally and identifies psychocultural and
structural factors which explain levels of conflict as well as
patterns of cooperation. Seminal view-points to culture and conflict
resolution are also presented by law scholars. S. Merry 7O and Laura
Nader71 criticise the idea of culture-free mediation and challenge
attempts to bracket history and culture from the study of conflict.
(3) The gendered nature of reality as well as conflict and conflict
resolution practices are focused on by an increasing number of
feminist writers. The 35th Annual Convention of the International
Studies Association in Washington, D. C. in 1994 included in its
section of Peace Studies a subgroup titled "Feminist Interventions in
66. Cohen, Raymond, Nepotiatin Across Cultures. Communication Obstacles in
International Diplomacy, Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991.
67. Avruch and Black, "The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution". Avruch, Kevin and
Black, Peter, "Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: Problems and Prospects", in
Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Inte g ration and Application, Dennis Sandole and
Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press,
1993, pp. 131-145.
68. Avruch, Kevin, Black, Peter and Scimecca, Joseph (eds.), Conflict Resolution: Cross-
Cultural Perspectives, New York, Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1991.
69. Ross, Marc, The Culture of Conflict. Interpretations and Interests in Comparative
Perspective, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 22.
70. Merry, "Disputing Without Culture".
71. Nader, Laura, "Some Notes on John Burton's Papers on 'Resolution of Conflict",
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1972, pp. 53-58. Nader, Laura,
"Harmony Models and the Construction of Law", in Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural
Perspectives, Kevin Avruch, Peter Black and Joseph Scimecca (eds.), New York,
Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1991, pp. 41-59.
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Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution". For example, Terrell Northrup
discusses in her paper the points of convergence and departure
between conflict theory and feminist theory. She concludes that
although conflict and conflict resolution theories and practices seem
to be congruent with feminist goals, an analysis based on feminist
notions of patriarchy and oppression is needed in order to understand
the involvement of power in conflict and conflict resolution
processes.72
(4) The idea of socially and discursively constructed reality is
advocated in some texts on mediation and problem-solving conflict
resolution. Anthony de Reuck analyses the notion of the problem-
solving workshop by employing Erving Goffman's frame analysis.
According to de Reuck, enemies in conflict have mutually exclusive
frames of reference which preclude cooperation between them. These
are psychological frames which are dependent on persistent patterns
of behaviour, i.e., they reflect social structures. de Reuck defines the
problem-solving situation to mean the dissolution of conflictual
frames and substitution of them by a joint (cooperative) frame.7 3
Deborah KoIb draws partly from the same literature as de Reuck and
analyses expressive tactics used by mediators. She employs a
dramaturgical framework to describe the specific ways mediators
create impressions about themselves, their roles, and their abilities,
and how these are sustained and supported. KoIb concludes that since
mediators often lack formal authority, "much of their influence
stems from their expressive management of their expertise, their
rapport with the parties, and the parties' perceptions of their
contributions to progress and settlement in the current case and in
others external to it".74
72. Northrup, Terrell, "Getting to Maybe: The Uneasy Partnership Between Conflict
Theory and Feminist Theory", a paper presented at the 35th Annual Convention of
International Studies Association, Washington, D. C., 28 March - 1 April 1 994.
73. de Reuck, Anthony, "A Theory of Conflict Resolution by Problem-Solving", in
Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution, John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds.),
London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 186-198.
74. KoIb, Deborah, "To Be a Mediator: Expressive Tactics in Mediation", Journal of Social
Issues, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1985, p. 23. KoIb's data comes from her participant observations
over a three-year period in a state agency and a field office of the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service in the United States. The cases covered both public and private sector
disputes.
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Benjamin Broome introduces the concept of relational empathy which,
according to him, can provide a means for understanding how to
effectively manage differences in conflict situations. He refers to
hermeneutics and phenomenology and studies such essential issues of
conflict resolution as the possibility of the creation of shared
meanings, the understanding of intersubjectively produced meanings
and the fusion of interpretative horizons. Broome comes close to de
Reuck's views by claiming that the development of shared meaning is
important in managing conflict, because through it "we increase the
prospect for mutual engagement in effective and productive
resolution of differences". 75 Sara Cobb and Janet Rifkin, on the other
hand, offer a "post-structural perspective on the mediation process,
one that addresses the relationship between discourse and social
processes and challenges the objectivism at the core of our
understandings about mediation and neutrality". 76 They study how
mediators produce and support in and through the rhetoric of
neutrality dominant ideologies and positions of privilege. In other
words, they explore how neutrality as a discursive practice actually
functions to obscure the workings of power in mediation and makes
invisible the political nature of mediation process. 77 Thus, Cobb and
Rifkin contribute to the research agenda demanded by Northrup.
How is this study, then, to be located among the categories of
literature identified? Since the thesis focuses on John Burton's
conflict resolution theory, it could be placed among the model of
third party consultation. However, it finds its proper home among the
new and alternative studies on mediation, because it is based on an
articulated conception of reality: it arises from the notion of socially
and discursively constructed reality. It also takes into account the
elements of power in constructing reality. Moreover, the work relies
on textual methods characteristic to hermeneutics. Thus, the study
bears resemblance to de Reuck's, Broome's and Cobb's and Rifkin's re-
75. Broome, Benjamin, "Managing Differences in Conflict Resolution: The Role of
Relational Empathy", in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Inte g ration and
Application, Dennis Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), Manchester and New York:
Manchester University Press, 1993, p. 93.
76. Cobb and Rifkin, "Practice and Paradox", pp. 37-38. Their study is based on more
than 30 mediation sessions and 15 interviews with mediators in six community mediation
programmes.
77. ibid., pp. 60-61.
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conceptualisations of mediation and problem-solving workshop
conflict resolution.
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2. GENERAL FEATURES AND A COMPARISON OF THREE PILOT
PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACHES
2. 1. History and general features
The idea of problem-solving workshops was developed in the early
1960s when there was an increase of interdisciplinary research in
social sciences in general, and in IR in particular. Such concepts as
'image', 'misperception', 'interaction', 'cultural understanding' and
'communication' became a more common usage of the scholars in IR.
Psychological attempts to explain the perceptions and belief-
systems of decision-makers became one of the most important areas
of empirical analysis in the field. As Herbert Kelman notes, in the
1960s a growing interest was in identifying the points at which
psychological factors - in the form of images and interaction
processes - enter into international relations. Given this interest,
problem-solving workshops were seen to be one way to
operationalise them.78
Bringing psychological and social-psychological research into IR was
meant to be an alternative to the dominant power politics approach.
As John Vasquez demonstrates, the impact of social-psychology
began to undercut the hold of the realist paradigm on at least a part
of the field in the late seventies. The new approach challenged the
realist paradigm by claiming that it may be possible to have a single
theory of interpersonal, intergroup and inter-state behaviour, and
that the view of international relations as a struggle for power may
be incorrect. Power politics was considered to be simply an image of
reality, not reality itself. Consequently, nation states were not any
more the main focus of the research.79
78. Kelman, Herbert, "Foreword", in Conflict in World Society. A new perspective on
international relations, Michael Banks (ed.), Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984, pp. xvii-
xviii. See also: de Reuck, Anthony, "Controlled Communication: Rationale and Dynamics,
The Human Context, Vol. Xl, No. 1, 1974, pp. 64-80. Oppenheim, A. N., "Psychological
Processes in World Society", in Conflict in World Societ y . A new perspective on
international relations, Michael Banks (ed.), Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984, pp. 112-
127.
79. Vasquez, John, The Power of Power Politics. A Critique, New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 1983, p. 52 and p. 75.
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The idea of problem-solving workshops as a form of international
conflict resolution was also influenced by the development of social
casework techniques and the conciliation procedures employed in
handling industrial 80 and communal conflicts 81 in the 1960s. It was
thought that these methods have in common the absence of
enforcement and the encouragement of processes of self-adjustment
and, therefore, it was assumed that they might be suitable for
international conflict resolution too.8 2
The London school's leader, John Burton, organised one week long
problem-solving workshops in 1965 and 1966 which paved the way to
other practical attempts. In 1965 there was a meeting between
nominees of the governments of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia
during the violent Borneo dispute. Similarly, there was a meeting in
1966 between nominees of the Greek President and Turkish Vice-
President of Cyprus. Both workshops were guided by a group of
scholars facilitating face-to-face interactions between the
parties. 83 These were followed by Leonard Doob's two week long
Fermeda workshop in 1970 which consisted of academics and civil
servants from Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. 84 Two pilot workshops
were conducted at Harvard University in 1971 and in 1972. In the
first Palestinians and Israelis met over a weekend with a team of
social scientists to discuss the conflict in the Middle East. 85 The
80. Bercovitch, Social Conflicts and Third Parties, pp. 59-87. See also: Blake, Robert,
Shepard, Herbert and Mouton, Jane, Mana g in g Interg roup Conflict in Industry, Houston:
Gulf Publishing Company, 1 964.
81. See a summary: Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Mana g ement..., pp. 54-60.
See also Ronald Fisher's list of studies on intergroup conflict resolution: Fisher, Ronald,
"Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup Conflict Resolution", Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1983, pp. 308-311. On Quaker conciliation see:
Yarrow, C., Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1978.
82. de Reuck, "Controlled Communication...", p. 65.
83. Burton, John, Global Conflict. The Domestic Sources of International Crisis,
Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984, p. 160. Burton, John, "Three Qualities of a Secure Nation",
in Solutions for a Troubled World, Mark Macy (ed.), Boulder, Colorado: Earthview Press,
1987, pp. 243-247.
84. Doob, Leonard (ed.), Resolvin g Conflict in Africa. The Fermeda Workshop, New
Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1970.
85. Cohen, Stephen et al., "Evolving Intergroup Techniques for Conflict Resolution: An
Israeli-Palestinian Pilot Workshop", Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1977, p.
166.
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second workshop focused on the conflict between India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh. 86 The Stirling workshop which brought together 56
Catholic and Protestant citizens of Belfast in 1972 was conducted by
Doob's Yale team.87
Even this limited sample of pilot workshops demonstrates the variety
of international problem-solving workshop attempts. It is easy to
recognise differences in the number and level of the participants and
in the duration of the workshops. However, an empirical comparison
of the workshops is difficult, because the principle of confidentiality
does not allow the facilitators to publish any detailed descriptions;
for example the London school follows the principle of
confidentiality strictly. Moreover, since actual workshops take place
in a historically specific situation and context, simple empirical
comparisons of different workshops and their outcomes may
undermine the complexity of historical, societal, economical and
cultural factors influencing them. Also the 'theoretical
incompatibility' of the workshop approaches makes comparing
demanding. The empirical case studies available on problem-solving
workshops interpret and construct data according to certain
theoretical frameworks. Observations of the behaviour of the
participants, of the inputs of the facilitators, and especially the
evaluations of the outcomes of the workshops are always filtered
through a theoretical framework. All comparisons should, therefore,
include a reflective account of the theoretical assumptions on which
the compared workshops are based.
Despite these difficulties in comparing and studying actual
workshops there seems to be a consensus among facilitators and
scholars of many practical arrangements and objectives. 88 The goals
86. Kelman, Herbert and Cohen, Stephen, "Reduction of International Conflict: An
Interactional Approach", in The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, William G.
Austin and Stephen Worchel (eds.), Monterey: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1979,
p. 291.
87. Doob, Leonard and Foltz, William, "The Belfast Workshop, An Application of Group
Techniques to a Destructive Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 17, No. 3,
1973, p. 489.
88. For the general features of problem-solving workshops see such summaries as:
Bercovitch, Social Conflicts and Third Parties. Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in
Management... de Reuck, "Controlled Communication...". UNITAR Research Reports,
"Social Psychological Techniques and the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes",
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of the workshop approaches can be partly derived from the general
objectives of action research. By creating a framework within which
conflicting parties can generate ideas for creative conflict
resolution, researchers become involved in an action programme
which offers them the opportunity to make observations of continuing
processes of conflict and conflict resolution. 89 The ultimate goal of
third party consultation is, especially according to Burton, conflict
resolution. 90 Kelman, on the other hand, postulates more moderate
objectives. He emphasises that the workshop is designed to promote
analytical communication which can be fed back and contributes to
the resolution of conflict in a negotiation process. 9 1
In some accounts problem-solving workshops are seen to be parallel
to official diplomacy and they are also called 'track-two diplomacy'.
Second track diplomacy is seen to support official diplomacy by
offering a framework for the innovative search for solutions;
solutions which lay stress on social-psychological factors of
conflict. 92 Despite the emphasis on social-psychology, it is
important to keep in mind that problem-solving approaches do not
assume that international conflicts are simply products of
Doob, Leonard (ed.), No. 1, New York, 1979. Fisher, Ronald, "Third Party Consultation:
A Method for...". Fisher, "Third Party Consultation as a Method...". Fisher, Ronald,
"Developing the Field of Interactive Conflict Resolution: Issues in Training, Funding and
Institutionalization", a paper presented at the 14th Annual Scientific Meeting of the
International Society of Political Psychology, Helsinki, Finland, July 1-5, 1991. Hill,
Barbara, "An Analysis of Conflict Resolution Techniques, From Problem-Solving
Workshops to Theory", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1982, pp. 109-
138. Kelman, Herbert, "The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution", in
Communication in International Politics, Richard Merritt (ed.), Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 1972, pp. 168-204. Kelman, Herbert, "Interactive Problem-Solving: a
Social-Psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution", in Conflict: Readin g s in
Management & Resolution, John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds.), London: Macmillan,
1990, pp. 199-215. Kelman, Herbert and Cohen, Stephen, "The Problem-Solving
Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International
Conflicts", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 1976, pp. 79-90. Mitchell, C. R.,
Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role. This part derives from these sources. The ideas
which can be particularly identified with an author are footnoted.
89. Kelman, "Interactive Problem-Solving...", p. 202.
90. Burton, World Society, p. 162.
91. Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner", pp. 64-69.
92. Bendahmane, Diane and McDonald, John, Jr., (eds.), Perspectives on Negotiations.
Four Case Studies and lnterpretatipns, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign
Service Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1986. McDonald, John, Jr. and Bendahmane,
Diane (eds.), Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy, Center for the Study of Foreign
Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1987.
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misunderstanding and misperceptions. Rather, these are seen to
characterise conflicts and to form substantial barriers to their
resolution.
Since problem-solving conflict resolution attempts are founded on
the perceived importance of subjective elements in conflicts, the
manipulation of psychological and physical environments of the
problem-solving workshop is thought to be necessary. The
manipulation of the psychological environment is done also through
managing the physical environment. Important physical arrangements
range from the shape of the table to the location of the workshop. The
manipulation is justified by claiming that none of the third party
functions or supportive activities can actually be carried out unless
the essential physical and social arrangements are present. It is
assumed that when the parties are set free from their official and
norm-oriented roles by offering them the unofficial, neutral, and
relatively isolated setting of the workshop, they wilt engage in new
thinking and behaviour. Kelman and Cohen clarify the notion of
'isolated setting' by claiming the creation of a 'cultural island' with
an illusory atmosphere of friendship in which participants are
encouraged to forget that they represent communities engaged in a
bitter conflict can be negative for the purposes of conflict
resolution. The participants should not be allowed to forget the
reality of their conflict at any stage of the workshop.9 3
The principle of symmetry should work in all arrangements of the
workshop. Symmetrical arrangements, in an ideal case, imply equality
in the number of participants, their institutional links, their manner
of recruitment, the conditions they are allowed to impose on their
participation, the distances they have to travel, and so on. Although it
is not always possible to fully carry out the principle, it can be seen
to be actualised satisfactorily when the workshop achieves and
maintains credibility in the minds of the participants and the groups
they represent. It is emphasised that the identification of the
participants is one of the most important and demanding tasks of the
facilitator. The task is vital, because the selection is an implicit
statement about the parties in and the nature of a conflict. In
93. Kelman and Cohen, "Reduction of International Conflict...", p. 299.
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addition, the selection of participants is essential, because
analytical problem-solving is considered to include intensive work at
the level of perceptions, interactions and behaviours of individuals.
Since the problem-solving workshop is often both process- and
content-oriented, the capability of the participants to provide it with
reasonable process and content inputs is important.
Opinions vary as to how close the participants should be to the
decision-making processes. Burton and Kelman state that
representatives have to be in a relationship with their principals
because that enables the transmission of alterations in perceptions
to decision-making structures. 94 Contrary to Kelman's and Burton's
views, Doob's Fermeda workshop consisted of academics and civil
servants who worked in areas unrelated to foreign policy. Similarly,
the Stirling workshop, organised by Doob and Foltz, consisted of
participants who were not major political figures.95
It is generally considered that the mediating body should be a panel
of professionally qualified and experienced persons who are not
committed to any particular settlement of the conflict, but are
"committed to the search for peaceful and just approaches to conflict
resolution". 96 According to Burton, it is preferable that those who
comprise the facilitating party do not have a specialised knowledge
of the area or the parties involved in the dispute. 97 Kelman and Cohen
challenge Burton's view. They maintain that more extensive
knowledge is necessary for the consultant to grasp the nuances of the
analysis and to develop credibility with the participants.98
The third party facilitates communication between the parties, and
draws upon social-scientific knowledge in interpreting
communication, in analysing underlying attitudes and issues, and in
injecting new concepts and ideas to the problem-solving process. The
94. Burton, John, Conflict and Communication. The Use of Controlled Communication in
International Relations, London: Macmillan, 1969, P. 41 and p. 45. Kelman and Cohen,
'Reduction of International Conflict...", p. 292.
95. Doob, Resolving Conflici in Africa, pp. xii-xiii. Doob and Foltz, "The Belfast
Workshop...", p. 496.
96. Kelman and Cohen, "Reduction of International Conflict...", p. 300.
97. Burton, World Society, pp. 159-160.
98. Kelmari and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop...", p. 81.
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facilitative, non-judgmental and diagnostic third party is supposed to
create an atmosphere where the discussion can be raised to a higher
system level from which it can flow back into constructive channels
to the dispute in question. In terms of third party identity, there is a
consensus about the necessity of third party impartiality and
neutrality.
2. 2. Theoretical comparison of three pilot problem-solving
workshop approaches
A comparison of three problem-solving approaches reveals that the
Harvard group led by Kelman emphasises that international conflicts
are not simply products of misunderstanding and misperception. Real
conflicts of interest or competing definitions of national interests
are often, according to Kelman, at the centre of disputes. Although
conflicts are not caused solely by subjective factors, face-to-face
communication in problem-solving workshops is important because it
is a preparation for diplomatic and political negotiations where a
conflict can be resolved. In other words, the workshop approach can
have significant impact at those points in the policy process at which
individual perceptions and attitudes play a determining role. Since
most conflicts involve real clashes of interests, ideologies and
structural commitments, the problem of transferring personal
changes to the policy processes remains critical.99
According to Doob's Yale group, when a problem-solving workshop
obliges participants to "look within themselves and their own
experiences to understand their reactions to pressure and conflict",
such understanding would facilitate changes in behaviour back
home. 10 ° Thus, the problem-solving workshops of the Yale group are
expected to produce perceptional, attitudinal and behavioural changes
through development of self-awareness and awareness of others. The
99. Kelman, "The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution", p. 169. Kelman
and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop...", p. 79. Kelman and Cohen, "Reduction of
International Conflict...", p. 301.
100. Doob and Foltz, "The Belfast Workshop...", pp. 493-497. Doob, Leonard, "A Cyprus
Workshop: An Exercise in Intervention Methodology", The .Journal of Social PschoIoa,
Vol. 94, 1975, pp. 161-178.
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underlying assumption is that knowledge of self and circumstances
can be applied to bring more control. Control, in turn, is thought to
generate conflict management and cooperation in real life situations.
However, Doob and Foltz doubt the possibilities of conflict resolution
through the workshop approach. They note about the Stirling workshop
that "we never dreamed that any workshop involving persons from
Northern Ireland could ultimately resolve the destructive conflict
there". 1 01
Two distinct phases of development are perceptible in the Burtonian
approach. Conflict and Communication1 02 represents a
communication framework and Deviance. Terrorism and War 103 , on
the other hand, consists of a fully developed human needs framework
which is, to some extent, founded upon sociobiological premiseslO4.
The communication framework includes a 'triangular conflict theory'.
The theory postulates three interrelated causes of conflict. It
assumes that in a society where the demands of individuals are not
fulfilled, the situation is perceived to be unjust. Perceived injustice
and misperceptions may lead to ineffective communication and,
finally, to conflict. Conflicts occur first at a domestic level and,
then, spill-over to an international sphere. In this view, all three
elements of conflict - needs, perceptions and communication - have
to be dealt with in conflict resolution processes.
John Burton's needs theory holds the origin of conflict in such human
needs as participation, identity and security which will be pursued by
individuals regardless of the consequences to self or system. If the
institutions obstruct the fulfilment of needs, conflict will result. In
other words, international conflicts arise from the failings of
101. Doob and Foltz, "The Belfast Workshop...", p. 492.
102. London: Macmillan, 1969.
103. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. See also: Burton, John "Conflict Resolution as a
Function of Human Needs", in The Power of Human Needs in World Society, Roger Coate
and Jerel Rosati (eds.), Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, pp. 187-
204.
104. In fairness to other writers within the Burtonian approach, it should be noted that
A. J. R. Groom and C. R. Mitchell have developed the needs theory in a non-deterministic
and non-biological direction. Groom, A. J. R., "No Compromise: Problem-Solving in a
Theoretical Perspective", International Social Science Journal, Vol. XLIII, No. 1, 1991,
pp. 77-86. Mitchell, C. R. "Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic
Questions about Basic Human Needs Theory", in Conflict: Human Needs Theory, John
Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 149-176.
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domestic systems to provide for the needs of people. Conflict
resolution within the problem-solving framework, therefore, involves
differentiating interests from needs by identifying universal needs,
improving communication, and deducing alterations in structures and
institutions in order to fulfil the needs identified in the process. 1 05
In terms of problem-solving techniques, the Yale group uses mainly
two methods which can be subsumed under the categories of 'National
Training Laboratory' (NTL) and 'Tavistock approach'. They are both
experimental methods enabling participants to learn about
psychological processes. The T-group (T for training) method can be
considered to be a subgroup of NTL. In T-groups participants are
expected to mobilise problem-solving behaviour. The task of a trainer
(facilitator) is, therefore, to arrange the environment in groups in
such a way that learning can take place in a collaborative growth-
oriented environment which differs from the everyday competitive,
survival-oriented environment the participants face back home. In T-
groups members can learn about themselves, interpersonal relations,
groups, and social systems. The often repeated phrase is that they
can 'learn how to learn'. 1 06
More precisely, at the Fermeda workshop the Yale group utilised a
sensitivity training technique, which consisted of a series of small
T-group sessions. In these the focus was on relatively free
expression of feelings and interaction. 107 The Stirling workshop, on
105. Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and War, pp. 80-81. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a
Function...", pp. 195-199.
106. Appley, Dee and Winder, Alvin, T-Groups and Therapy Groups in a ChaJpo Society,
London, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973, P. 85 and p. 91. See more on T-
groups: Bradford, Leland, Gibb, Jack and Benne, Kenneth, "Preface", in T-Group Theory
and Laboratory Method, Leland Bradford, Jack Gibb and Kenneth Benne (eds.), New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1964, pp. vii-x. Benne, Kenneth, Bradford, Leland and Lippitt,
Ronald, "The Laboratory Method", in T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method, Leland
Bradford, Jack Gibb and Kenneth Benne (eds.), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964, pp.
15-44.
107. The Fermeda workshop used T-groups in its first phase. In its second phase the
general assembly was formed with the aim of achieving a joint solution. Doob, Resolving
Conflict in Africa, pp. 9-11 and pp. 119-124. Foltz, William, "Two Forms of Unofficial
Conflict Intervention: The Problem-Solving and the Process-Promoting Workshops", in
Unofficial Diplomats, Maureen Berman and Joseph Johnson (eds.), New York: Columbia
University Press, 1977, Pp. 204-208. See also a critique of the method as it was used in
the Fermeda workshop: Eshete, Andreas, "Appraisal by an Ethiopian" in Resolving Conflict
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the other hand, used a combination of Tavistock and NTL training. The
Tavistock approach is not only concerned with the 'here and now'
events, but also the 'there and then' regressive forces which
constantly obtrude into the otherwise productive functioning of the
group. 108 Learning in the Tavistock approach highlights such issues
as authority, power and leadership. The Yale group argues that self-
knowledge concerning these issues could be the initial step toward
discovering ways through which communities might conceivably live
together.1 09
Compared with the methods used at the Fermeda workshop by the Yale
team, the Harvard group employs the laboratory method, but does not
use solely T-groups nor sensitivity training techniques. Since the
Harvard school emphasises intergroup processes, it claims to require
some additional methods and techniques. The techniques the team
utilises in their 'interactional analysis' include structured group-
oriented interventions, such as role reversal. Workshop participants
are also divided into smaller groups that could work separately, and
they are encouraged to engage in conflict fractionation exercises.
Although the methods are not pure training methods, they involve
participants in 'earning processes. Kelman and Cohen claim that
learning, for example, a common language and symbol system can
foster a vocabulary of de-escalation.1 1 0
in Africa, Leonard Doob (ed.), New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970, pp.
85-1 03.
108. de Mare, P. B., Perspectives in Group Psychotherapy. A Theoretical Background,
London: Allen & Unwin, 1972, p. 73.
109. Doob and Foltz, "The Belfast Workshop...", pp. 500-502. Alevy, Daniel et al.,
"Rationale, Research, and Role Relations in the Stirling Workshop", Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1974, pp. 276-284. Foltz, "Two Forms of Unofficial...", pp.
201 -221. The Tavistock design has been criticised, because participants are put through
what is essentially group psychoanalysis. A group of persons who were involved in
organising the Stirling workshop writes about the method: "For some individuals, there
can be no denying, this can be a very illuminating process, but inevitably involving the
kind of punishing self-analysis which is the basis of psychoanalysis. The value of
introducing psychoanalytic techniques into a foreign culture and unfamiliar situation is at
the very least questionable". Boehringer, C. H. et al. "Stirling, The Destructive
Application of Group Techniques to a Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 18, No.
2, 1974, p. 266.
110. Kelman, "The Problem-Solving Workshop in...", p. 194. Kelman and Cohen,
"Reduction of International Conflict...", pp. 291-295.
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The method used by the Burtonian approach can be traced back to two
origins, namely T-group and social casework methods. Casework
techniques in social work, with their underlying psychoanalytic
origin, consist of a wide range of activities.1 11 Their ultimate goal
is to develop in the individual the fullest possible capacity for self
maintenance in a social group. However, the Burtonian approach does
not claim that states are maladjusted individuals with whom a
facilitator works. Rather, the London school is interested in the
supportive approach of the caseworker and the professional
relationships between the participants and the consultant involved in
psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and group therapy.1 1 2 In sum, the
London group uses the same methods as the other groups, but the
introduction of some elements from social casework clarifies the
relationship between the facilitator and the participants
The pilot problem-solving schools are founded upon the idea of
analytical learning in an atmosphere where the participants can be
set free from their everyday roles. However, the teams disagree what
should be learned and at what level. At the workshops of the Harvard
and London groups, learning is oriented also toward a content,
whereas at the Yale group workshops it is mainly oriented toward
group processes. The Yale group uses such concepts as 'emotions' and
'feelings', whereas the other two schools avoid this kind of discourse.
The Yale group maintains that the expression of personal emotions is
an integral part of conflict resolution in the workshop. The London
and Harvard schools, on the other hand, do not consider it to be
important, because they want to emphasise the intergroup nature of
conflicts. Especially, the Harvard group focuses on the intergroup
level and, therefore, criticises the focus of the Yale group on the
interpersonal aspects.
111. On social casework see: Younghusband, Eileen (ed.), New Developments in Casework.
*	 Readings in Social Work, Vol. II, London: Allen & Unwin, 1966.
112. Burton, Conflict and Communication, p. ix and pp. 66-69.
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2. 3. Philosophical and social-psychological assumptions
An analysis of the stated objectives and the nature of parties and
intermediaries in the problem-solving workshops reveals that there
is a strong belief in rationality. Since subjective elements are
considered to play an important part in every conflict and to form an
obstacle to conflict resolution, it is thought that these elements
have to be tackled in a rational way. It is assumed that human beings
are capable of rational thinking and acting when an appropriate
framework is offered. Problem-solving workshops are supposed to
offer a framework for conflicting parties for scrutinising the nature
of their relationships and for analysing the ultimate roots of their
differences. The analysis is expected to take place by exercising both
instrumental reasoning about means to ends and discursive
reasoning1 13 about definitions and values.
Moreover, social scientists are assumed to represent instrumental
knowledge and rationality par excellence. With this knowledge they
are supposed to be capable of social engineering within a problem-
solving framework. In practice, they engage in social engineering by
manipulating the setting and structure of the workshop; by choosing
the participants; by acting themselves as intermediaries; and by
controlling the conceptualisations of the conflict. There is an
implicit assumption in problem-solving approaches that the control
of an environment - that is, managing inevitable changes at all levels
of the physical and social world - for example, in the form of
problem-solving workshops is an integral part of human rationality.
The Enlightenment idea of universal man who is essentially rational
and who, because of the rationality, is determined to control social
as well as natural environments is, thus, fundamental for this
problem-solving ideology.
113. Discursive rationality refers to interaction, where individuals construct and
interpret the identities of themselves and others. The aim is neither the control nor the
selection of means to an end, but the generation of normative judgements and action
principles. Dryzek, John, Discursive Democracy: Politics. Policy, and Political Science,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. The concept will be discussed in the
fourth chapter.
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Social engineering and instrumental rationality coincide with the
principles of (neo)behaviouralism.1 14 Behaviouralism is concerned
with the under-utilisation of the social and behavioural sciences in
practical affairs. It is based on an uncritical trust in the existence of
objective scientific facts and in their value in solving practical
problems. Universalising tendencies in the spirit of behaviouralism
can be found in the traditional view of problem-solving. The
conception of universal rationality leads problem-solving workshop
approaches to assume that the methods used in workshops are
suitable to all cultural contexts. The approaches consist also of an
element of emancipatory interest. The emancipatory interest
manifests itself in a wish to create non-distorted and reciprocal
communication which generates emancipation from domination and,
finally, helps men to achieve rational autonomy. It is assumed that
the process of emancipation is forwarded by the 'therapeutic'
methods employed in the workshop.
The relation between individual and society is at the theoretical
centre of some problem-solving approaches. The founders of
laboratory methods saw the group as the link between the individual
person and the larger social structure: the group was assumed to
facilitate change in the larger social structures upon which
individual lives depend. In other words, the emphasis was neither
psychological nor sociological, neither the individual nor the social
group, but their interplay.1 15 Kelman states clearly the importance
of this interplay. According to him, workshop groups are designed to
produce change in individuals as a vehicle for change in policies and
actions of the political system.1 1 6
Laboratory methods are influenced by system theory and, especially,
by its notion of feedback. Due to this infiuence, a workshop group is
considered to form a system where transactions take place. It is
thought that participants get feedback from other participants and
114. See more on the relation between laboratory methods and behaviouralism: Bradford,
Leland, Gibb, Jack and Benne, Kenneth, "Two Educational Innovations", in T-Group Theory
and Laboratory Method, Leland Bradford, Jack Gibb and Kenneth Benne (eds.), New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1964, PP. 8-10.
115. ibid., p. 5. de Mare, Perspectives in Group Psychothec, p. 21.
116. Kelman, 'Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner, p. 86.
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from facilitators, and this feedback can serve to steer subsequent
behaviour. Feedback is, thus, considered to be a stimulus which is
responded to by a participant.1 17 There is an idea of open systems in
the type of system theories which form a basis for group therapy (and
laboratory methods). Structures, within a group or in an environment,
are seen to be "continuously opened and restructured by the problem-
solving behaviour of the individuals experiencing and responding to
concrete situations".1 1 8
All methods employed by problem-solving workshop approaches are
based on theoretical and philosophical premises including an image of
human 'being' and human behaviour. These premises are transferred to
problem-solving workshops, to practices, by utilising different
techniques. Moreover, the methods imply what is seen to be conflict
resolution. For example, if the method used focuses on learning, the
techniques chosen by the facilitator encourage the participants to
conceptualise the workshop situation in terms of learning. Thus, what
is considered to be the resolution of conflict is something which
involves learning. On the other hand, if a content-oriented technique,
for example through theoretical inputs, encourages the participants
to see the conf!ict situation in the light of universal human needs,
the settlement is supposed to tackle these basic needs. In other
words, the methods set the framework within which the settlement
can take place. The idea of the neutrality of the problem-solving
methods and techniques suggested, for example, by the UNITAR
report l 1 9 is thus incorrect.
117. Benne, Bradford and Lippitt, "The Laboratory Method", pp. 24-25. Lakin, Martin,
Experiential Groups: The Uses of Interpersonal Encounter. Psychotherapy Groups. and
Sensitivity Training , Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press, 1972, p. 10.
118. de Mare, Perspectives in Group Ps ychotherapy, p.142.
119. UNITAR Research Reports, p.21.
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CHAPTER III: JOHN BURTON'S VERSION OF HUMAN NEEDS
THEORY
There is a long tradition of human needs thinking in Western
philosophy and social sciences. A starting-point for many theories is
biology; needs are assumed to arise from man's biological nature. It
is also argued that since needs are something biological, they are
universal. Several theorists have tried to identify the most
fundamental needs and have produced lists which have often only
added to the number of needs considered to be essential. There are
clearly two categories of needs which theorists have deduced:
'physiological' needs which are seen to be vital for living organisms
to survive and 'psychological' needs which are assumed to contribute
to general human welfare.
All these issues are challenged in a needs debate. It is claimed that
all lists intended to identify needs are subjective, and potentially
endless. Since there is no empirical evidence to support needs
thinking, the lists are bound to remain subjective. Moreover, there
cannot ever be any empirical evidence, because the concept of need
cannot be operationalised. Since it cannot be operationalised, needs
theories cannot be verified. Even worse, as Popper would point out,
the concept is not falsifiable. It is also asked whether we know
according to any objective criteria when needs are satisfied. In other
words, there may be different degrees of needs satisfaction. The
differentiation of needs from their satisfiers is also unclear, it is
said, in many needs theories. Although needs are assumed to be
universal, the satisfiers could still be seen to be culturally
constituted. All these considerations are seminal and contribute to
the discussion of needs. This thesis, however, directs its critique
solely towards the ideas of biological nature and universality of
needs: the needs ideology will be challenged from a social
constructionist point of view in the second part of the work.
John Burton's texts include a version of human needs thinking. What is
particular to the version is that it forms the very core of his conflict
and conflict resolution theory. The chapter studies Burton's needs
theory and locates his version of theory in a wider tradition of
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thinking. Both points of convergence and departure between needs
theories and Burton's version are pointed out. The study is mainly
conducted by employing an analysis of metaphors: Burton's theory is
treated as a narrative whose power is based on metaphors. By
studying them, an understanding of the assumptions underlying
Burton's thinking is achieved.
1. HUMAN NEEDS THEORY
1. 1. Examples of human needs thinking
Although there is a vast literature on human needs, there is no
consistent research programme. In other words, several versions of
human needs theory exist. Common to most of them is, as noted
above, the postulation of certain universal needs rooted in the
biological conditions of man. Thus, the idea of human needs provides a
foundation for certain types of assumptions about human nature: John
Burton's view that the human needs approach is not ideological is not
correct. 1 The approach is ideological, as are all social scientific
constructs, because it includes a contestable image of human 'being'
and human nature.
Two intellectual traditions in Western thinking have explicitly
adopted the human needs approach to understand political phenomena.
First, the concept of human needs receives considerable attention in
the area of political theory. Human needs is a central concept in the
language of Stoicism, classical tragedy, Augustinian Christianity,
EnUghtenment discourse and Marxism. 2 More recently, development
1. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 30-35. Burton, John, "The Role of
Authorities in World Society", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 8, No.
1, 1979, pp. 78-79.
2. On the traditions of Liberalism, Marxism and Gandhism see: Roy, Ramashray, "Three
Visions of Needs and the Future: Liberalism, Marxism, and Gandhism", in Power of Human
Needs in World Society, Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati (eds.), Boulder & London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1988, pp. 59-76. For a comprehensive account of needs thinking in
political theory see: Springborg, Patricia, The Problem of Human Needs and the Critique
of Civilization, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981.
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studies discuss the notion of needs. 3 There are efforts to identify
minimal standards of basic human needs, to determine levels of
human needs deprivation, and to recommend how such needs can be
satisfied.4
For Abraham Maslow the theory of human needs is a theory of the
ends and ultimate values of an organism. Seen from the point of view
of behavioural sciences, needs are organisers of behaviour. Maslow's
well-known hierarchy of needs 5 includes such needs as physiological
needs, safety needs, belongingness and love needs, esteem needs, and
a need for seif-actualisation. He claims that when the physiological
needs are satisfied, higher needs emerge. An often forgotten element
in Maslow's needs theory is that the hierarchy is by no means meant
to be rigid. In other words, it allows a range of variations in needs
satisfaction. 6 Maslow's views can be interpreted to have some direct
relevance to conflict analysis, since he writes: "If it is easy to
accept basic needs frustration as one determinant of hostility, it is
quite easy to accept the opposite of frustration (i.e., basic need
3. See, for example: Ghosh, Pradip (ed.), Third World Development: A Basic Needs
Approach, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984. Lisk, Franklyn, "Conventional
Development Strategies and Basic Needs Fulfilment", International Labour Review, Vol.
115, No. 2, 1977, pp. 175-191. Streeten, Paul, "From Growth to Basic Needs", Finance
and Development, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1979, pp. 28-31. Streeten, Paul and Burki, Shahid
"Basic Needs: Some Issues", World Development, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1978, pp. 411-421. van
Weigel, B., "The Basic Needs Approach: Overcoming the Poverty of Homo oeconomicus ",
World Development, Vol. 14, No. 12, 1986, pp. 1423-1434.
4. Coate, Roger and Rosati, Jerel, "Human Needs in World Society", in Power of Human
Needs in World Society, Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati (eds.), Boulder and London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1988, pp. pp. 3-4.
5. Maslow's list is a foundation for many accounts of needs in the current needs debate.
For example, Johan Galtung mentions security needs, welfare needs, identity needs and
freedom needs. Oscar Nudler assumes the need for identity, the need to growth and the need
to transcend to be fundamental. Joseph Scimecca reduces all needs to the needs of self-
reflectivity and freedom. Galtung, Johan, "The Basic Needs Approach", in Basic Needs. A
Contribution to the Current Debate, Katrin Lederer (ed.), Cambridge, MA.: Oelgeschlager,
Gunn & Ham; Konigstein/Ts: Verlag Anton Ham, 1980, p. 66. Nudler, Oscar, "Human
Needs: A Sophisticated Holistic Approach", in Basic Needs. A Contribution to the Current
Debate, Katrin Lederer (ed.), Cambridge, MA.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Ham;
Konigstein/Ts: Verlag Anton Ham, 1980, pp. 143-147. Scimecca, Joseph, "Self-
reflectivity and Freedom: Toward a Prescriptive Theory of Conflict Resolution", in
Conflict: Human Needs Theory , John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 205-
218.
6. Maslow, Abraham, Motivation and Personality, New York: Harper & Row, 1970 (3rd
ed), pp. 15-26; p. 30 and pp. 35-36.
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gratification) as an a priori determinant of the opposite of hostility
(i.e., friendliness)."7
According to Paul Sites, on the other hand, human needs are related to
social control. In Sites' view, individuals attempt to control the
physical world in order to gratify their biological needs. Sites lists
in his Control: The Basis of Social Order8 eight basic needs: a need
for response, a need for security, a need for recognition, a need for
stimulation, a need for distributive justice, a need for meaning, a
need to be seen as rational and rationality itself and a need to
control. Needs are essential in becoming a human being in Sites'
account. He maintains that the primordial priority of needs stems
from primary emotions which are prerequisites of the survival of the
physiological organism and psychological self. Given this essentiality
of needs, the influence of needs is many times stronger than the
influence of the social forces which play upon man. Also Sites theory
has got an element of political theory. He argues that the satisfaction
and deprivation of individual human needs are the key sources of
societal order and change. He assumes that many persons will fight
and die to protect values related to needs gratification.9
Similarly, James MacGregor Burns studies the significance of needs
gratification for political processes. According to him, needs for
food, security, sex and the higher needs suggested by Maslow have to
be gratified if a society is to be harmonious. Burns considers needs
as 'welisprings of political leadership'. Leadership arises from the
capacity of a leader to induce followers to act for certain goals that
represent the values and the motivations - the wants and needs, the
aspirations and expectations - of both leaders and followers.1 0
7. ibid., p. 36.
8. Sites, Paul, Control: The Basis of Social Order, New York: Dunellen Publishing Co.,
1973.
9. ibid., p. 3; p. 9; p. 11 and p. 43. Sites, Paul, "Legitimacy and Human Needs", in
Conflict: Readings in Manaaement and Resolution, John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds.),
London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 117-144. Sites, Paul, "Needs as Analogues of Emotions",
in Conflict: Human Needs Theory, John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 7-
33.
10. Burns, James MacGregor, "Wellsprings of Political Leadership", The American
Political Science Review, Vol. LXXI, No. 1, 1977, pp. 266-275.
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These three writers illuminate some typical trends in a branch of
needs thinking. They all reduce the origin of human needs to biology.
Since needs are seen to derive from the biological nature of the
human being, they are also considered to be the primary motivations
of human behaviour. Given that needs motivate behaviour, they relate
to the social world too. The value given to needs satisfaction is
assumed to provide a foundation for either social stability or
disorder. In other words, a linkage between needs satisfaction and
social harmony is established in the theories. 1 1
Human needs thinking can be summarised by claiming that it
postulates an idea of 'metaphysical originality'. According to the
idea, there is something given in the human condition, for example,
subconscious, emotions or human needs. The given is considered to be
something original and authentic, and human nature is seen to have
its main ground on this originality. The original human condition, for
example characterised by human needs, is claimed to have priority
over other conditioning factors of man's 'being-in-the-world'.
Metaphysical originality is also used as a point of reference in
scientific explanations concerning human beings. For example, human
behaviour is derived from human needs by interpreting human needs
as motivations of behaviour. 1 2
1. 2. John Burton's functionalist view of human needs
John Burton's needs theory has several similarities with the needs
theories introduced above. Burton also reduces the origin of needs to
biology. He considers human beings to be determined to satisfy their
needs, and postulates a linkage between needs satisfaction and social
harmony.
11. See more on the linkage: Roy, Ramashray, "Social Conflicts and Needs Theories", in
Conflict: Human Needs Theory, John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, P. 126.
12. Avruch and Black discuss the idea by employing a psychoanalytic metaphor. According
to them, the psychoanalytic metaphor postulates an image of a manifest content that
overlies - masks and distorts - a latent content. For example, human needs can be seen to
be a fundamental stratum of the person which acts as the engine' that motivates
behaviour. Avruch and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature in...", p. 224.
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In World Society1 3 the notion of soclo-biological values are
developed by Burton.1 4 His claim is that "people of all races and
creeds have some common values and similar objectives".1 5 The
common denominator in different branches of social sciences and the
common explanatory factor for human behaviour at different levels of
behaviour can be found in universal socio-biological values. Soda-
biological values are, according to Burton, the preferences of people,
the drives that finally underpin or destroy institutions. These values
are closely related to, if not direct expressions of, biological drives
and motivations.1 6
A fully developed universalistic and biologically based human needs
theory is presented in Burton's and Sandole's 'generic theory of human
needs'. According to them, a generic theory implies an explanation
that transcends observable differences in human behaviour. It is a
theory which is universal and applies to all social levels. Burton's and
Sandole's theory argues that there are fundamental drives and
motivations that cannot be repressed. The drives and motivations are
based on universal and genetic basic needs - such as drives for
identity, development, meaning and consistency in response - and
they direct human behaviour. Furthermore, in Burton's and Sandole's
view, there can be no long-lasting and authentic social stability
unless the basic needs satisfaction of individuals is met.1 7
Burton establishes his generic theory of needs by employing the
methodological principle of abduction. For him abduction implies a
trust in an original personal hypothesis from which deductions flow.
13. Lanham: University Press of America, 1987.
14. In Systems. States. Diplomacy and Rules Burton discusses the needs of systems and
states and the wants of people. He notes that all individuals as well as national groups want
to participate fully in decision-making and in the control of their environment. In
Conflict and Communication the idea of human needs is still vague. Burton argues that fear
and threat, denial of participation rights, perceived injustice, disappointment in
expectations are the typical origins of conflict behaviour. Moreover, he considers the
legitimisation of an authority to rest upon performance in the satisfaction of human
values. Burton, Systems. States. Diplomac y, and Rules, pp. 22-23; p. 27; p. 134 and p.
136. Burton, Conflict and Communication, p. 24; p. 32; p. 38 and pp. 90-91.
15. Burton, World Society , p. 124. Burton lists in the book (ibid., p. 128) such soclo-
biological values as freedom, self-determination, group integrity, equal opportunities in
education and employment, and the preservation of cultures and identity.
16. ibid., pp. 123-136.
17. Burton, John and Sandole, Dennis, "Generic Theory: The Basis of Conflict Resolution",
Neg otiation Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1986, pp. 333-344.
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He maintains that abduction is vital, because rarely can there be
realistic testing in politics. As the idea of abduction suggests, the
emphasis on improving theory is more important than the processes
of verification and falsification. 1 8
A logic of functional analysis can be found in Burton's version of
needs theory. Burton assumes that human needs will be pursued
regardless of consequences. In every society there are, however, elite
groups which gain most through the maintenance of status quo and,
therefore, resist the demands of the needs satisfaction of other
groups in the society.1 9 Burton calls the phenomenon of resistance
'role defence'. He assumes that if the institutional values, which
often reflect the interests of elites, do not fully allow the
satisfaction of human needs of all groups in the society, conflict will
emerge. Conflict may cause structural changes which weaken the
elite positions. 2 ° Thus, it is maintained that unless elite groups or
authorities allow the satisfaction of needs, they are not functional
for the society, i.e. they do not contribute to its survival, because
human needs satisfaction is the ultimate prerequisite for the stable
existence of society. According to the logic, the functionality of
authorities is dependent on the functionality of human needs
fulfilment.
18. See: Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 19-20 and p. 256. The term
'abduction' as it is originally used by C. S. Peirce suggests that "while Induction is the
inference of the Rule from a Case and a Result, Hypothesis [abduction] is the inference the
Case from a Rule and a Result". Eco, Umberto "Horns, Hooves, lnsteps, Some Hypotheses
on Three Types of Abduction", in The Sian of Three. Dupin. Holmes. Peirce, Umberto Eco
and Thomas Sebeok (ed.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983, p. 203.
19. Burton notes that no blame can be attributed either to persons or elites as a group.
They seek to pursue their interests within existing structures and institutions, and in the
absence of real alternatives their interests are in maintaining existing institutional
arrangements. Burton, Global Conflict, pp. 35-36.
20. Burton, John, "Theory and Reality", Millennium: Journal of International Studies,
Vol. 4, No. 3, 1975, pp. 258-259. Burton, John, "The Dynamics of Change in World
Society', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1976, pp. 75-77.
Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and War, pp. 140-150. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 19.
Burton, John, "The History of International Conflict Resolution", in International Conflict
Resolution. Theory and Practice, Edward Azar and John Burton (eds.), Brighton:
Wheatsheaf, 1986, p. 53. Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, p. 19. Burton,
"Conflict Resolution as a Function...", p. 203. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and
Provention, pp. 55-57.
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This functional and instrumental view of society implies that if
social forms do not satisfy individual needs, they must be changed.
As Ramashray Roy points out, the underlying typically liberal views
maintain that the individual is prior to society, society is created by
individuals and society exist to serve individual purposes. 21 Although
functionalist theories tend to stress the fulfilment of needs as
leading to harmony and Burton stresses the non-fulfilment of needs
as leading to conflict, the logic of a functional type of explanation
prevails in Burton's needs theory.22
Similarly, problem-solving conflict resolution is seen in Burton's
theory as a steering mechanism whose ultimate function is to
contribute to the survival of the society. The survival is brought
about through controlling and managing change, i.e. through non-
cataclysmic change. According to Burton, problem-solving processes
help parties in a conflict to cost accurately the consequences of
change and the resistance to change. For Burton, "the processes of
facilitated conflict resolution are designed to cut down the delays
and upheavals that occur in change and to speed up the evolutionary
process toward greater fulfilment of societal needs". 23 Steering of a
society takes place within the framework set by the satisfaction of
human needs. As noted earlier, if there is a tension between human
needs and institutions, it is change in institutions that is necessary.
Thus, the focus in Burton's needs as well as conflict theory is on the
individual unit: the needs of the unit determine the effective
operation of the social system of which it is a part.24
21. Roy, "Three Visions of Needs....", p. 74.
22. For the functionalist logic see also: Avruch, Kevin and Black, Peter, "A Generic
Theory of Conflict Resolution: A Critique", Ne gotiation Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1987, pp.
93-94.
23. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Function...", p. 203. See also: Burton, "Theory and
Reality", p. 259. Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and War, p. 213. Burton, Global Conflict,
p. 112. Burton, "The History of...", p. 53.
24. Chris Brown's criticism is accurate at this point. He writes: "Groups, even states,
enter Burton's world but they do so as forums within which individuals act; there is no
sense of groups or states acting as they do in response to a structural logic distinct from
the wills or intentions of their component parts." Brown, Chris, "International Theory:
New Directions?", Review of International Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1981, p. 180. The ideas
of function and steering are also an integral part of Burton's thinking. The scope of the
thesis does not include those issues. For the issues see particularly: Burton, Peace
Theory. Burton, International Relations.
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2. METAPHORS AND THESES OF NEEDS THINKING
2. 1. Medical metaphor and a thesis of alienation
It should be emphasised that in Burton's view human needs as such do
not lead to conflict, rather, conflict emerges from the frustration
caused by unfulfilled needs. Human needs are, thus, seen to be
something original and constructive in the sense that they include a
potential for harmonious society. Institutional arrangements of a
society may temporarily destroy the originality, and conflict arises.
Deviance and dysfunctional violent conflicts are assumed to be
symptoms of deeper problems in the society, manifestations of
conflicts between human needs and structures. In other words,
conflicts are political manifestations of system failures, the
failures of a domestic system to provide the needs of people.25
The implicit medical metaphor in Burton's theory insinuates that
dysfunctional conflicts and deviant behaviour are signs, like physical
symptoms, of something else, of diseases. Thus, conflict, as
symptoms of a disease, as such is not malign since it is merely a sign
of system failings. 26 In order to understand how conflict can be a
symptom, two things have to be kept in mind. First, conflict is
considered to be endemic. Second, it is assumed that functional
conflicts can be differentiated from dysfunctional ones, or, at least,
the	 functional	 value	 of	 conflict	 from	 its	 dysfunctional
consequences. 27 Since conflicts are endemic, the aim is to retain
25. See: Burton, Global Conflict, p. 48. Burton, World Society, p. 143. Burton, "Conflict
Resolution as a Function...", p. 195. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp.
247-24 8.
26. For an explicit use of the medical metaphor in the Burtonian tradition see: Banks,
Michael, "Four Conceptions of Peace", in Conflict Management and Problem Solvin g : From
Interpersonal to International Applications, Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste
(eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1987, pp. 269-271.
27. Lewis Coser lists such as group-binding, group-preserving and internal cohesion
increasing functions of conflict. Coser is criticised, because he overemphasises the
normative order of the society. For the functionality of conflict see: Coser, Lewis, iJi
Functions of Social Conflict, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956. Coser, Lewis,
Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, New York: The Free Press, 1967. Mitchell, C.
R., "Evaluating Conflict", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1980, pp. 61-75.
For a critique see: Sites, Control, pp. 95-96.
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conflict which has functional value and "to control it so as to avoid
perversions which are destructive of human enjoyment and widely
held social interests".28
The medical metaphor and analogy have a long tradition in Western
thinking. A general medical analogy of society and statesman can be
found, for example, in Plato's Statesman 29 . According to Plato, the
doctor cannot be challenged so long as he acts for the physical
welfare of his patients, and by analogy the statesman cannot be
challenged so long as he acts for the common social welfare of the
citizens he governs. Plato considers the statesman as a specialist
who practises an art upon a whole community of non-specialists.
Plato seems to suggest that the statesman can have expertise about
values. A true statesman has an insight into the nature of reality
which, in turn, gives him moral strength to govern.30
The medical metaphor of conflict, on the other hand, has its roots in
Talcott Parsons' sociology. He considers conflict to be primarily a
disease. Conflict appears to Parsons as a partly avoidable, partly
inevitable and endemic form of sickness in the body social. Similarly,
Lewis Coser's idea of conflict relies on the metaphor. For example, in
his discussion on the civil rights movement of the Afro-Americans in
America in the 1960s, Coser notes that the riots in Los Angeles
"indicate a sickness in the body social which demands immediate
remedy if it is not to undermine social order altogether". 3 1
The metaphor can be found in Maslow's texts too. He, like Burton,
entertains the idea that deviance of an individual can be caused by a
society. Maslow writes:
"If we were to use the word sick in this way, we should then
also have to face squarely the relation of people to their
society. One clear implication of our definition would be that
(1) since a person is to be called sick who is basically
28. Burton, World Society, p. 138.
29. Plato, Statesman, J. B. Skemp (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952.
30. ibid., § 293b-293e, pp. 194-195. Skemp, J. B., "Introduction", in Plato,
Statesman, J. B. Skemp (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952, pp. 40-51.
31. Coser, Continuities in the Study..., p. 87. See also: Coser, The Functions of Social
nflict, pp. 21-23.
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thwarted, and (2) since such basic thwarting is made possible
ultimately only by forces outside the individual, then (3)
sickness in the individual must come ultimately from a
sickness in the society. The good society would then be defined
as one that permitted people's highest purposes to emerge by
satisfying all their basic needs."32
Although Maslow does not explicitly relate unfulfilled needs to
conflict, the medical metaphor in his text is powerful. It creates an
image of sick society which is capable of producing defeated and
alienated individuals.
If conflict is a sign, what is the disease? The disease in the body
social is alienation. The notion of alienation has also a long tradition
in Western thinking. 33 The term can be best understood through its
negative connotations. The theological use of alienation established a
meaning by speaking about isolation of human from God. Kant, on the
other hand, took a first step to build a link between alienation and
reification. The link imputes a negative value-judgement on the
objectifying process of economic transfers. 34 Durkheim's description
of anomie, which can be interpreted as alienation, brings in social
norms. For Durkheim, anomie is a situation in which the social norms
32. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 31.
33. For the notion of alienation see: Barakat, Halim, "Alienation: A Process of Encounter
between Utopia and Reality", The British Journal of Sociolo gy, Vol. 20, 1969, pp. 1-10.
Israel, Joachim, Alienation. From Marx to Modern Sociolo gy, Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
1971. Mizruchi, Ephraim, "An Introduction to the Notion of Alienation", in Alienation:
Concept. Term, and Meanings, Frank Johnson (ed.), New York and London: Seminar Press,
1973, pp. 111-124. Schacht, Richard, Alienation, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
1971. For a criticism of alienation theses see: Denise, Theodore, "The Concept of
Alienation: Some Critical Notices", in Alienation: Concept. Term, and Meanings, Frank
Johnson (ed.), New York and London: Seminar Press, 1973, pp. 141-160. For seminal
accounts of alienation see: Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott (ed.), Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1955 (originally published 1651), chapter XIV. Rousseau, Jean-
Jacques, "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality", in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social
Contract and Discourses, G. D. H. Cole (trans.), London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1973
(originally published 1755), pp. 66-75. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract,
Maurice Cranston (ed.), London: Penguin Books, 1968 (originally published 1762),
Book I.
34. Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 15 and p. 20. Johnson, Frank, "Alienation: Overview
and Introduction", in Alienation: Concept. Term, and Meanings, Frank Johnson (ed.), New
York and London: Seminar Press, 1973, pp. 6-7.
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regulating individual conduct have broken down or are no longer
effective as rules for behaviour.35
The human needs narrative of Burton postulates a version of the
alienation thesis. The thesis consists of the idea of human needs as
something original which cannot be suppressed. However, values
imposed by institutions may try to alienate individuals from their
human values, separate people from their needs and the metaphysical
originality constituted by needs. As Burton explicitly argues,
"alienation occurs in any system, if in practice, participation and
identity are denied". 36 In other words, institutional values may cause
alienation whose symptom is deviant behaviour and dysfunctional
conflict. The result is a sick society which is characterised by a
further denial of human needs satisfaction. Moreover, in the
pathological society the major constraints of human behaviour,
namely values attached to relationships, do not work and, as a
consequence, authorities lose their legitimacy.
A quote from Burton reveals the thesis:
"We arrive at the position that the individual in society will
pursue his needs and desires (some of which may be
programmed genetically and may include some elements of
altruism) to the extent that he finds this possible within the
confines of his environment, his experience and knowledge of
options and all other capabilities and constraints; he will use
the norms common within society and push against them to the
extent necessary to ensure that they work in his interests; but
if the norms of the society inhibit and frustrate to the degree
that he decides they are no longer useful, then, subject to
values he attaches to social relationships, he will employ
methods outside the norms, outside the codes he would in
other circumstances wish to apply to his behaviour. In doing so
he will be labelled deviant by society; but this is the cost he is
prepared to pay to fulfil his needs."37
35. Seeman, Melvin, "On the Meaning of Alienation", American Sociological Review, Vol.
24, No. 6, 1959, P. 787.
36. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 94.
37. Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and War, pp. 78-79. See also: Burton, "The Dynamics
of Change...", p. 67. Burton, "The Role of Authorities...", p. 76. Burton, John, Dear
Survivors, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982, pp. 52-55. Burton, John, "World
Society and Human Needs', in International Relations, A Handbook of Current Theory,
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In the sick body social there is "generally an erosion of authority and
defensive responses by authorities". 38 Decision-makers are not,
according to Burton, perceived as being concerned with the common
good, and this gives rise to revolutionary, and often violent, changes
in leadership. Revolutionary attempts, in turn, lead to even more
coercion and an endeavour to enforce law and order by the leaders
who want to preserve old structures and institutions.39
2. 2. Sociality and a theory of social contract
It has been described above how an alienated individual becomes
anti-social. Similarly, it can be asked how an individual becomes
social. Burton's theory suggests that if the society offers
relationships cherished by the individual, he or she will not challenge
them by anti-societal behaviour. In Burton's version of human needs
theory there is a belief that once the basic human needs of the
individual are fully satisfied, individuality will merge into and
become identica' with sociality. By the same token, it is assumed
that if basic human needs are fully developed, the individual will be a
fully moral person. 4 ° Thus, the link between needs fulfilment and
sociality established by many needs theorists can be found in
Burton's texts too.41
According to Burton, needs theory "draws attention to means of
promoting harmonious behaviour within a legitimized authority
structure". 42 Unless there is the fulfilment of needs of individuals
and groups, the social and political order cannot be harmonious.
Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1985, pp. pp. 52-53.
Burton,"The Means to Agreement", p. 235. Burton, John, Resolvin g Deep-Rooted
Conflict, p. 23. Burton, John, 'International Conflict Resolution and Problem Solving", in
Conflict Management and Problem Solvin g : From Interpersonal to International
Applications, Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.), London: Frances Pinter,
1987, p. 254 and p. 256.
38. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 39.
39. ibid., p. 39
40. Roy, "Social Conflicts and Needs Theories", p. 128.
41. For a view which denies the link see: Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter XIII.
42. Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and Wai, p. 213.
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Burton notes that the more secure the identity of, for example, a
minority ethnic group, the more likely it is to accord recognition to
others, and to cooperate with wider social and political systems.
Individuality becomes sociality, because needs provide objective and
rational criteria for policy-making and, as a result, a type of society
emerges which is acceptable to everyone.43
The logic of linking needs and harmony is not clear. The assumption
that "only by satisfying or creating opportunities for individuals to
satisfy their basic needs can there exist the possibility of a fully
developed human person, a whole man, and a harmonious, progressive
society" can be questioned. 44 The postulation of the compatibility
between individuality and sociality may be necessary in order to
mitigate the tension between the drive towards freedom and the
requirements of order in needs theories. However, the conclusion that
the satisfaction of needs should automatically produce this
compatibility, as some theorists claim, does not logically follow
from the premise.45
The question why authorities have to fulfil needs or offer
possibilities for human needs satisfaction sheds some light on the
'individuality versus sociality' problem. Human needs fulfilment is a
source of power in Burton's theory: authorities have legitimacy and
can maintain power in a society which enables needs satisfaction. It
is assumed, in this view, that legitimization does not derive from
force. Rather, its source is in human needs which cannot be
suppressed in a long-run. Burton notes the reciprocal gains attained
from the legitimised relationship. He writes: "Legitimization, on the
other hand, stresses the reciprocal nature of relations with
authorities, the support given because of the services they render,
and respect for legal norms when these are legitimized norms."4 6
Thus, Burton's notion of legitimization implies a theory of social
43. ibid., p. 63. Burton, Dear Survivors, p. 26. Burton, Global Conflict, pp. 147-148.
Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 21 and p. 106.
44. Roy, "Social Conflicts and Needs Theories", p. 129.
45. ibid., pp. 125-148.
46. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 127. See also: Burton, Deviance.
Terrorism and War, pp. 123-139. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp.
123-136.
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contract which is seen to suffice to explain the sources of
sociality.4 7
Although traditional social contract theories define certain mutual
obligations that generally link rulers and ruled, those in authority and
those subject to authority 48 , Burton's theory does not strictly define
any tasks based on mutual obligations. It, rather, provides criteria
for legitimised changes in political institutions and social structures
in general. According to the tradition of social contract theory set by
Rousseau, the obligations of the ruler are protection, the maintenance
of peace and order, and the guarantee of the material security. In
Burton's theory, on the other hand, the obligation of the authorities is
the general promotion of such social conditions that human needs
fulfilment becomes possible. Peace and order, sociality and social
harmony, are assumed follow automatically.
Social contract is seen in contract theories to serve to regulate
inherent and unavoidable conflict among (1) the demands and
requirements of the individual worker or household for food, clothing,
shelter and a share in amenities and pleasures of life; (2) the needs
of the society as a whole and (3) the demands and requirements of the
dominant individuals or groups. 49 According to Burton, (1) and (2) are
functionally related in the sense that individual needs satisfaction is
supposed to benefit the whole society. However, there can be conflict
between the individual and the elite groups or, rather, reified
institutional values imposed by the elite groups. The social contract
serves to regulate the conflict, as mentioned earlier, by offering
criteria for legitimate changes when institutional values undermine
human values.
47. For an introduction to social contract theories see: Lessnoff, Michael, Social Contract,
London: Macmillan, 1986. For classical texts see: Locke, John, Two Treatises of
Government, Peter Laslett (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988
(originally published 1689), Book II, chapter VIII. Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter XIV.
Rousseau, Social Contract, Book I, chapter 6. See also a recent version of social contract
theory: Rawis, John, A Theory of Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
48. They are mutual obligations in the senses (1) that each of the parties is subject to a
moral obligation to carry out certain tasks as its part of the implicit social contract and
(2) that failure to either party to perform the obligation constitutes grounds for the
other to refuse the execution of its task. Moore, Barrington, Jr., Iniustice. The Social
Bases of Obedience and Revolt, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1978, p. 20.
49. ibid., p. 32.
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Social contract theories accept reciprocal obligations by free and
rational human agents. Contractual obligations postulated by contract
theorists are often founded on natural law or natural rights of human
beings. Natural law is assumed to consist of a body of rules
prescribing rights and duties that are considered to be 'natural' in the
sense that they pertain to human nature. 5 ° In Burton's theory the
ultimate source of natural law is in needs. As Burton argues, the
"natural law is in this case a set of needs of the individual that must
be satisfied if he is to be an effective unit in a harmonious
society".5 1
It can be tentatively claimed that the form of rationality suggested
by this type of human needs thinking is mainly instrumental. Since
natural law is seen to be based on needs, the mode of human
rationality which follows is a rationality of man who tries to
maximise his or her needs and continuously reorganises priorities
according to respective opportunity costs. This understanding of
rationality does not undermine the idea of social contract. On the
contrary, it supports the view by interpreting the contract as a way
to guarantee mutual benefits for both the individual and the
authority.
50. For the connection between natural law and human needs thinking see: Rubenstein,
Richard, "Basic Human Needs Theory: Beyond Natural Law", in Conflict: Human Needs
Theory, John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 336-355.
51. Burton, "The Role of Authorities...", p. 78. See also: Burton, Conflict: Resolution and
Provention, pp. 91-92.
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3. HUMAN NEEDS AND PROBLEM-SOLVING CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
3. 1. Purification through professional cure
Since the problems are, according to Burton, 'sick societies' and
'alienated people', a professional cure is needed. When a conflict
occurs, the authority of the traditional mediator is, however,
undesirable because it is often based on power and coercion as a
means of dealing with conflicts. Given the fundamental tension in
many conflicts between the preservation of institutions in the
interest of social stability and the satisfaction of the needs of
individuals, problem-solving conflict resolution offers a way to take
into account and cost conflicting interests and strategies. The
professional facilitator needed in the problem-solving workshop
feeds back to the participants knowledge about common patterns of
behaviour in similar circumstances.52
In Burton's view, the authority of the third party has to derived from
a recognition by the parties of a professional expertise. "The third
party is an observer in a scientific role" is an often repeated phrase
by Burton. 53 The third party is considered to be in a scientific role
when he or she makes no assessments, judgements or value
interventions and adopts a neutral position. The expertise of the
facilitator arises from his or her superior knowledge of the 'natural
law based on needs' and common patterns of human behaviour. 54 The
ideal behaviour of the facilitator suggested by Burton can be traced
back to the principles of positivist natural sciences. According to
them, the scientist was to remain an outside observer of the
processes of nature. This idea was challenged, for example, already in
the 1920s by atom physicists. Heisenberg claimed then that even in
science the object of research is no longer nature itself, but man's
investigation of nature. His argument, thus, disputed the hypothetical
52. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 202-228.
53. Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and War, p. 37. Burton, Dear Survivors, p. 121.
Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 204.
54. Burton, John, "Resolution of Conflict", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No.
1, 1972, p. 6. Burton, World Society, p. 153.
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distinction between the researcher and the research object prevailing
in natural sciences at that time.55
Burton does relax the requirements of the ideal facilitator by
employing a metaphor of doctor. He maintains that the study of
conflict and its resolution and prevention are professions in the same
way that medicine and engineering are professions. Moreover, they
are all universal professions in the sense that the basics of their
fields do not vary across cultures. As with any other profession, the
profession of facilitator needs an ethical code which guides
behaviour. Burton derives three general rules from the medical
profession: professionalism, secrecy and perceived neutrality. The
rules imply that the creation of a relationship of trust with a client
is vital for a professional relation to emerge. 56 The facilitator, like
the doctor, has the expertise to recognise the symptoms of the sick
body social. Since the disease is alienation, he or she helps the
individuals themselves to overcome the malady. The professional help
is needed because individuals and groups are often so deeply involved
in their conflict (symptoms) that they do not know how to get the
resolution (healing) process started.
The type of skills needed in conflict resolution are not those
possessed by a general practitioner. They are, rather, therapeutic
skills. The connection between psychotherapy and needs gratification
can be found already in Maslow's texts. He saw therapy as a way to
satisfy needs on an interpersonal basis. 57 Similarly, the techniques
used in the problem-solving workshops which derive from T-group
experiments and social casework have a psychoanalytic origin.
However, it should be emphasised that the medical analogy has
limits. The participants in the Burtonian type of problem-solving
workshop are not considered to be 'sick' or 'alienated' individuals
55. North, Robert and Willard, Matthew, "The Post-Behavioural Debate: Indeterminism,
Probabilism and the Interaction of Data and Theory", in Conflict in World Societ y . A new
perspective on international relations, Michael Banks (ed.), Brighton: Wheatsheaf,
1984, p. 33.
56. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 149 and pp. 162-163. Burton, John, "The History of...",
p. 41. Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, pp. 27-29. Burton, Conflict: Resolution
and Provention, pp. 214-216 and p. 228. Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in
Manag ement..., pp. 186-1 88.
57. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 92-110.
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neither are the techniques employed aimed at working at an
individual level. Despite the limits, the doctor metaphor justifies
certain types of facilitative techniques. The techniques employed in
the workshop differ from the techniques used by the traditional
mediator, because they are thought to deal with the real causes of
conflict, not with symptoms.
A filter metaphor creates an image of the relationship between the
facilitator and the participants in the problem-solving workshop.
Burton writes:
"What is required in a problem-solving forum is a 'filter' to
screen out false assumptions and implications from existing
knowledge, cultural and ideological orientations and personal
prejudices. Probably the main task of the third party is to
provide this filter. If the participants can use this filter, then
they will be able to perceive realities accurately, to assess
available theoretical and empirical knowledge, and arrive at
reliable conclusions."58
In other words, the main contribution of the facilitator to a conflict
resolution process is in checking the preconceptions of the
participants and observing and testing their images of reality.
Through the filtering processes purification from prejudices, cultural
elements and ideologies is assumed to be achieved, and the
metaphysical originality - defined now as knowledge of real human
needs - is expected to be gained back.
Purification is achieved by a means of a negative and a positive
process. The negative process is the filtering process, where the
removal of all preconceptions about the existing state of affairs is
done. The positive side is the replacement of conflict-loaded theories
and information with alternatives that do not lead to conflict. 5 9
Disclosure is, from the point of view of the participants, the method
of filtering. As the psychoanalyst helps the patient to reveal his or
her inner feelings, so does the facilitator help the parties to
disclose, first, their stereotypes and prejudices and, later, their
58. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 208.
59. Brown, International Theory...", pp. 176-177.
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fundamental and real needs. The vacuum left by the filtering process
is filled with 'perfect knowledge'60 which is assumed to eliminate
false consciousness about original human conditions.
Some tentative notes about the filter metaphor can be made. The
metaphor suggests that the problem-solving procedures are not
relative to culture and, moreover, that the aim of the workshop is
actually to filter away cultural factors. The view clearly denies
culture its constitutive role in conflict and conflict resolution. The
denial leads to the assumption that there are culture-free techniques
of conflict resolution. The underlying notion of acultural man derives
from Burton's version of needs theory in which needs are rooted in
biology and considered to be universal, ahistorical and acultural.
3. 2. The 'organic cell' metaphor and functional cooperation
How is it possible to maintain the healthy situation achieved in the
problem-solving workshop that provides the society with
preconditions for permanent, but dynamic, harmony? Functional
cooperation is the answer for Burton. He maintains that conflict
resolution must be based on functional arrangements which are
designed to meet a specific set of social, economic or technical
needs. Legitimate functional arrangements establish a control
mechanism by building up and maintaining valued relationships in the
society.6 1
David Mitrany's account of the New Deal's political strategy reveals
the basic tenets of functional cooperation. He writes:
"Each and every action was tackled as a practical issue in
itself. No attempt was made to relate it to a general theory or
system of government. Every function was left to generate
others gradually, like the functional subdivision of organic
60. The term is employed by A. J. R. Groom in "No Compromise", p. 79.
61. Burton, "Functionalism and the Resolution of Conflict", p. 238. Burton, Deviance.
- Terrorism and War, pp. 166-167.
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cells; and in every case the appropriate authority was left to
develop its functions and powers out of actual performance."62
The metaphor of 'organic cell' and its biological analogy are the very
core of the functionalist approach advocated by Mitrany. The
metaphor creates an image of evolutionary and teleological processes
in which cells - as well as societies or even world society - develop
internally towards more sophisticated specialisation and
subdivisions. Specialisation occurs according to tasks or functions.
As a cell responds to its environment, is sensitive to it, so will a
society through functional arrangements become more sensitive to
changes in its environment and will develop new ways of adaptation.
The approach is pragmatic in the sense that there is no need to,
according to Mitrany, refer to general theory when tackling practical
problems: praxis guides theory. In Mitrany's words, functionalism
"knows only one logic, the logic of problem". 63 Moreover, problems
should be dealt with in an incremental manner, because reality is
considered to be in a constant flux where no fixed plans can be
applied. The view is liberal and believes in human rationality. The
argument is that people can work together most easily on functional,
occupational and technical matters, and by working together in these
roles, they begin to know and understand each other in other roles.
Rewarding common activity, growing gradually as the result of the
learning experience of previous success, is assumed to change the
attitudes of rational people towards each other.64
Mitrany maintains that the state is unable to guarantee such basic
needs as security and the maximisation of welfare. Functional
institutions are needed because in them problems are dealt with in an
open participatory way by the relevant experts. Gradually a sense of
community, according to Mitrany, will arise out of interests held in
common. Shared interests will further emerge through task expansion
62. Mitrany, David, The Functional Theory of Politics, London: Martin Robertson, 1975,
p. 163.
63. ibid., p. 258. See also: Mitrany, David, A Working Peace System, Chicago: Quadrangle
Books, 1966, P. 56.
64. Burton, World Society, p. 110. Taylor, Paul, "Introduction", in David Mitrany, Ih
Functio[Theory of Politics, London: Martin Robertson, 1975, p. xxi.
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and spillover in which cooperation deepens in existing areas and
spreads to new domains. States are expected to lose their salience,
and loyalties are transformed from states to functional bodies. The
greater the number and diversity of ties the less likely is war to
occur. Mitrany recommends two types of actions: actions which take
as many issues as possible out of the field of political competition
and actions which develop a web of common activities. The network
of activities which serves all people will gradually build up
foundations for a 'living international society', for a 'working peace
system'.65
Burton applies the idea of functional cooperation to conflict
resolution. He maintains that resolution can be assisted by this type
of cooperation. In order to tackle human needs conflict resolution
processes must be concerned with finding the political structures
which promote the full development of the individual. According to
Burton, such structural arrangements might include the development
of decentralised systems and forms of functional cooperation.
Consequently, functional cooperation would work against elite power
and reduce the danger of dysfunctional conflicts.66
More importantly, the logic of Mitrany's functional cooperation can be
found in the notion of the problem-solving workshop conflict
resolution as suggested by Burton. Similarly to a functional
institution, problems in the problem-solving workshop are assumed
to be dealt with in an open participatory manner. They are seen to be
dealt with not solely by experts, but with their help. Gradually a
sense of community is expected to evolve bringing the participants
together more and more in a positive manner to resolve, or at least to
discuss, problems which are perceived to be held in common.
Problem-solving processes are seen to be learning processes where
participants learn about themselves and others. Pragmatism prevails
65. Mitrany, A Working Peace System. Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, p.
225. Olson and Groom, International Relations Then & Now, pp. 190-191.
66. Burton, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and the United Nations", p. 79. Burton, Conflict
and Communication, pp. 88-94. Burton, "Resolution of Conflict", p. 19. Burton, "The
Role of Authorities...", pp. 76-77. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Function...", p. 196.
Burton, John, "Unfinished Business in Conflict Resolution", in Conflict: Readin g s in
Manag ement & Resolution, John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds.), London: Macmillan,
1990, p. 329.
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in the workshop in the sense that the participants are also
encouraged to discuss practical issues given that they reflect their
real needs. In brief, the workshop is thought to be an 'exercise in
reason' in which the liberal faith in human rationality is realised.67
Mitrany's functionalist approach is in accordance with some views of
human needs thinking, because also "functionalists holds that
violence has its roots in the social and economic circumstances of
people, and that if we give them a moderate sufficiency of what they
want and ought to have they will keep in peace". 68 As demonstrated
earlier, in the Burtonian version of needs theory violence is partly a
product of social circumstances. When social structures hinder needs
satisfaction and violence emerges, the individual is not to be blamed.
Social circumstances and their relation to social harmony as well as
the 'common needs of people' as a foundation for cooperation are,
thus, emphasised in both approaches.
Functionalist ideology offers a further justification for the trust in
the expertise of the facilitator. Functionalism implies that benefits
will accrue and spread widely in the society when specialists
concentrate on a particular task, service or function. The specialists
can consider problems of technical kind, and minimise the role of
ideology. As a consequence, effective control and effective
management are obtained. 69 This view of expertise supports the
notion of acultural problem-solving conflict resolution in which the
aim is to limit the power of ideological and cultural factors. The
expert facilitator with a capacity to treat problems in a 'technical'
manner can best fulfil the limiting function.
This chapter can be summarised by pointing out oppositions in
Burton's human needs narrative. The ideas of voluntarism, learning
and pragmatism which are rooted in Mitrany's functionalism are
opposed by an element of determinism arising from human needs
thinking. Since needs are, in the Burtonian version of needs thinking,
67. See also: Avruch and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature...", p. 225.
68. Taylor, "Introduction", p. xi.
69. Taylor, Paul, "Functionalism: the Approach of David Mitrany", in Frameworks for
International Co-operation, A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), London: Pinter
Publishers, 1990, pp. 128-129.
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derived from biology and interpreted as motivations, it can be
tentatively argued that from this viewpoint needs determine to an
extent human behaviour. At the same time, human beings are seen to
be capable of learning and their behaviour is considered to be based
on free will. Similarly, the liberal trust in universal reason which is
assumed to actualise in the workshop context opposes the notion of
individual and instrumental rationality found in Burton's needs
theory. It should be emphasised that the oppositions do not
necessarily demonstrate the inconsistency of Burton's texts. They,
rather, illuminate internal tensions which characterise any text.
The oppositions and metaphors discussed above will be employed in
the next chapter which will deal in a more detailed manner with the
rationale of the Burtonian problem-solving workshop. The focus will
be on the types of explanations of and the ways of explaining human
motivations, actions and reason.
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CHAPTER IV: THE RATIONALE OF THE BURTONIAN PROBLEM-
SOLVING WORKSHOP: EXPLANATIONS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR
AND FORMS OF RATIONALITY
Theories of conflict and conflict resolution always include an image
of human 'being' and human nature: a type of person engaged in
conflict and conflict resolution is constructed in theories. As
demonstrated in the previous chapter, Burton's primary image seems
to be that of the biologically conditioned human. Moreover, theories
consist also of explanations of human action and rationality. In other
words, every theory of conflict is part of some general theory of
action. In order to 'reconstruct' Burton's problem-solving conflict
resolution theory further, the chapter will study how he explains
human behaviour.
For analytical purposes the Burtonian approach is divided into three:
behaviour outside the workshop, the entry decision and behaviour
within the workshop structure. 1 At every stage it is asked what is
the mode of behaviour Burton assumes while explaining action, and
what is the form of rationality related to the assumed form of
behaviour. The chapter discusses also the assumptive basis of his
explanations. The study of presuppositions leads us to such questions
as, what it the ultimate motivational force underlying behaviour and,
again, what kind of suppositions are made about human nature? The
first three parts approach the questions from the point of view of the
workshop participants and the last from the angle of the facilitator.
1. BEHAVIOUR OUTSIDE THE WORKSHOP
1. 1. Needs as an explanation of human behaviour
The aim of this part is to study the assumptive basis of needs
thinking as it relates to the analysis of human behaviour. More
1. The phrase 'workshop structure' is employed, because it describes well the idea of
workshop acting as a framework for behaviour.
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specifically, the purpose is to examine needs theories - and
especially John Burton's version of needs theory - as one class of
explanation of motives. R. S. Peters' classification of motive
explanations offers a starting-point for defining motive. According to
him, if a human being has a motive, it must have a goal of some sort,
however weak its influence or however obvious or attainable it may
be. For Peters, there are four types of motive explanations: (1)
explanations which deal with the reason of the actor, (2)
explanations which postulate the reason, (3) causal explanations and
(4) end-state explanations.2
Needs theories can be considered as one type of end-state explanation
of human behaviour. An end-state explanation explains behaviour by
reference to requirements of the organism which serve to organise
and motivate behaviour. In this view, needs can be interpreted as a
construct, a fiction or hypothetical concept, which stands, for
example, for a force in the brain region. Furthermore, needs can be
assumed to have substantial impact on the perception and
organisation of reality as well as on behavioural activities within
it. 3 Seen from another point of view, there is a 'psychologist's use of
needs'. That is, needs are seen as hidden causes, whose discovery is
made possible by the special technique of the psychologist. According
to A. Louch, three senses can be noted in the 'psychologist's use of
needs'. First, need is used in the sense of conditions for survival,
whether of the individual or of the species. In the second sense it is
not merely survival that is at stake, but quality of survival. The third
sense, on the other hand, identifies need with homeostatic processes
of a physiological nature in which certain kinds of activities restore
an independently defined equilibrium.4
As suggested in the previous chapter where the idea of metaphysical
originality in needs thinking was identified, the words 'force' and
'hidden causes' are vital for needs theories. If we assume, according
2. Peters, R. S., The Concept of Motivation, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul and New York:
Humanities Press, 1958, pp. 27-51.
3. Renshon, Stanley, "Human Needs and Political Analysis: An Examination of a
Framework", in Human Needs and Po'itics, Ross Fitzgerald (ed.), Oxford, New York:
Pergamon Press, 1977, pp. 53-54.
4. Louch, A. R., Explanation and Human Action, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1966.
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to the logic of metaphysical originality, that there is a fundamental
stratum of the person which acts as the 'engine' that motivates
behaviour, we need to further specify what is the 'engine', force. It is
not sufficient to state that needs as such act as a motivational force,
because the questions 'why' and 'how' remain unanswered. As Patricia
Springborg notes, almost all subsequent versions of needs theory
agree that an explanation of human motivation and conduct is to be
sought not in the metaphysical realm of the soul, divine will, or
spirit, but in certain instincts, drives, propensities or powers of man
as a physical being. 5 Thus, one way to specify the 'engine' is to claim
that needs correspond with drives 6 , whose demands seek immediate
satisfaction at any cost subject only to the higher cognitive and
moral constraints of ego and superego, or, as Burton would claim, of
values attached to relationships.
Early attempts to specify human needs proceeded on the assumption
that behind every behaviour one could find a corresponding drive.
These attempts proved to be problematic, because it was assumed
implicitly that every object and situation for which an organism aims
must be accompanied by a characteristic drive for the object. Such
instincts as an instinct for 'social behaviour' and an instinct 'to avoid
eating apples in one's own orchard' became postulated by needs
theorists. Neither did Freud's dualistic theory of human needs prove
to be fruitful because of its high level of abstraction. Lists of needs
(needs understood as drives), as described in the previous chapter, on
the other hand, present difficulties of operationalisation and data
gathering. 7 In sum, the problem of how to conceptualise the
complexity and diversity of human motives in a way that permits
empirical inquiry has not been solved by the conception of 'needs as
drives'.
Although teleological (goal-oriented) forms of explanation are
employed by many needs theorists, the concept of stimulus and its
5. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., p. 4.
6. 'Drive' is understood here as an explanatory concept referring to goal-oriented
behaviour. For more detailed discussions see: Young, Paul, "Physiological Drives", in
International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 4, 1968, p. 275. Bolles, Robert,
Theory of Motivation, New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967,
Chap. 5.
7. Renshon, "Human Needs and Political...", pp. 56-57.
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causal form of explanation can also be found in several theories.
Causality enters into a needs explanation if drive is identified with
the energy potentially available for behaviour, and it is asked what
triggers that potential. It can be answered, as stimulus-response
behaviorism does, that an aspect of the environment perceived by an
organism acts as a stimulus and triggers behaviour. Some writers
have expressed an extreme view by claiming that the use of the drive
concept "reflects an ignorance of the stimulus: if more were known
about the stimuli associated with each specific drive, one could
dispense with a general non-specific drive factor".8
To sum up, needs theories form a class of prescriptive end-state
explanations of human behaviour. Often a reference to needs implies a
standard pattern of prescribed goals, but it does not really explain
actions by reference to them. 9 Therefore, it is necessary, in order to
establish a plausible explanation, for needs theories to postulate the
idea of drives as the engine of behaviour. Yet, the problems of the use
of the notion of drive illuminate the unsatisfactory capacity of needs
theories for explaining behaviour. 1 0 The claim for the empirical and
objective definition of needs can be understood in the light of these
problems. 1 1 If we could specify a particular set of empirical needs,
we would be able to explain at least a part of human behaviour by
referring to them. As a consequence, we could repudiate prescriptive
explanations based on a normative needs concept.
Needs as an explanation of behaviour raises the question of human
nature and, closely related to it, the question of the ontological
foundation of needs. As Springborg points out in her study on Western
human needs thinking, a long line of philosophers, from Aristotle to
Hegel, and the existentialists, has put emphasis on the concept of
desire. It has been assumed that desire is some way symptomatic of
the human condition. Desire is seen to be expressive of man's
8. Quoted from Young who refers to Robert Bolles. Young, "Physiological Drives", p. 276.
9. Peters, The Concept of Motivation, p. 18.
10. See more on the difficulties needs theories have in explaining behaviour: Louch,
Explanation and Human Action, pp. 70-79. Renshon "Human Needs and Political...".
Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., pp. 252-274.
11. See, for example: Watt, E. D., "Human Needs, Human Wants, and Political
Consequences", Political Studies, Vol. XXX, No. 4, 1982, pp. 533-543. Burton, Deviance.
Terrorism and War, p. 64.
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freedom, because it indicates man's own role in fulfilling his or her
needs and in reinforcing his or her identity and development. On the
other hand, the concept of needs can be used to argue a quite
different case: one can establish a strong connection between human
nature and needs by claiming that needs are embedded in man's
biological structure. 12 For example, Abraham Maslow and John Burton
argue that needs are biologically founded, genetically implanted.
Maslow discusses the 'instinctlike nature of basic needs'. 1 3
Similarly, Burton's and Sandole's generic theory which assumes that
we are dealing with universal patterns of behaviour and, moreover,
with the explanation that transcends observable differences of human
behaviour, is founded on a belief in the biogenetic origin of needs.1 4
By embedding needs in man's biological structure these writers
consider, thus, the basis of human nature to be in biology.
Burton's biologically oriented needs theory exemplifies also the idea
of universal human nature. The logic of universalistic needs thinking
assumes that what is true of human nature, must, because
universality is one of its facets, be true of all individuals in all
cultures. Needs represent a set of objective data that conforms to
this requirement. The recourse to the universality of needs offers a
potent way to defuse contextualism. Moreover, it is concluded by
many needs theorists that what is universal, by virtue of its
universality, can be accorded greater significance than any local
variation: the universal is thought to be more basic than the
parochial.1 5 Discussions about needs may include also implicit
statements about the sociality of needs. As demonstrated in the
previous chapter, in many needs theories there is a tendency to
postulate the compatibility between individuality and sociality. As a
result, it is supposed that human nature as such is good. Even the idea
of biologically founded needs can include the axiom. The principle
12. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., p. 252. It is important to note the
difference between needs regarded as a human condition and needs regarded as the very
essence of human nature.
13. Maslow, Motivation and Personality , p. 54.
14. Burton and Sandole, "Generic Theory", pp. 333-344.
15. Berry, Christopher, Human Nature, London: Macmillan, 1986, pp. 82-85.
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characterises particularly the humanist psychology advocated, for
example, by Maslow. 1 6
1. 2. John Burton's needs theory and the explanation
of behaviour
In Deviance. Terrorism and War Burton	 unconventionally
differentiates action from behaviour:
"The distinction between action and behaviour is important in
this context. Action is observable. Behaviour is the motivation,
the reason for action. It cannot be observed. Observing
behaviour is interpretation of action and, as such, may not
coincide with the actual motivation leading to action." 1 7
The definition, thus, suggests t at behaviour is something more
original and deeper than action: it is the reason for action. Action as
such is a surface under which it is possible to find a more
fundamental stratum of causes.
According to Burton, the hidden sources of action can be found in
human needs. He claims that "there are human needs more compelling
in directing behaviors than any possible external influences". 18 Needs
are defined by him as underlying and basic motivations, that cannot
be bargained away. Therefore, according to Burton, needs can be used
to explain, for example, dissidence, deviant behaviour and role
defence. 19 Burton's way to use the concept of motivation can be
16. Maslow argues that the gratification of basic needs leads to consequences that may be
called 'desirable', 'good', 'healthy' and 'seif-actualising'. Thus, Maslow's concept of self-
actualisation follows from, and is logically dependent on, his belief that human nature is
innately given and good. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., p. 186.
17. Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and War, p. 32. Burton's differentiation between action
and its hidden sources leads him to claim that traditional IR theory has missed 'hidden
behavioural data' which explains why conflicts persist. Burton, "World Society and
Human Needs", p. 47. The distinction between action and behaviour as it is suggested by
Burton is not used in the thesis. Rather, action is identified with behaviour and the
Burtonian notion of behaviour is identified with the motives of behaviour.
18. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 33.
19. Burton Deviance. Terrorism and War, p. 59 and p. 73. Burton, Dear Survivors, p.
75. Burton, Resolvin g Deep-Rooted Conflict, p. 23. Burton, John and Ramsden, Hedda,
"Order and Change", in International Relations. A Bibliography, A. J. R. Groom and C. R.
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classified as a 'psychologist's conception' in which the motive is seen
to be the reason that is actually operative. Moreover, as Peters points
out, "the logical force of the term 'motive' has been often interpreted
causally by postulating a particular sort of causal connection
between pursuing the goal and some inner spring of action". 2 0
Burton's interpretation of motive is in accordance with Peters'
observation, because Burton postulates a causal connection between
needs as reasons for action and pursuing the goal of needs
satisfaction. His discussion on drives, on the other hand, can be seen
to be an attempt to reinforce the causal connection, because drives
clearly establish causal conditions which initiate goal directed
behaviour.
In Conflict: Resolution and Provention Burton states explicitly that
human beings have drives. He writes that "human beings, however,
appear to have certain inherent drives that are not within their
ability to control, and which certainly cannot be suppressed by
external socialization, threats and coercion".2 1 Moreover, Burton
identifies needs with drives by claiming that "needs, in particular,
are inherent drives for survival and development, including identity
and recognition". 22 He uses here, thus, a typical end-state
explanation by explaining human behaviour by reference to
requirements of the organism which serve to organise and motivate
it. In other words, in addition to establishing causal conditions which
initiate behaviour, Burton's explanation relies on teleology in the
sense that it postulates a striving or motivation toward something.
The concept of drive, or 'needs as drives', lends itself to be
understood, thus, also as a goal-oriented requirement in his version
of needs theory.
Burton's mode of explanation can be summarised by saying that in his
needs theory needs act as motives. Since needs are drives, drives are
Mitchell (eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1978, P. 132. Burton claims in World Society
(p. 126) that socio-biological values (needs) are "closely related to, if not direct
expressions of, biological drives and motivations". Thus, "they are a fundamental particle
of human behaviour".
20. Peters, The Concept of Motivation, pp. 38-39.
21. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 32.
22. ibid., p. 39. See also: Burton, "The Dynamics of Change...", pp. 66-67. Burton, Global
Conflict, p. 138. Burton and Sandole, "Generic Theory", p. 338.
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considered as ultimate motives for behaviour. The terms 'motive' and
'drive' become thus almost synonymous. Moreover, needs are assumed
to be goals, since Burton writes that "needs relate to those goals that
are universal" and the "claim for territory could be a tactic in the
pursuit of the goal of security". 23 This type of use of 'motive' implies
that whenever one explains an action by reference to a motive one
both assigns a goal and a cause. 24 Thus, Burton uses both causal
explanation by assigning a cause for behaviour and teleological
explanation by using goals as an explanatory factor. However, it
should be emphasised that Burton's list of needs, introduced in the
previous chapter, limits the scope of causes and goals. Burton is not
arguing that behind every action we can find a corresponding drive.
Rather, he claims that there is a certain set of needs (drives) and the
ultimate goal of an individual is the satisfaction of these particular
needs.
Furthermore, Burton does not claim that he is explaining all
behaviour. He states that he aims at explaining conflictual behaviour
and studying the behavioural reasons that lead to conflict. Therefore,
the notion of frustrated and denied needs - or needs satisfaction and
obstruction of needs maximisation 25 - is fundamental for his theory:
it helps to explain behaviour that is inconsistent with normal
behaviour. In the Burtonian explanation of frustrated needs the
classic Freudian mechanism is at work. It is assumed that the drives
if frustrated in their original purpose must seek substitute outlets
and, as such, may turn up in the disguise of opposites. 26 Burton
assumes that, for example, the need for identity, if blocked, may end
up taking the form of territory claim. The territory claim, in turn,
may be perceived and conceptualised by the actors in terms of
conflicting interests.
23. Burton, John "About Winning', International Interactions, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1985, pp.
74-75.
24. Peters, The Concept of Motivation, p. 39.
25. The terms 'needs maximisation' and 'goal maximisation' refer in this context to the
tendency of human beings to satisfy their needs at any cost. See: Burton, "The Dynamics of
Change...", p. 75. Burton, Dear Survivors, p. 15. Burton, "About Winning", p. 88. The
notion of maximisation can be found also in Burton's discussion on the entry problem. The
concept will be studied in a more detailed manner later in this chapter.
26. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., pp. 190-191.
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Despite the aim to explain mainly 'deviant' behaviour, Burton's needs
theory does imply a general theory of behaviour. It is not logical to
argue that deviant and conflictual behaviour is motivated by certain
drives and normal behaviour by something else, If we postulate a
theory based on drives, that inevitably, to a certain extent, explains
all types of behaviour. However, this is not to say that there may not
be other causes that give arise to behaviour.
As noted earlier, the idea of metaphysical originality can be found in
many needs theories. Burton's needs theory relies on it by equating
needs with drives, and by giving drives a status of motivational
force. However, drives do not act in a vacuum; they need a trigger to
be activated. For Burton, environment plays an important role both as
a trigger and as a constraint. He writes:
"All behaviour is a response by an actor - an individual or a
group - to the environment. Behaviour cannot be analysed
without reference to the personality of the actor. Nor can
behaviour be analysed in isolation from the physical setting,
the institutional structures and the legal and social rules of
the society in which it occurs. It is the result of interaction
between the needs and interests of actors and environmental
constraints (including the needs and interests of other
actors)."27
The idea of biologically founded human nature is closely related to
the notion of drive. In Deviance. Terrorism and War Burton postpones
the explicit discussion of the bases of human nature. He states that
"for the purposes of this study it is not necessary to enter into any
argument whether such needs are genetic or environmentally
induced". 28 On the other hand, while studying nationalism, he
concludes that "these manifestations of nationalism have biological
origins and protective functions". 29 Later Burton, in Olson's and
Groom's words, "comes down heavily in favour of nature". 3 ° He
27. Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and War, p. 183. See also: Burton, "The Dynamics of
Change...", p. 70.
28. Burton Deviance. Terrorism and War, p. 75.
29. ibid., p. 80. See also: Burton, "The Dynamics of Change...", pp. 66-67.
30. Olson and Groom, International Relations Then & Now, p. 212.
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writes, for example, that "in ontological terms the individual is
conditioned by biology". 31 Moreover, needs are "goals that are
ontological or universal in the human species, and which are probably
genetic, and which, therefore, are not subject to change even in
changed conditions".32
The idea of universal and biologically founded human nature, thus,
forms the ontological core of Burton's needs theory. The idea of
universal human nature is, however, inherently problematic. As
Springborg argues, it is not necessarily the case that the common
denominator to which we refer in explaining uniform phenomena is
necessarily a real entity as such, a simple or discrete thing. 33 She
continues:
"This is the problem posed by the theory of universals, raised
first by Plato. It is not necessarily the case that the existence
of tables in all shapes and forms must be explained in
reference to a blueprint or archetypal table which represents
their essence; no more is this the case with man."34
All notions of human nature denote 'models of man'. The medica'
metaphor discussed in the previous chapter insinuates the model of
well-functioning, healthy individuals whose temporary alienation is
caused by the sick society. In the model, pathologies, or deviant
behaviour as Burton calls them, are, therefore, considered as an
effect of dysfunction. This type of image points to a hidden prejudice
in favour of the homeostatic model of man, and favours an account of
behaviour as causally determined rather than intentional (goal-
oriented).
31. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 36.
32. ibid., p. 212. Earlier Burton saw human being to be more malleable, and made,
therefore, more room for society. In Dear Survivors (p. 130) he claims that although
drives are biologically based, part of them may be acquired, that is, they are generated by
the experience of living within a society.
33. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., pp. 191-192.
34. ibid., p. 191.
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1. 3. Needs, values, interests and culture
Burton maintains that "there are drives and motivations toward
human goals that cannot be repressed; for instance, drives for
identity, development, meaning, consistency in response (which
implies distributive justice), and other ontological needs stated
earlier". 35 The use of both words, 'drive' and 'motivation', implies
that there are other motivations than drives. This brings up the
traditional distinctions between needs and interests and between
needs and wants. 36 Burton differentiates needs from interests and
values. His argument is that human motivations include "some that
are required for the development of the human species, some that are
culturally specific, and some that are of a transitory nature". 37 For
Burton, needs are universal in the human species, values are cultural
and interests are transitory.38
According to Burton, values 39 are characteristic of particular social
communities, and may alter over periods of time. They are acquired,
not genetic. Values motivate behaviour in the sense that preservation
of values may lead individuals to defensive and aggressive
behaviours. It is the pursuit of needs that is the reason, for example,
for the formation of identity groups, but it is values attached to
identity groups, and the defence of these values from which
aggressive behaviour arises. Interests, on the other hand, refer to the
occupational, social, political and economical aspirations of the
individual and identity group. They are typically related to material
goods, and, therefore, transitory, negotiable, and competitive.
35. Burton and Sandole, "Generic Theory", p. 338.
36. As Springborg notes, already the Stoics made the disjunction between subjective
desires and objective needs. The relation of needs and wants was also much discussed by
the Epicureans. The utilitarians, unlike the Stoics and the Epicureans, removed the
dichotomy between subjective desires and objective needs. In more recent needs theories,
Maslow considered instinctoid needs good, and claimed that culture has the power to induce
false or artificial needs. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., pp. 13-14 and p.
187.
37. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 36.
38. ibid., p. 36.
39. Burton's terminology varies; sometimes values are referred as 'socio-psychological'
or 'cultural values' and needs as 'socio-biological values' or 'fundamental values'. Burton,
Deviance. Terrorism and War, pp. 57-58. Burton, World Society, pp. 127-129.
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Interests are not in any way an inherent part of the individual as are
needs and, moreover, they may conflict with needs. Interests
motivate behaviour too, but only in a very limited sense: they
motivate behaviour which is mainly aimed at an occupational, social,
political or economical gain.40
Burton's theory, thus, consists of an 'onion model'. According to the
model, the very essence of human being can be found in universal and
ontological needs which resist cultural influences. The second layer
of the onion is values, which are, to a certain extent, influenced by
culture, and, therefore, are relative to societies. Since individuals
attach values to needs, values impinge upon needs. The uppermost
layer is interests which have a limited scope and which are largely
under the influence of culture, Interests are mainly related to
material gains. All these layers motivate behaviour. However, they
motivate it differently: their scope and force vary. The ultimate
motivation arises from needs. They are seen to be the 'engine' of
behaviour. Values attached to needs have a narrow motivational
power. Similarly, utilitarian interests motivate in limited fields.
The layer metaphor raises the question of culture. What is the role of
culture in motivating human behaviour? Burton makes his view on
culture clear by arguing that culture and needs must be
differentiated. Although culture is of the vital importance - it is a
satisfier and many deep-rooted conflicts have an inter-cultural
dimension - "culture as such, however, we must conclude, is not an
important consideration in a facilitated analytical problem-solving
conflict resolution process". 41 Burton, thus, recognises the role of
culture, but it does not and should not, according to him, intrude into
40. Burton, Global Conflict, pp. 145-148. Burton, "World Society and Human Needs", p.
50. Burton, "About Winning", pp. 74-75. Burton, John, "The Facilitation of
International Conflict Resolution", in Research in Social Movements. Conflict and Change,
Luis Kriesberg (ed.), London: Greenwich, Connecticut, Vol. 8, 1985, P. 37. Burton, "The
Means to Agreement", p. 234. Burton, John, "The Procedures of Conflict Resolution", in
International Conflict Resolution. Theory and Practice, Edward Azar and John Burton
(eds.), Sussex, Boulder: Wheatsheaf Books, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986, p. 96.
Burton, John "The Theory of Conflict Resolution", Current Research on Peace and
Violence, Vol. IX, No. 3, 1986, p. 128. Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, p. 16.
Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Function...", p. 194. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and
Proventi gn, pp. 37-39. Burton and Sandole, "Generic Theory", p. 337.
41. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 215.
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problem-solving processes. 42 As Avruch and Black summarise,
culture is reasonably deep in Burton's theory, in the layer of values,
but it is far from fundamental. Culture is interpreted in Burton's
theory in a thoroughly individualistic and instrumentalist manner,
existing so far as it can be identified with an instrumental needs
satisfier. 43 Moreover, as Springborg notes, if human needs are
innately prescribed in a needs theory, as they are in Burton's version,
it puts a "heavy burden on culture for which the theory in general
makes no room".44
Burton's way of differentiating values and interests from needs does
not shift the image of a biologically bounded human being to a social
constructionist direction. In other words, since cultural elements
brought in by the notions of values and interest do not penetrate to
the 'core of the onion', to the level of needs, these conceptions do not
elicit discussions on the possibility of culturally and socially
founded human existence. Furthermore, the distinction does not
significantly extend the scope of motives, because the onion model
gives priority to needs by placing them into the deepest motivational
stratum.
Another way to differentiate needs from interests, and to introduce
cultural elements, would be to claim that the basic division is
between artificially (culturally) produced wants and objective needs
- the argument used, for example, by Christian Bay. 45 In that case it
could be argued that conflicts are caused by the discrepancy between
needs and wants, and that the aim of the problem-solving workshop is
to overcome the difference by making the participants aware of their
42. The filter metaphor discussed in the previous chapter expresses also this view, On
cultural expressions of needs see: Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and War, p. 69. Burton
and Sandole, "Generic Theory", p. 343.
43. Avruch and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature in...", p. 227. See also: Burton, Conflict:
Resolution and Provention, p. 211.
44. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., p. 188.
45. Christian Bay bases his theory of human needs on the idea of artificially produced
wants (synonymous desires) and underlying needs. According to him, wants do not always
coincide with needs. His thesis is that "whenever superficial wants are fulfilled but
underlying needs remain frustrated, pathological behaviour is likely to ensue". Bay,
Christian, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral
Literature", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 59, No. 1, 1965, p. 48. See
also: Bay, Christian, "Taking the Universality of Human Needs Seriously", in Conflict:
Human Needs Theory, John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 235-256.
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true needs. However, even this distinction is problematic. It means
returning to the Marxist division between real and artificial, between
true and false needs.46 The notion of false needs (or rather wants)
evokes easily the notion of 'false consciousness', that is, human
beings under the influence of some forms of society or modes of
production (e.g. capitalist) do not get to know their true needs. The
problem is that the conception of 'false consciousness' presupposes a
'correct' diagnosis of needs and wants, which is likely to be a
dogmatic diagnosis. 47 A 'correct', often also called 'objective',
diagnosis of needs, by viewing real needs as independent of the
perceptions, concepts and frames of reference of actors in the social
world, tends to produces an authoritarian definition of needs which
dictates what the real needs should be.
Burton does not use the terminology, but there is an element of this
discussion in his theory. The aspect can be found particularly in his
conflict resolution theory, where he supposes that many conflictual
claims can be reduced to needs. For example, a claim for territory can
be interpreted as a need for identity. The logic of the statement is
that there is something more original underlying artificial wants. The
idea of false consciousness enters into the argument, because it is
implicitly assumed that the conflicting parties do not know their real
needs, and, therefore, they operate at the level of false wants. The
role of the facilitator becomes, according to the logic, justified with
reference to a need to raise the level of consciousness of the
participants.
46. Such writers as Herbert Marcuse, Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm and Jean-Paul
Sartre have tried to trace the doctrine of true and false needs back to Marx. To put it very
simply, the recent Marxist tradition of needs thinking has argued that the capitalist
society has forced to consume greater and greater quantities of commodities that an
individual really does not need. Exploitation in this context, then, consists not in the
failure to meet basic needs so much as in the creation of false needs. Springborg, flj.
Problem of Human Needs..., pp. 1-18.
47. Smith, M. Brewster, "Metapsychology, Politics, and Human Needs", in Human Needs
and Politics, Ross Fitzgerald (ed.), Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press, 1977, p. 132.
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1. 4. Human needs and determinism
As it is tentatively argued in the previous chapter, human needs
thinking includes often a form of biological determinism. Especially
if needs are referred to as drives, we have little choice but to
conform. Moreover, if needs are considered to constitute a natural
law similar to physical natural laws, as Burton considers them to
constitute, their determining force cannot be avoided. 48 The notion
of determinism as it relates to the explanation of human behaviour
is, however, not simple. 49 In the context of the previous chapter,
determinism was seen as a framework which sets certain limits to
behaviour. Avruch and Black, on the other hand, while discussing
Burton, talk about biogenetic determinism without clarifying the
notion. 50 They are correct that a form of determinism is implicitly
included in the idea of genetically implanted needs. However, the
definition of determinism should not be taken for granted.
Roger Trigg notes that a simple causal explanation favoured by a part
of sociobiology which claims that everything can be explained in
terms of genes, involves a biological determinism. Trigg argues that
since determinism is the thesis that every event has a cause, a belief
in determinism embraces the claim that all human behaviour is
causally explicable. 51 It is important to keep in mind that Burton's
explanation of behaviour outside the workshop structure relies on
both the causal and teleological modes of explanation. Unlike Trigg's
'reductionistic determinist', Burton does not claim that everything
48. Burton, "The ROle of Authorities...", p. 78. Burton, "International Conflict Resolution
and Problem Solving", p. 255.
49. A quote from Richard Dawkins illuminates the complexity. Dawkins writes: "Once the
genes have provided their survival machines [e.g. human beings] with brains that are
capable of rapid imitation, the memes [units of cultural transmission, units of imitationi
will automatically take over." Dawkins concludes by claiming that it is perfectly possible
to hold that genes exert a statistical influence on human behaviour while at the same time
the influence can be modified, overridden or reversed by other influences. Dawkins,
Richard, The Selfish Gene, Oxford, New York; Oxford University Press, 1989 (2nd ed),
p. 200 and p. 331.
50. Avruch and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature in...", p. 222.
51. Trigg, Roger, Understanding Social Science, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985, pp. 171-
172. For more detailed definitions of biological determinism and reductionism see: Rose,
Steven, Lewontin, R. C. and Kamin, Leon, Not in Our Genes: Biology. Ideology and Human
Natre, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985, pp. 5-7. For biological explanations of
aggression and violence see: Webb, Keith, "Science, Biology, and Conflict", Paradigms,
Vol. 6, No. 1, 1992, pp. 65-96.
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can be explained in terms of genes. In other words, he does not reduce
all behaviour to biology. Thus, in this sense his determinism is
different from that which can be found in some versions of
sociobiology.
Discussions about determinism should take into account different
degrees of determinism. That is, it is vital to discriminate between
such notions as biology 'determines', 'guides', 'puts constraints to' or
'sets a framework for' human being and behaviour. Burton's statement
that the "individual is conditioned by biology" seems to suggest the
extreme degree of determinism. 52 On the other hand, the sentence
can be given another interpretation: the term 'conditioned' can be
understood to refer to a set of biological conditions which
establishes a framework for behaviour. The degree of determinism in
this interpretation is, thus, lower than in the view hold by Avruch and
Black.
However, whichever interpretation we choose, human nature is
defined as a given, as a constraint, as a limit by Burton. Humans as
humans are seen to have a limited range of options open to them, and
that what is taken as a given sets the limits of action. The limited
range of possibilities implies that there is a constancy and
predictability about what humans will do in specific situations. As
Berry puts it, "what is taken as a given maps out a conceptual space"
within which theorising on human being takes place.53
There are several ways to relax determinism in needs thinking. For
example, the study on needs satisfiers, as it is done by Mitchell,
assumes that there are culturally and historically relative means to
satisfy needs. 54 Marxist theory, on the other hand, supposes that man
is infinitely malleable, because of the possibility of self-creation
through praxis. Needs in a human being are considered to be
expressive of an ability to transcend the limits of material
52. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 36. Burton states also that "this
biological approach is resisted by many who label it determinism. But if there are
universal human needs their final description will be made possible through biology".
Burton, Global Conflict, p. 142. He argues also that "needs theory is not biological
determinism". A private correspondence between the author and John Burton.
53. Berry, Human Nature, p. 104.
54. Mitchell, "Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution", pp. 149-176.
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existence. Thus, humans are self-conscious subjects who know the
area of their dependence on the material world, and, therefore,
understand the boundaries of freedom. 55 Furthermore, a way to relax
biological determinism is to take into account the complicated
effects of social learning. Social learning theory can be employed in
needs theories by claiming that needs cannot be directly translated
into human motives, but, rather, they acquire motive status through
social learning. 56 Similarly, different socialisation processes can be
seen to shape man to the extent that it overcomes biological
conditions. Burton does not, however, agree with these arguments. He
does not discuss praxis as a means to transcend man's limitations.
Neither does he agree with social learning theories. On the contrary,
he claims that the scope of socialisation is limited, and man is more
conditioned by needs than society.57
Given the goals of this chapter, it needs to be also asked what type of
rationality is included in the Burtonian needs thinking. Avruch and
Black claim that in Burton rational behaviour (costing) masks an
underlying, fundamental irrationality, the at-any-cost fulfilment of
basic human needs. 58 Their conclusion needs modifying. Since Avruch
and Black identify needs in Burton's theory with Freudian irrational
Id, they arrive at the conclusion that all behaviour is not controlled
by reason, that is, it is irrational. Burton's needs theory can, on the
other hand, be seen from a biological angle. In that view rationality
denotes the survival value of the organism. Talcott Parsons calls
views which advocate the explanation of action in terms of the
ultimate nonsubjective conditions such as heredity and environment
'radical anti-intellectualistic positivism'. One form of radical
positivism is instinct theory, which, according to Parsons, always
refers to the concept of survival value. 59 Similarly, Burton's needs
theory refers to survival of a 'human organism', and sees behaviour in
55. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., p. 10 and p. 99.
56. Renshon, "Human Needs and Political...", p. 60.
57. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 33 and p. 70.
58. Avruch and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature in...", p. 227.
59. Parsons, Talcott, The Structure of Social Action, New York: The Free Press, 1967, p.
67 and pp. 115-116.
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terms of nonsubjective conditions such as drives. 60 Given the idea of
survival value, behaviour, even at the form of 'at-any-cost fulfilment
of basic human needs', is rational - or at least functional - from the
point of view of a biological organism. In other words, behaviour can
be argued to be rational, because it contributes to survival.
60. Burton states that "needs are inherent drives for survival and development'. Burton,
Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 39. See also: Burton, "World Society and Human
Needs", p. 52.
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2. THE ENTRY STAGE: THE DECISION TO ENTER INTO THE
WORKSHOP
2. 1. The model of strategic action and rational choice
The facilitator has an important role to play in organising the
problem-solving workshop. As stated earlier, the facilitator
manipulates the workshop in the sense that he or she chooses the
participants, organises the workshop setting and chairs discussions.
However, that does not explain why conflicting parties decide to
enter into the workshop and choose to search for a problem-solving
solution. The aim of this part is to study how Burton's theory explains
the entry moment, and what kind of reasoning process is assumed to
be gone through by the participants. It is tentatively supposed that
Burton bases his explanation of entry on rational choice theory, or
more generally, on a model of strategic action. Jurgen Habermas'
notions of the teleological and strategic models of action which
offers, at least, conceptual tools for the analysis of Burton will be
studied first.
According to Habermas, since Aristotle the concept of teleological
action has been at the centre of the philosophical theory of action. By
teleological action Habermas means a situation where the "actor
attains an end or brings about the occurrence of a desired state by
choosing means that have promise of being successful in the given
situation and applying them in a suitable manner".6 1 Thus, the
important notion is that of a decision among alternative courses of
action. Habermas defines a strategic model:
"The teleological model of action is expanded to a strategic
model when there can enter into the agent's calculation of
success the anticipation of decisions on the part of at least
one additional goat-directed actor. This model is often
interpreted in utilitarian terms; the actor is supposed to
choose and calculate means and ends from the standpoint of
maximizing utility or expectations of utility. It is this model
61. Habermas, Jurgen, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the
Rationalization of Society, Vol. 1, London: Heinemann, 1984, p. 85.
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of action that lies behind decision-theoretic and game-
theoretic approaches in economics, sociology, and social-
psychology."62
Habermas discusses the assumptions underlying the teleological
modeL of action. He claims that the teleological concept of action can
be viewed under the aspect of purposive-rationality. It is assumed in
the model that there are actors who achieve their ends by way of an
orientation to, and influence on, the decisions of other actors.
Therefore, success in action is dependent on other actors, each of
whom is oriented to his or her own success and behaves cooperatively
only to the degree that fits his or her egocentric calculus of
utility. 6 3
The Habermasian definition of strategic action draws attention to
fundamental questions which can be asked when studying Burton's
explanation of the entry stage. First, does an actor calculate means
and ends from the point of view of utility? Second, and more
generally, how is an actor assumed to make a rational choice to enter
into the workshop? Third, what is the mode of rationality which is
included in Burton's notion of behaviour at this stage? It is worth
noting that the model of strategic action is essentially
individualistic. This does not contradict the Burtonian idea of actor,
because for Burton the most important actor is the individual.
Before studying Burton, the theory of rational choice - or the rational
choice paradigm as it is also called - needs to be studied further. The
rational choice approach can be seen to be a subgroup of Habermas'
teleological model. The approach proposes to analyse human choice
behaviour on the assumption that actors are rational in the sense that
they tend to maximise their satisfaction of preferences or expected
utility. 64 Thus, it offers a model of optimising behaviour, or as
62. ibid., p. 85.
63. ibid., pp. 87-88.
64. Mitchell defines expected utility (EU): "The essence of the EU approach is that those
making a choice among options consciously calculate the overatl value, or 'utility'
outcomes likely to result from such options. They then combine this utility with their
estimated probability of particular outcomes and make a choice regarding the optimum
course of action to achieve the outcome offering the highest Expected Utility. Expected
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psychologists see it, the rational choice paradigm is a heuristic
device for interpreting behaviour. There are several versions of this
theory, including utility theory, decision-making theory, game theory,
and exchange theory, but they all focus on studying human choice
behaviour. In the social sciences, the rational choice paradigm has
found the most sympathetic response among economists. 65 In
general, the paradigm is appealing, because it is seen to offer a way
to model behaviour. As a model, and especially as it is employed by
economists, the paradigm tells us what we ought to do in order to
achieve our aims as far as possible. Unlike moral theory, rational
choice theory emphasises conditional imperatives, pertaining to
means rather than ends.66
Utility is obtained by combining three factors. First, there are the benefits to be obtained
from a particular outcome. Secondly, there are the costs of pursuing and obtaining that
outcome. Finally, there is the estimated probability that choosing a course of action will
produce anticipated outcome, so that the benefits accrue while the costs are borne."
Mitchell, C. R., "Ending Conflicts and Wars: Judgement, Rationality and Entrapment",
International Social Science Journal, Vol. 127, No. 1, 1991, p. 38.
65. For a comparison of how economists and psychologists use the rational choice
paradigm see: Hogarth, Robin and Reder, Melvin, "Introduction: Perspectives from
Economics and Psychology", in Rational Choice. The Contrast between Economics and
Psychology, Robin Hogarth and Melvin Reder (eds.), Chicago and London: The University
of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 1-23.
66. Rational choice theorists themselves are well aware of the assumptions underlying
the paradigm as well as of the critical readings aimed at disputing the assumptive basis.
The tradition of critical readings of the rational choice paradigm is not new, and,
moreover, the questions imposed have been partly answered by rational choice theorists.
Neither the scope nor the aim of the thesis allow me to discuss all the problems of rational
choice theory and, therefore, the level of critique adopted is ontological. The crucial
question about rational choice theory as it relates to this thesis is, in Denzin's words, that
"is the postulate of rationality which structures this theory suitable for the analysis of
the structures of rationality and emotionality that organize daily life, or is its utility
limited only to the ideal norms which organize certain forms of economic action and the
activities of certain kinds of scientific theorists". Denzin, Norman, "Reading Rational
Choice Theory", Rationality and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1990, p. 173. For an excellent
introduction to the paradigm and to its criticism see: Elster, John, "Introduction", in
Rational Choice, Jon Elster (ed.), London: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 1-33. See also:
Hollis, Martin, Models of Man. Philosophical Thouahts on Social Action, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 36-38. Hollis, Martin, The Cunnino of Reason,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 15-46. For discussions on the
rational choice paradigm in the analysis of international conflict see: Bueno de Mesquita,
Bruce, "An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict", American Political Science
Review, Vol. 74, 1980, pp. 917-931. Edwards, Ward, "Utility, Subjective Probability,
their Interaction and Variance Preferences", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IV, No.
1, 1962, pp. 42-51. Mitchell, C. R. and Nicholson, Michael, "Rational Models and the
Ending of Wars", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1983, pp. 495-520.
Nicholson, Michael, Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992. Wittman, Donald, "How a War Ends: A Rational Model
Approach", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1979, pp. 743-763. For an
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Burton's explanation of the decision to enter into the workshop starts
with needs maximisation. He states that "parties to a conflict are
responding to the situation in the ways that appear most beneficial
to them in light of the knowledge that they have of the motivations of
others and the options open". 67 In other words, actors in conflict
"seek to maximize their satisfactions in the best way they know
within the structural conditions existing and within the limits of
their knowledge of options". 68 Thus, human beings, according to
Burton, tend to maximise their satisfactions of needs in a way that
appears beneficial to them. Following the logic of the argument, it
can be claimed that the Burtonian actor is motivated by the
possibility of maximising his or her needs turned into utilities.69
This form of needs satisfaction is different from the form discussed
in the previous section for two reasons. First, it is assumed that the
actor takes into account and anticipates other actors and their
decisions. That is not the case in the 'everyday' type of needs
satisfaction which aims at needs fulfilment at any cost. Second, the
actor calculates means and ends and tries to end up with a best
maximisation of utility. In 'everyday' needs satisfaction the actor
does not calculate, because he or she is 'conditioned' to gain the
fundamental goal, that is, to achieve needs satisfaction. The needs
explanations are, thus, used by Burton in two separate ways and in
two situations. Needs are employed to explain the behaviour of
individuals in general, and, on the other hand, needs are used to
explain behaviour in a conflict situation and in decision-making in
example of a critical reading of the paradigm and an answer to it see: Denzin, Norman,
"The Long Good-bye: Farewell to Rational Choice Theory", Rationality and Society, Vol. 2,
No. 4, 1990, pp. 504-507. Abell, Peter, "Denzin on Rational Choice Theory", Rationality
and Society , Vol. 2, No. 4, 1990, pp. 495-499.
67. Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and War, p. 121.
68. ibid., p. 175. See also: Burton, "Resolution of Conflict", p. 8. Burton, "Theory and
Reality", p. 254. Burton, "About Winning", p. 88 and p. 91.
69. As Avruch and Black note, rational choice theory turns interests and needs into
utilities. They write: "They [people] strive to fulfil their needs. They try to maximize
that which they find desirable. When we follow the logic of this, we see that we have
turned interests and needs into utilities; human motivation, in its entirety, is thus
reduced to maximizing these utilities." Benefits are thought of in the light of the rational
choice paradigm as utilities that can be maximised and minimised, and the choices which
produce the greatest benefit are claimed to maximise utility. Avruch and Black, "Ideas of
Human Nature...", p. 226. Peters' definition of motive (as described in the first part of
the chapter) and the notion of teleological explanation apply here.
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conflict. Consequently, in Burton's theory meanings of the notions of
'needs satisfaction' and 'needs maximising' vary according to the
context.
The main assumption in Burton's theory as it relates to the decision
to enter into the workshop is that humans maximise their needs,
utilities or gains (Burton's own terminology varies here). The
maximisation takes place by responding to the environment, and that,
in turn, produces behaviour. However, there are limitations, according
to Burton, to utility maximising in terms of the knowledge available
and in terms of the motivations of other actors. This implies that the
'Burtonian rational choice model' is not burdened with the game-
theoretic assumption that the parties have perfect knowledge of such
parameters as the rules of game and the ways to calculate utilities
or probabilities. In brief, man is assumed by Burton to be capable of
rational behaviour and taking into account the motivations of others
and the options available. Thus, the Habermasian notion of strategic
action applies to Burton's theory.
The conclusion that Burton employs the strategic model can be
elaborated further by asking why the parties choose to enter into the
workshop when other options may be available to them. Burton
studies the point and asks whether it is realistic to expect
conflicting parties to pursue the seemingly complex processes of
problem-solving conflict resolution. He seems to give two sets of
answers. According to the first, since parties cannot afford to have a
decision forced on them on important matters of values, they prefer
conflict resolution rather than settlement. Therefore, it is in the
interests of participants that conflict is resolved analytically so
that stability is the outcome. Moreover, Burton argues that
traditional mediation processes have failed because they have not
been able to offer a framework in which parties could meet without
in any way prejudicing their power and bargaining positions, without
attracting charges of appeasement and without making it appear that
they are too readily seeking peaceful solutions. Given the failure of
traditional mediation processes, parties seek alternative procedures.
On the other hand, parties may not be aware of these and perceive no
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options, and, therefore, continue conflict. 70 These descriptions do
not yet explain anything. They simply assume that parties have
certain interests, and that given the option of the problem-solving
workshop type of conflict resolution and the failure of traditional
means, parties will rely on problem-solving procedures.
The other set of explanations refers to costs and benefits and the
capacity of actors to analyse them. For Burton, the crucial question is
whether resolution processes will be preferred to the cost of
conflict. The question dictates the mode of answer which states that
the longer-term costs of conflict will be unacceptable in the absence
of an agreement. Therefore, according to Burton, even the more
powerful party is prepared to seek problem-solving solutions.
Alternative conflict resolution procedures may have costs as well,
but these are assumed to be significantly lower than the costs of
social disruption in the future if the conflict continues. Thus, Burton
states, "whatever ultimate goals we seek to promote or preserve"
they are "most surely and most economically achieved by problem-
solving procedures". 71 What, then, leads Burton to think that actors
want the 'most economical so'ution'? He bases his argument on the
presupposition that "all varieties of human species have abilities to
think, and with or without help can follow a logical and analytical
thought process". 72 Therefore, they are able to go through costing
processes which help them to maximise their utilities.73
It is important to keep in mind two things: the Burtonian notion of
game and the role of the facilitator at the entry stage. According to
Burton, the conflict is perceived as a zero-sum game by the parties
at this stage, and, therefore, the perception of other actors and the
anticipation of their moves are important. 74 Since the parties are
70. Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and War, p. 98. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 89; p. 100
and p. 117. Burton, "About Winning", pp. 78-80. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and
Provention, p. 217.
71. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 120.
72. ibid., p. 214.
73. Burton, Dear Survivors, P. 131. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 47;
P . 69; p. 120; p. 165; p. 202; p. 214 and p. 218. Burton, "International Relations or
World Society?", p. 106. Burton, "Unfinished Business in Conflict Resolution", pp. 330-
331.
74. For Burton's notion of game see: Burton, "About Winning", PP . 71-73. Burton, "The
Procedures of Conflict Resolution", PP. 92-94.
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reasoning actors, the role of the facilitator is easy to justify. The
facilitator acts as a 'pull' factor: he or she pulls the actors towards
the problem-solving procedures by setting out the workshop option.
On the other hand, the long-term costs of the conflict act as a natural
'push' factor in the minds of the conflicting parties.
In sum, Burton assumes that the actors engage in calculations about
the expected utility of various outcomes. He does not discuss in
detail how the actors consider costs, benefits, and probabilities,
although he supposes that human beings are capable of rational
choices, i.e., maximising satisfaction of preferences (utilities). The
prevailing mode of rationality derives from the ability to cost means
to an end and to assess consequences of actions. Thus, the assumption
that Burton applies a version of the strategic model of action to
theorise the entry stage seems to be confirmed.
2. 2. The entry mode of rationality
Contrary to Avruch's and Black's claim that Burton's version of
biogenetic determinism leads to irrationality of behaviour, there are
several elements in Burton's theory which suggest human tendency
towards rational behaviour. The question is, however, what is the
type of rationality which is postulated by Burton, and more crucially,
is that form of rationality appropriate for explaining human
behaviour in the contexts of workshop entry and problem-solving?
The first question is studied in this part of the thesis. A study of
wider, ontological, views of Western rationality are needed to
understand the concept of instrumental rationality which
characterises the Burtonian entry stage.
Cognitive-instrumental rationality has marked the self-
understanding of the modern era. The type of rationality, according to
Habermas, "carries with it connotations of successful self-
maintenance made possible by informed disposition over, and
intelligent adaptation to, conditions of a contingent environment".75
The telos inherent in the cognitive-instrumental mode of rationality
75. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, p. 10
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is instrumental mastery. On this 'realistic' model, rational actions
have the basic character of goal-directed, feedback-controlled
interventions in the world of existing states of affairs. 76 Similarly,
Michael Oakeshott discusses the Rationalist whose reason is aimed at
problem-solving and whose character is that of the engineer. The
mind of the Rationalist is controlled by the appropriate technique,
and his or her attention is related to his or her specific intentions.
According to Oakeshott, the view takes purpose as the distinctive
mark of rational conduct: rational conduct is behaviour deliberately
directed to and governed solely by the achievement of a formulated
purpose. As a consequence, the view reduces mind to a neutral
instrument, to a piece of apparatus in service of purposes.77
Habermas' and Oakeshott's accounts of cognitive-instrumental
rationality and the Rationalist come close to the Weberian notion of
Zweckrationalitàt. Zweckrationa! (instrumental, means-ends
rational) action is rational in the sense of employing appropriate
means to a given end. It appears that a person acts rationally when
his or her "action is guided by considerations of ends, means and
secondary consequences", and when, in acting, he or she "rationally
assesses means in relation to ends, ends in relation to secondary
consequences, and, finally, the various possible ends in relation to
each other".78 Zweckrational action, thus, presupposes conscious
reasoning in terms of means and ends. The type of action can be
defined subjectively and objectively. Subjectively defined it refers
to the expectations the actor has about the consequences of
alternative ways of acting, and to his or her conscious efforts to
bring about one or some of these expected consequences. There s, on
the other hand, also an objectively rational correlate of
zweckrational action in Weber's theory. The selection of means to a
given end can be assessed in terms of objective rationality, since It
is thought to be possible to discriminate objectively - for Weber,,
scientifically - between adequate and inadequate means.79
76. ibid., pp. 10-12.
77. Oakeshott, Michael, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, London and New York:
Methuen, 1984, pp. 1-36 and pp. 83-87.
78. Weber, Max, Max Weber. Selections in Translation, W. G. Runciman (ed.) and E
Matthews (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 28-29.
79. Brubaker, Rogers, The Limits of Rationality . An Essay on the Social and Moral
Thought of Max Weber, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984, p. 4; p.36 and pp. 51-	 z/'
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It should be emphasised that Weber's definitions of rationality refer
to ideal types, and, moreover, they are not assumed to exist without
other forms of rationality. 80 For the purposes of this study, Weber's
definition of Zweckrationalität has to be relaxed. Instead, an useful
definition is offered by John Dryzek who uses the term 'instrumental
rationality', and defines it in terms of the capacity to devise, select,
and effect good means to clarified ends. According to him, the ideas
of instrumental rationality and analytic sensibility go hand in hand.
Analytic sensibility implies that complex phenomena are assumed to
be best understood through intelligent disaggregation into their
component parts, and that these parts are then best apprehended in a
piecemeal fashion.8 1
Since the problem faced by the Burtonian actor at the entry stage is
to choose the combination of means and ends that will maximise his
or her expected utility, Burton has to justify the basis of the choice.
Rational choice theory often discusses at this point the issue of
rational belief as it relates to probability. 82 According to Burton,
however, the bases of a choice can be found simply in costs. In his
view, every actor engages in costing through instrumental reasoning;
through reasoning which evaluates means, ends, means-ends relations
and consequences. Seen from the point of view of motivation, the
actor is motivated 83 at this stage largely by the possibility of
utility maximising.
Different criticisms are pointed at the rational choice paradigm and
its notion of instrumental rationality. Several writers note that
instrumental rationality has nothing to say about either the source or
80. Weber classifies formal and substantive rationality, subjective and objective
rationality and Zweckrationalität and Wertrationalität. See: Brubaker, The Limits of
Rationality.
81. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, pp. 3-6.
82. For a summary see: Nicholson, Rationality and the Analysis of..., pp. 49-50.
83. The notion of motivation is problematic in this context. As Hogarth and Reder note,
both economists and psychologists who refer to the paradigm of rational choice agree on
the importance of motivation, but disagree about what constitutes appropriate motivation.
For economists motivation is appropriate only if rewards are an increasing function of
the correctness of responses. Psychologists, on the other hand, have greater difficulty in
specifying the conditions under which subjects are appropriately motivated. Hogarth and
Reder, "Introduction: Perspectives from...", p. 11.
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the rationality of the goal of the agent. It only speaks about the most
effective means to given ends. 84 In Burton's case, the rationality and
source of goals can be ultimately derived from universal human
needs: the goal is always needs satisfaction. A choice which satisfies
a need maximises an utility and, on the other hand, often a maximised
utility satisfies a need.
The notion of interaction is also limited in the rational choice
paradigm and in its view on rationality. As Hollis points out,
interaction is thought to be the sum of choices made by each actor.85
Although instrumental rationality offers insights neither into the
rationality of goals nor into interaction apart from the sum of
choices made by each actor, the narrative of Prisoner's Dilemma can
add to it - according to an unconventional interpretation given by
Norman Denzin - a form of cooperation. For Denzin, the Prisoner's
Dilemma is a narrative which principally produces an image of social
actors. As he puts it:
"The story of 'The Prisoner's Dilemma' thus contains the
rational actor within the prison-house of rationality. For the
sake of the theory, and its own narrative structure, the story
argues that the actor can get out of that prison only by
cooperating with others. In this way, rational choice theorists
make the egoistical actor a social being. Once he or she is
placed within the game-theory context, all of the assumptions
regarding rational choice are brought back into place. What
was previously rewarding for individuals now becomes
rewarding for groups. Groups will attempt to induce members
to accept and adhere to actions which maximize collective
rewards."86
84. Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, p. 77.
Nicholson, Rationality and the Analysis of..., p. 50. Herbert Simon holds the view too. He
claims that in its treatment of rationality, neoclassical economics (and the traditional
rational choice paradigm) is silent about the content of goals and values. In contrast,
according to him, other social sciences in their treatment of rationality seek to determine
empirically the nature and origins of values and their changes with time and experience.
Simon, Herbert, "Rationality in Psychology and Economics", in Rational Choice. The
Contrast between Economics and Psvcholooy, Robin Hogarth and Melvin Reder (eds.),
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 26. The gap between the
aims of economics and other social sciences has not, as Burton's case exemplifies,
prevented social scientists from adapting some elements of the rational choice paradigm.
85. Hollis, The Cunning of Reason, pp. 23-24.
86. Denzin, "Reading Rational Choice Theory", p. 175.
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Thus, an actor has a possibility for cooperation, but only in a form of
game. Similarly, in Burton's theory the actor is basically self-
interested since he or she wants to maximise his or her personal
utility, but by making the decision to enter into the workshop he or
she transcends personal interests and engages in a sphere of common
goals.
In sum, in Burton's model we have the basic idea of rationality as an
instrumental choice of what maximises expected utility. According to
Hollis, one important feature of this idea is that it makes the
rational agent a bargain-hunter. He or she never pays more than he or
she must and never gets less than he or she could at the price. By
adding the notion of marginal utility to rational choice theory, it is
guaranteed that the actor will reject inferior choices where it is
unclear what is his or her best choice. 87 The rational choice model
turns interests and needs into utilities, and reduces motivation to
maximising these utilities. The paradigm postulates rational,
calculating and maximising human nature. Moreover, when the model
is applied to conflict resolution, the sociocultural context is taken as
given and its relationships to the dispute treated as unproblematic.88
In other words, the model has universalising tendencies, and it does
not discuss the cultural context of utility maximising. It can be
argued that by keeping silent about culturally bounded utilities, it
can neither explain nor understand choices made in a particular
conflict situation.
In order to recall the aim of the phenomenological part of this thesis,
some critical questions can be tentatively introduced in regard to
Burton's explanation of the entry stage, in regard to his study of
human choice behaviour. The structure of criticism which arises from
the Burtonian version of the rational choice paradigm is similar to
that which arises from his needs theory. That is, given the
assumptive basis of strategic action and the rational choice
paradigm, it can be questioned whether the universalising picture of
87. Hollis, The Cunning of Reason, pp. 22-24.
88. Avruch and Black, 'Ideas of Human Nature in...", p. 222 and pp. 226-227.
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human nature postulated by the paradigm is accurate. Moreover, it can
be disputed whether the minor or, rather, non-existent role given to
culture is based on an appropriate view of human existence.
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3. BEHAVIOUR WITHIN THE WORKSHOP STRUCTURE
3. 1. Three modes of behaviour
This section of the chapter studies the workshop situation and its
modes of behaviour and rationality. Burton's method is to build upon
his previous theories and explanations, namely needs theory and the
strategic model of action. A pragmatic notion of human action is
introduced by Burton at this stage, and the conception of rationality
enriched by discursive elements.
As described earlier, Burton claims that needs relate to universal
goals. Conflict is however never, according to him, over these
universal goals. Rather, a question how to best achieve a goal causes
disputes. 89 Given that needs are goals that are sought by all persons,
in all cultures and in all circumstances, their satisfaction is also the
ultimate target of any problem-solving workshop. Actions can be
seen, thus, to be purposive in the workshop context, because they
drive at needs fulfilment. In short, purposive actions are explained by
reference to their goals in Burton's theory. These goals need not to be
reached, but they motivate behaviour and affect the way the agent
behaves. In terms of the mode of explanation, Burton employs the
form of teleological explanation which assumes a goal at work.
However, the needs explanation is not the only one employed by
Burton. According to him, the problem-solving workshop is always a
costing process; a costing process which involves changes in values
and means. Burton argues that "given a problem-solving forum, each
party, in its own interests, will seek to find means of satisfying, not
only its own needs and interests, but also those of others in order to
avoid costly and dysfunctional conflicts". 90 In other words, the
parties are assumed to solve problems by finding outcomes that are
89. Burton, Glohal Conflict, pp. 145-147. Burton, "About Winning", p. 75. Burton,
Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 43.
90. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 22.
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positive sum. 91 The Burtonian actor chooses something by costing
different options in terms of ends and means. The actor is seen to
maximise his or her own interests in the problem-solving forum in a
way that also maximises the interests of others, and simultaneously
transfers the zero-sum relationship into positive sum. For Burton, an
option which satisfies the needs of all parties is the most beneficial
to the participants. Burton, thus, employs the narrative of Prisoner's
Dilemma to explain sociality and cooperation. By cooperating with
others the rational actor is thought to be able to get out of the
'prison-house of egoism'. However, unlike the traditional
interpretation of Prisoner's Dilemma, Burton does not assume that
cooperation arises from the second best choice. He rather thinks that
a most beneficial choice from the point of view of the individual
participant includes the possibility of cooperation.
In addition to the needs explanation and the strategic model of
action, Burton explains behaviour also by discussing the
conceptualisation of the workshop in terms of common problems. The
conception of 'pragmatic92 mode of behaviour' is appropriate for
describing this element in Burton's explanation. The ontological
assumption of the view is, that reality, or at least parts of it, can be
seen and interpreted in the light of problems to be solved.
Burton, however, denies the role of pragmatism in problem-solving.
For him, pragmatism implies an "absence of knowledge, of theory and
of predictive capacity". 93 He continues by defining pragmatism in
relation to conflict resolution:
91. Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and War, p. 52; pp. 110-111 and p. 118. Burton, "The
Facilitation of International...", p. 42. Burton, "The Means to Agreement...", p. 240.
Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, p. 23. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a
Function...", p. 197. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 27; p. 47; p. 88; p.
167 and p. 217.
92. The word 'pragmatic' refers also to the pragmatist movement in philosophy. It should
be emphasised that although pragmatists are referred to in this part, the aim is not to
study that heterogeneous philosophical approach. Attention will be drawn only to John
Dewey's account of experience and the formulation of problems, William James' idea of
human needs as a measure of metaphysical views, and the general notion of problem-
oriented action.
93. Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Management..., p. 20. See also: Burton, John,
"Conflict Resolution as a Political System", in The Psychodynamics of International
Relationships, Vol. 2, Vamik Volkan, Julius Moniville and Demetrios Julius (eds.),
Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991, p. 75.
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"In other words, pragmatism is the process of exploring
alternatives almost at random, though intuition and experience
may guide. If these alternatives prove useful or beneficial they
should be followed, even in the absence of any reasoned or
theoretical justifications which would throw light on longer-
term consequences. If they fail others must be sought, again by
pragmatic means. Faced with a problem or a specific conflict,
the pragmatist employs intuition, unconsciously held theories,
trial and error, innovation and expediency."94
This view of pragmatism is restricted and based on limited aspects.
Moreover, even these chosen elements are partly misinterpreted. To
challenge Burton's view on pragmatism it is sufficient to summarise
that although pragmatists deny the possibility of transhistorical
knowledge, that implies neither rejection of reason nor trust in
intuitive means. 95 Despite Burton's denial of pragmatism, it can be
demonstrated how pragmatism opens up points of views to Burton's
explanation of workshop activities.
According to pragmatism, a human being, in order to tackle practical
problems and to bring change to an environment, has to be active. The
notion of active experience is especially at the centre of John
Dewey's thinking. He refuses to identify experience with a passive
registry of the 'given'. Rather, the experiencing subject is seen to be
active, a judging agent who takes what is presented to be such-and-
such, selects and emphasises in arriving at a settled experience. This
stress on the reconstructive function of experience means also
blurring the edges of the traditional distinction between 'theoretical'
and 'practical'. As John Smith notes, "the older empiricism saw
experience primarily as the ultimate basis of theoretical knowledge;
Dewey envisaged experience as a means and ultimately method
94. Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Mana g ement..., p. 20.
95. For challenges of Burton's view see, for example: Lawler, Peter, "Pragmatism,
Existentialism, and the Crisis in American Political Thought", International Philosophical
Quarterly, Vol. XX, No. 3, 1980, pp. 327-338. Rorty, Richard "Overcoming the
Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey", The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XXX, No. 1, 1976, pp.
280-305. Rorty, Richard, Consequences of Prag matism, Brighton: The Harvester Press,
1982. Smith, John, Purpose and Thought: The Meaning of Pragmatism, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1978.
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oriented to the future and aimed at the selective control of
consequences and outcomes". 96 Dewey's instrumentalism can be
grasped by claiming that in his view "ideas are not mirrors, they are
weapons". 97 The function of ideas is to prepare us to meet events. In
short, the learning capacity of the human species, its ability to
overcome obstacles that make for insecurity, are, for pragmatism and
especially for Dewey, matters essentially related to the role
performed by reflective intelligence in the course of experience.98
Similarly, Burton argues that "human decision making has, given
appropriate concepts and insights into the nature of social problems
and their future costs, capabilities that can and do influence future
evolution". 99 Burton assumes that the problem-solving workshop
provides a context for this type of decision-making, that is,
decision-making which uses concepts and insights as 'weapons' for
influencing and transforming reality and problems. The facilitator
provides the participants with a conceptual and theoretical
'armament', if they do not have it already. Moreover, decision-making
deals with the future in the sense that it evaluates future costs and
tries to anticipate future obstacles to needs satisfaction. The human
mind, within an appropriate framework, is for Burton an active
instrument which constantly judges, selects and emphasises in order
to avoid unpredicted and uncontrollable change and events.
Connotations that have become attached to the term 'experience'
itself in its ordinary usage under the influence of pragmatism draw
attention to some aspects of the workshop structure. The term
'experience' has a connotation of the personal undergoing, living
through, or enduring of situations and events. It suggests also the
acquisition of skills enabling one to respond in an appropriate fashion
to the way objects encountered will behave, persons will conduct
themselves, or systems will work. The term, thus, refers to active
and transforming skills to accomplish a certain aim or to resolve a
problem arising. On both connotations experience means interactions
96. Smith, Purpose and Thought, p. 86.
97. ibid., p. 86. Smith refers to Santayana's discussion on Dewey.
98. ibid., pp. 78-87. See also: Hollis, Martin, "The Self in Action", in John Dewey
Reconsidered, R. S. Peters (ed.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, pp. 56-75.
99. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 72.
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and transactions, commerce between the experiencing subject and
whatever is encountered or needs to be handled.10°
Burton regards the workshop as a place where active and constructive
encounters between the conflicting parties can take place. In the
workshop, according to Burton's explanation, the participants can
acquire 'skills' to resolve problems and to consider consequences of
their actions. The participants are encouraged to be analytical in
order to discover options that are acceptable in terms of their
interests, and that satisfy their needs. Moreover, the participants are
encouraged to develop skills which enable them to respond to their
environment in a more beneficial fashion in the future. Burton's
conception of 'conflict provention' can be interpreted also in this
light. 101 Conflict provention means, then, anticipating the future in
order to produce controlled and unconflictual changes in the society
by employing skills acquired in a problem-solving workshop.
There is a structural analogy between the Deweyian notion of
knowing and the Burtonian explanation of workshop experience. Dewey
discriminates four logical moments within a reflective experience.
First, reflection arises when there is a discrepancy or conflict, a felt
difficulty within our experience. Second, a careful formulation of the
problem is essential if our inquiry is to be productive. The third
moment demands suggestions of a possible solution. The last step
involves reasoning of the consequences of suggestions, which can
lead to testing and confirming hypotheses. 1 02 According to Burton's
explanation, the methods used in the problem-solving workshop help
the participants to conceptualise and perceive their conflict in terms
of problems to be solved. As in Dewey's reflective experience, a
problem has to be formulated in order to create a productive
problem-solving process. The formulation of a problem is not,
100. Smith, Purpose and Thou g ht, pp. 94-95.
101. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Proventig n, Part IV.
102. Bernstein, Richard, "Introduction", in John Dewey, n Experience. Nature. afl
Freedom, Richard Bernstein (ed.), Indianapolis, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
1960, pp. xxvii-xxxiii.
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however, enough. Considerations of practical actions have to be
produced and tested against reality.1 03
As noted earlier, Burton's needs theory offers the fundamental
targets for the workshop. The notion of needs can be given also
another interpretation. William James considers needs as yardsticks
of competing metaphysical (e.g. materialism and theism) views.
Smith summarises James' idea:
"At this point, however, James introduced another and quite
different consideration, namely human needs and the
possibility of their fulfilment. Instead of two alternatives
differing solely in their account of 'what's what' in regard to
the future, their difference is now to be estimated with
respect to their 'appeal' to the person called on to believe them
and this means what each of the alternatives implies about the
life and destiny of the person."1 04
The Burtonian notion of 'needs as navigation points' denotes needs as
universal yardsticks for the workshop: the participants can evaluate
and reflect upon the workshop procedures, the options open to them
and their own behaviour and others' behaviour from the point of yew
of needs. It should be emphasised that Burton's explanaton o
workshop behaviour does not suggest that using needs as navgaton
points should take solely an abstract form, rather, needs allow the
evaluations of the practical consequences of the workshop too.
Particularly, dealing with functional problems involves the parfes rrli
evaluating the practical consequences of ther acfons. As
demonstrated in the previous chapter, Mitrany's tunct ona sit
approach has influenced the Burtonian notion of problem-so v n. kn
Mitrany's functionalism, as well as in pragmatism, there s p arm rii,
but problems are thought to be best dealt with in an ncremerta
manner. Similarly, Burton assumes that the workshop partcpaIrits
are guided by a practical interest to solve functional problems.. These
103. Burton speaks about 'reality testing' which means that the parties are hetped n the
workshop to test their perceptions of the conflict situation against 'realIty'. Burton.
World Society, p. 160.
104. Smith, Purpose and Thoug ht, p. 39.
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problems are assumed to be dealt with in an incremental manner,
since the solution is not a final end product. Rather, the solution "is
itself another set of relationships that contains its own sets of
problems". 1 05
Dewey's account of control offers also an angle to study some
practical elements of problem-solving workshops. Dewey defines the
problematic situation in general as some form of maladjustment
between the interest and the needs of the organism and the
potentialities of the environment. Given the problem of
maladjustment as it is defined by Dewey, the control of an
environment with the help of technology, social planning and
engineering is regarded as solving problems. By comparison, self-
control or, more important, reorientation of the self with respect to
personal values and ideas, did not receive a great deal of attention in
Dewey's thinking. Thus, it has been claimed that the type of problems
where the organism 'becomes problematic to itself', and the problems
consequent on that development, are not noted by Dewey. There are,
however, problems which cannot be resolved solely in terms of
controlling devices projected by an instrumental intelligence aiming
at reshaping the environment 1 06
The Deweyian notion of control can be related to workshop activities
by asking to what extent the behaviour of the participants is assumed
to be motivated by the aim of control? The whole project of the
problem-solving workshop can be seen in the light of social
engineering which aims at controlling the environment, that is,
managing inevitable changes at all levels of the social world by
solving problems. However, Burton does not stop here; he goes further
when he explains behaviour in the workshop. He introduces elements
of discursive rationality which aim neither solely at controlling nor
at purposive considerations of means to an end when resolving a
conflict. Discursive rationality points strongly to reorientation and
reinterpretation of the 'self' with respect to personal, as well as
cultural, values and ideas. In other words, the aspect of control is
important in Burton's explanation, but it is not, according to him, the
105. Burton, Dear Survivors, p. 119.
106. Smith, purpose and Thou g ht, pp. 88-89.
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only purpose the actors have within the problem-solving structure.
The interactional nature and hermeneutical elements (actors' own
interpretations of the situation) of the workshop suggested by Burton
add, thus, a new layer to his explanation of workshop behaviour.107
To sum up, the study of Burton's explanation of workshop activities
reveals how he builds upon the notion of biologically conditioned
human 'being'. The layer following needs theory assumes that human
nature is rational in the sense that it is capable of costing and
evaluating the consequences of actions. A human being is, thus,
considered to be able to learn voluntarily, and to change and control
its natural and social environments. However, control of an
environment is not always sufficient for resolving a conflict, and,
therefore, Burton postulates an image of a person who engages
himself or herself in self-reflective and interpretative behaviour.
3. 2. Instrumental and discursive rationality
Since the workshop, according to Burton, includes purposive cost-
benefit analysis of means to an end for resolving the conflict at hand,
the notion of instrumental rationality remains in his explanation.
Similarly, the type of explanation referring to a pragmatic interest
implies instrumental rationality, because it assumes the finding of
instrumentally solvable functional problems in the workshop. Solving
problems is seen to be instrumental for more general and important
aims, namely conflict resolution and needs satisfaction. The
communicative aspect of the workshop structure, on the other hand,
suggests the form of discursive rationality advocated, for example,
by John Dryzek. 1 08 Although Dryzek promotes partly uncritically
discursive rationality, the concept as it is developed by him opens up
an interesting insight into Burtonian problem-solving. It describes
107. Burton, Dear Survivors, p. 120. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 135. Burton, Conflict:
Resolution and Provention, p. 204.
108. The notion of discursive rationality is developed by John Dryzek in his Discursive
Democracy. Dryzek himself uses the term 'communicative rationality'. In this thesis,
however, the term 'discursive rationality' is preferred, because it emphasises the
dialectic and contextual nature of this type of rationality. The word 'dialectic' refers in
this work solely to dialogue.
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fruitfully an aspect of workshop rationality which is hinted at, but
not fully theorised by Burton.
What, then, does discursive rationality mean, and how does it appear
in the Burtonian notion of workshop behaviour? Dryzek's views rely
heavily on the notion of communicative rationality developed by
Jurgen Haberrnas. According to Dryzek, discursive rationality is
rooted in the interaction of social life. Dryzek refers to Habermas and
writes 1 09:
"Communicative action is oriented toward intersubjective
understanding, the coordination of action through decision, and
the socialization of members of the community [...].
Communicative rationality is the extent to which this action
is characterized by the reflective understanding of competent
actors. This situation should be free from deception, self-
deception, strategic behavior, and domination through the
exercise of power. Communicative rationality is a property of
intersubjective discourse, not individual maximization, and it
can pertain to the generation of normative judgements and
action principles rather than just to the selection of means to
ends. However, communication is concerned in part with the
coordination of actions, so communicative rationality cannot
totally replace instrumental rationality; rather it can only
restrict the latter to a subordinate domain." 1 1 0
According to Habermas, the proper home of communicative rationality
is the life-world of social interaction, where individuals construct
and interpret the identities of themselves and others. Communicative
rationalisation, in its ideal form, is seen by Habermas to free the
life-world from custom, myth and illusion on the one hand and from
the domination of specialists and manipulators on the other. Dryzek
109. There are, however, several differences between Habermas' and Dryzek's views.
Dryzek claims that instead of limiting discursive rationality to the sphere of the life-
world of social interaction, he expands it to the spheres of 'social' and 'systemic'. It
follows, that he does not see the domains of instrumental and communicative rationality to
be separate and incompatible. Dryzek also tries to overcome the critique levelled at
Habermas' objectivistic position which seeks an objectivistic solid ground for both truth
arid morality. Moreover, he advances the view according to which communicative
rationality provides only procedural criteria, not substantial, about how to disputes and
arguments might be resolved and about how principles might be constructed. ibid., pp.
14-22.
110. ibid., p. 14.
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claims that discursive rationality can contribute to the resolution of
complex social problems, because it also allows for reasoned
consensus on normative judgements that, if attained, could motivate
actions. Moreover, it makes understanding across different frames of
reference possible, since it constitutes generalizable rather than
particular interests.1 11
Dryzek discusses 'discursive designs' which are the institutional
manifestations of discursive rationality. He uses such examples as
alternative dispute resolution procedures and problem-solving
workshops. These are discursive designs, according to Dryzek, since
around them the expectations of a number of actors can converge;
individuals participate in them as citizens, not as representatives of
states or a hierarchical body; no concerned individuals are excluded;
collective and individual needs and interests of the individuals
involved are included; they are oriented to generation and
coordination of solution and actions situated within a particular
problem context and within the design there are no hierarchy or
formal rules, though debate may be governed by informal canons of
free discourse and a decision rule of consensus obtains. 1 12 Following
Dryzek's argument, it can be claimed that a third party is needed to
facilitate communication within such a design, because he or she can
help the parties to overcome instrumental rationality and to move
into the sphere of discursive rationality.
If a problem-solving approach requires that all the actors involved
scrutinise the nature of their relationships and analyse the ultimate
roots of their differences in the interests of the extinction of the
causes of conflict, it involves, according to Dryzek, discursive
rationality. Beyond the continued pursuit of instrumental rationality,
the workshop as a discursive design can allow for the exercise of
discursive reasons about normative judgements, interests, goals,
values and problem definitions. Given this understanding of the
problem-solving workshop, possible different cultural backgrounds of
the participants become highlighted. As Dryzek states, cuttura
111. ibid., p. 20 and pp. 53-54. See also: Habermas, The Theory of Communicative
Action, Vol. 1, p. 10 and pp. 95-101.
112. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, p. 43.
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differences are not merely semantic; they involve a lack of
agreement on the very existence of certain objects. If an agreement
is absent, participants can still reach consensus based on reasoned
disagreement by striving to understand the cultural tradition and
conceptual framework of the other participants.1 1 3
The Burtonian explanation of workshop behaviour lends itself to be
interpreted in the light of the notions of discursive design and
discursive rationality. Burton's explanation fulfils many of Dryzek's
criteria of discursive rationality: interaction and intersubjective
understanding are taken into account; the individuals participate as
citizens; all relevant parties are assumed to be included; there is a
particular problem context which does not, however, exclude the
scrutinization of mutual relationships; the workshop is structured in
a nonhierachical manner and discussions are informal and free to an
extent. Moreover, the third party does not merely emphasise
instrumental costing, he or she also guides the participants in the
direction of the communicative possibilities of the workshop.
However, it would be a mistake to entirely identify the Burtonian
account of workshop behaviour with Dryzek's idea of discursive
design. In other words, it is not accurate to claim that Burton refers
solely to the discursive mode of rationality while explaining
behaviour in the workshop. What are the main differences? First, the
ontological roots of Burton's explanation are in universal and
biologically founded needs, and, therefore, it contains a certain
degree of determinism. Unlike Burton, Dryzek claims that needs, such
as identity, become constituted in a discursive design, in
communicative social interaction. All forms of biological
determinism are lacking from Dryzek's view. Second, Dryzek opposes
social engineering and sees discursive rationality as a weapon
against tendencies which enable engineering. As described in the
previous chapter, Burton's texts suggest a form of social engineering
within the workshop. Third, unlike Dryzek, Burton puts a lot of
emphasis on analytical reasoning and instrumental costing processes
in order to guarantee a purposive account of the conflict at hand. As
pointed out above, Dryzek explains workshop activities mainly in the
113. ibid., p. 42 and pp. 90-108.
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light of discursive, non-purposive reasoning. Furthermore, Dryzek
emphases dialectic interaction, whereas Burton's views on utility
maximisation reduce the notion of interaction to a 'sum of choices
made by each actor'. Fourth, unlike Burton, Dryzek considers culture
as a main constitutive factor of human 'being'. In sum, Burton's man is
more determined by biological conditions than Dryzek's socially
constituted human. Burton's actor is strongly tied to utility
maximisation and instrumental rationality, whereas Dryzek's actor is
largely communicative, and, therefore, eager to, through discursive
designs, modify his or her socially and culturally produced needs,
values and goals.
3. 3.	 Interaction
Until now the focus has been largely on the question how Burton
explains human behaviour. However, the workshop concept leads us
also to a study of interaction as the notion of discursive rationality
clearly demonstrates. Although Burton does not fully theorise
discursive rationality, it can be studied how and to what extent he
explains interaction while discussing the workshop context. The title
of the chapter reveals Burton's focus: his emphasis is on individual
behaviour instead of interaction.1 1 4
There are three approaches to interaction as it relates to conflict
resolution in the workshop context in Burton's texts. First, in
Conflict and Communication (which does not yet present Burton's
version of needs theory) there is an assumption that misperceptions,
false interpretations, prejudice between national groups and
unrealistic expectations about the policies of other states are
elements, if not causes, of conflicts. It is argued that psychological
factors play an important role in conflicts, and controlled
communication is a means to tackle them. According to Burton, the
virtue of controlled communication is that it is based on face-to-
face discussions in which persons have to present viewpoints as well
as re-assess and correct perceptions and interpretations. The
114. It is worth noting that, for example, in World Society there is no discussion on
interaction at all. Neither does the word 'interaction' appear in any of his indexes.
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improvement of communication, that is, making it effective, between
the parties in conflict is thought to be important, because it enables
the corrections. 1 1 5
Burton approaches interaction from the point of view of
communication by arguing that the improvement of communication in
an interactive problem-solving process is a precondition for conflict
resolution. The picture of communication given by Burton is narrow.
He limits the discussion to the claim that communication needs to be
effective: it needs to be effective in terms of the accuracy of
conveying information and the exactness of interpretation. For
Burton, "information must be received as was transmitted" and it is
vital that "what was transmitted was sent deliberately and contained
accurate information". 1 1 6
The second approach to interaction suggests that the facilitator
influences heavily direct interaction between the participants.
Burton notes that the "seminar [Falklands/Malvinas workshop] format,
including the third party panel of scholars, was designed to ensure an
analytical and explanatory discussion that would reveal the hidden
data of motivation and intention". 1 1 7 Moreover, Burton states that
the "quality of the interaction and of the outcome depends almost
entirely on the input from the facilitating panel".1 1 8 Thus, the
facilitator is seen to be largely in charge of the analytical
interaction between the participants. He or she creates an innovative
atmosphere and facilitates qualitative interaction which consists of
direct and effective communication. Positive interaction is, in this
view, something which seldom exists in a conflict resolution
situation without the facilitator.
Third, Burton discusses interactive decision-making models. In that
mode of decision-making decisions are made as a result of
interaction among all parties concerned. For Burton, problem-solving
115. Burton, Conflict and Communication, p. 11; p. 23 and pp. 49-59. See similar views
also: Burton, "Resolution of Conflict", p. 17; p. 21; p. 23 and p. 27.
116. Burton, Conflict and Communication, p. 55.
117. Burton, "The Facilitation of....", p. 40.
118. Burton, "Three Qualities of a Secure Nation", p. 245. See also: Burton, Deviance.
Terrorism and War, pp. 117-118. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 42; p.
45; p. 78 and p. 195.
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workshops are a form of interactive decision-making in which the
participants are assisted to monitor communication. According to
him, the "system of interaction is an open one, that is, the parties are
subject not merely to interaction among themselves, but to
interaction with a wider environment over which there can be no
control".1 19 His argument is the same as earlier, namely, positive
interaction can be created in problem-solving conflict resolution
processes, and analytical and effective communication advances
it.1 20
Since Burton only hints at the possibility of discursive rationality,
interaction is an under-theorised and -explained field in his texts. He
does, however, state that in the intimate and analytical interaction
of problem-solving conflict resolution "the only reality which is
relevant is that of the participants". 121 The statement can be seen to
point to interaction which relies on the creation of a shared reality
and shared interpretations of the conflict and conflict resolution
situation. Since the dominant mode of rationality is then discursive,
priority is given to multiple interpretations of reality instead of
biologically based needs. If the problem-solving workshop is
explained in this way, there is no need to postulate the notion of
universal human needs. There is no need to find the universal
denominators of man.
It should be emphasised that Burton does not accept the explanation.
He argues that the interactive procedures of conflict resolution are
essentially the same for peoples of all cultures, because there is an
'universal culture' based on needs. l 22 In other words, there is the
common reality founded on needs of which it is possible to find a
common definition. Different interpretations of reality are referred
to in the problem-solving context only in order to find the seminal
'needs-reality'. The workshop which acts as a filter, filters away
119. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 135.
120. Burton, Dear Survivors, pp. 70-74. Burton, Global Conflict, pp. 131-136.
Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Function...", pp. 190-191 and p. 199. Burton, Conflict:
Resolution and Provention, pp. 183-187.
121. Burton Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 204.
122. ibid., pp. 206-207.
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cultural influences, among them 'culturally-bounded' interpretations
of reality.
In sum, Burton's version of needs theory, which extends its internal
logic to his conflict and conflict resolution theory, explains human
behaviour mainly from the point of view of the solitary ego. It
explains behaviour from the point of view of the needs conditioned
and utility maximising individual. The internal logic of Burton's needs
theory leads him to assume that common goals are achieved through
utility maximising behaviour and, therefore, there is no need to
theorise interaction. The supposition is, however, problematic: it
gives a narrow, biological, picture of man and prioritises
instrumental rationality over other rationalities.
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4. FACILLTATOR: BEHAVIOUR AND RATIONALITY
4. 1. Two modes of behaviour
The study of Burton's views of the behaviour of the facilitator shows
that he does not refer to needs as an 'engine', as a motivational force
of facilitative behaviour. He gives lists of recommended behaviour
but does not explain explicitly why the facilitator acts. l 23 Burton's
starting-point for explaining the expertise of the facilitator can be
found, however, in his version of needs theory. When a need is
theoretically established, it opens up a space for expertise since the
means of satisfying it may very well be in the domain of an
expert. 124 In Burton's view, human needs can be discovered, if not
satisfied, with the right kind of expert knowledge. On this argument,
then, one person may know what another person needs better than he
or she himself or herself. Moreover, needs can be generally spoken
about as realities to be studied disinterestedly by needs experts.
It can be asked, then, why Burton rejects discussion on the needs of
the facilitator? The 'primitiveness' of needs, or more precisely, the
simplicity of drives explains the lack of study. The facilitator has, as
Burton seems to suggest, overcome the state of simple needs
satisfaction, because he or she is fully aware of his or her own needs.
He or she is, therefore, not any more entirely conditioned by biology,
by biologically founded drives. Thus, in Burton's theory, the
motivational force of a facilitator is not derived from drives, but,
rather, from self-awareness and self-reflection. The claim can be
supported and illustrated by studying the double role of the
facilitator suggested by Burton.
According to Burton, the "third party is in an analytical, almost a
teaching situation, drawing attention to false assumptions, and
123. See especially: Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict
124. Louch, Explanation and Human Action, p. 70. See also critiques of expertise of needs
thinking: Illich, Ivan "Needs", in The Development Dictionary. A Guide to Knowledue as
Power, Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), London: Zen Books, 1992, pp. 88-101. Watt, "Human
Needs, Human...", p. 538.
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opening up possibilities of arriving at potentially realistic ones".1 25
Thus, the third party is a fully participating actor in the workshop.
What makes his or her participation special, however, is his or her
superior knowledge of the reasons of behaviour and of the alternative
options available for the participants. The knowledge is superior
because it implies an awareness of general theories of conflict and
human behaviour. It enables the third party to be also an "observer in
a scientific role" who "makes no assessments, judgements or value
interventions".1 26 Since the facilitator is not greatly influenced by
culturally dependent values or wants, he or she can act as a filter.
Burton emphasises the capacity of the facilitator for reasoning, and
sees his or her mind as an instrument capable of dealing with
complex problems and putting general theories into practice. The
mind of the facilitator is filled with expertise knowledge, and it does
not consist of prejudices and is neutral in relation to the values of
the participants.
The motivational force of the Burtonian facilitator can be found in
the purposive, instrumental mind which aims at solving problems and
theorising on the basis of experience. Oakeshott calls this type of
mind which is assumed to be unprejudiced and open without
dispositions a 'purified mind'. Behind the belief in the purified mind
there is a conviction that mental disinterestedness and absence of
prejudice are intellectual virtues. Moreover, the notion arises from a
desire for certainty and the conviction that certainty is possible only
in respect of something we have been given, i.e. the capacity to
employ the mind.127
If the instrumental mind is the ultimate basis of behaviour, in what
kind of context is this mind, then, assumed to work? Given Burton's
thesis of alienation and the notion of professional cure (the medical
metaphor) which is needed to overcome alienation, the mind of the
expert facilitator is assumed to work in curative processes. A
parallel of the principles of psychoanalytic therapy and problem-
125. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 199.
126. ibid., p. 204. See also: Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and War, pp. 116-122.
Burton, Dear Survivors, pp. 119-123. Burton , Global Conflict, pp. 149-152. Burton
and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in..., p. 144.
127. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 83-95.
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solving helps to understand these processes. According to Springborg,
therapy "puts a heavy emphasis, not on the causality of behaviour,
since that is beyond the control of the individual to a certain extent,
but on the ability of the individual to understand, adapt to, and
monitor his own development and his relations to the external
world".. 1 28 Although the analyst helps to interpret the psychic
processes of the patient with reference to metapsychological
principles, the form which therapy takes is that of the patient telling
the analyst, rather than the analyst telling the patient.
Psychoanalysis is, thus, concerned principally with the subject and
his or her interpretations.129
Similarly, the workshop context created by the facilitator is aimed
at increasing the ability of the participants to understand the
development of a particular conflict and relationships as they relate
to that conflict. The subject's own interpretation of a conflict
situation is important, but the third party is needed to refer to human
needs as 'navigation points', as ontological principles and
fundamental goals of the workshop. Human needs are employed by the
facilitator in the same way as metapsychological principles are used
by the psychoanalyst. Needs are depth metaphors of which the
facilitator is aware, but the participants are not. The facilitator can
help the participants to interpret the situation by referring to these
ontological principles. The facilitator is supposed to be able to fulfil
the task, if his or her mind is free from the burden of 'cultural
prejudices' which hinder the understanding of the universal principles
of human behaviour.
However, it should be emphasised that there are major differences
between the ideas of psychoanalytic therapy and Burtonian problem-
solving conflict resolution. For example, Freudian theory could never
have engaged in postulating needs and drives in a behavioural manner;
it never presumed to have a scientific knowledge of the causality of
behaviour. Therefore, it rarely stepped outside the frame of reference
that the patient himself or herself supplied. 1 30 Burton, on the other
128. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., pp. 195.196.
129. ibid., pp. 195-196.
130. ibid., p. 196.
—123 -
hand, postulates needs in a behavioural manner giving them a status
of a motivational force. Since needs are thought to be 'objectively'
defined, they are employed as reference points outside the frames of
reference of the participants. The facilitator uses them, for example,
to conceptualise and interpret the commonalities between the
participants although the participants themselves do not necessarily
raise the question of common needs.
Although the Burtonian purified mind is abstract in the sense that it
is free from prejudices and it aims at certainty, it is not alienated
from practices. As described earlier, the notion of action research is
vital for problem-solving approaches. The term 'experience' in its
ordinary use is in accordance with the idea of action research. To
speak of medical, legal or business experience is to refer to the
encounter of an individual and his or her familiarity with the
materials, operations and transactions appropriate for one of these
practices. Thus, the primary emphasis falls on one being acquainted
with, or actually having done the operation in question. According to
the second connotation, to speak of the experience is to point to the
ability to perform effectively.1 31 Similarly, the Burtonian
explanation of the behaviour of the facilitator does not arise solely
from the notion of purified mind, it includes elements which
emphasise the familiarity of the facilitator with the workshop
practices. Familiarity, in turn, implies effective behaviour. 1 32
4. 2. The rationality of the facilitator
The conception of rationality underlying the notion of a purified mind
derives from Enlightenment rationality. The eighteenth century
writer Condorcet exemplifies this type of rationality. Enlightenment
means in this framework a political concept for emancipation from
prejudice through the diffusion of scientific knowledge with its many
practical consequences. For Condorcet, perfection no longer means
the realisation of a telos found in the nature of a thing; it signifies
instead a process of improvement that has a direction but is not
131. Smith, Puroose and Thou g ht, p. 94.
132. See: Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict.
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teleologically limited in advance. Condorcet advocates 'scientifically
organising learning processes' which are based on scientific help in
answering normative questions. He assumes that all problems to
which religious and philosophical doctrines previously supplied
answers can be largely transposed into scientifically manageable
problems, and in this sense rationally resolved. Moreover, he supposes
that rationality that has broken through in the natural sciences does
not merely reflect standards peculiar to Western civilisation but is
inherent in the human mind in general.l 33
The idea of the rationalisation process found in Condorcet's thinking
is summarised by Habermas:
"He [Condorcet] relies on an automatic efficacy of the mind,
that is, on the belief that human intelligence is disposed to the
accumulation of knowledge and brings about advances in
civilization through a diffusion of this knowledge per Se. This
automatism appears in two aspects, which stand in an inverse
relation to one another. From the practical perspective of
those involved, the civilizing advances appear to be the results
of a practice of disseminating knowledge, of the influence of
philosophers on public opinion, of the reform of the schools, of
popular education, and so on."
In addition to the practical perspective there is always a theoretical
perspective of the scientist:
"From the theoretical perspective of the scientists, the
civilizing advances present themselves as phenomena that can
be explained by laws of nature. Thus: from the practical
perspective, rationalization appears as a communicative
practice carried on with will and consciousness; from the
theoretical perspective, it appears as a cognitive process
flowing along in a lawlike way." 1 34
The Burtonian problem-solving project as a whole is characterised by
Condorcetian rationality, and, moreover, the mode of rationality is
133. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, pp. 145-151.
134. ibid., p. 151. Note also the similarities between these views and those presented by
(neo)behaviouralists (Chapter II).
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embodied especially in the behaviour of the facilitator.1 35 Three
points from Burton's views support the claim. First, Burton's
criticism of dogmatism and his attachment to 'scientific processes'
reflect the Enlightenment tradition. Burton assumes that he rejects
ideological constructs of humanity in favour of an advanced,
scientific and non-ideological model. 1 36 Second, the Burtonian
project is based on a belief in the existence of natural-law-like
needs. By assuming that a set of needs can be discovered
scientifically (objectively), Burton trusts in scientific procedures in
finding the essence of humanism. Moreover, he supposes that because
we can define objectively these needs, they can work as guidelines
for future decision-making and policies. The problem-solving
workshop can be, then, regarded as a 'scientific learning process'
where science, based on knowledge of natural laws, helps in
answering normative (value) questions. Third, the role of the
Burtonian third party as a teacher is similar to that of Condorcet's
Enlightener: both of them are assumed to contribute to the civilising
process by diffusing knowledge.
Two other forms of rationality can be found in Burton's explanations
of the behaviour of the facilitator. In addition to Enlightenment
rationality, the facilitator is assumed to be capable of social
engineering which demands instrumental rationality. The facilitator
selects the participants, organises the workshop setting and chairs
discussions. All these activities require instrumental rationality
which is based on the capacity to devise, select, and effect good
means to clarified ends. The end is conflict resolution, and the
workshop procedures and setting are means to this clear end.
Moreover, these are means which can be manipulated and engineered
with the help of an instrumental mind. The workshop can also, on the
135. Jean-Pierre Cot places Burtonian workshop rationality in a more recent tradition.
He writes: "Burton's views belong to a respectable stream of thought, illustrated by the
Quakers and by certain apostles of international conciliation. A patient discussion among
reasonable men can solve any problem. A panel of specialists (even before World War I,
Ludwig von Bar and Effremoff had proposed a council of wise men) must help the parties
by giving them some technical information on their difficulties." Cot, Jean-Pierre,
"Critical Remarks on John Burton's Paper on Resolution of Conflict with Special
Reference to the Cyprus Conflict", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1972,
p. 33.
136. See especially: Burton, Dear Survivors, pp. 22-26. Burton, Global Conflict, pp.
16-24. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Proventi gn, pp. 30-35.
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other hand, be considered to be a discursive design where the
facilitator participates in and practices discursive rationality with
the participants. The facilitator takes part in exercising discursive
reasoning about normative judgements, staying, nevertheless, neutral
in relation to the values the participants have.
4. 3. The rationality debate as an epistemological question
The question of the rationality of the facilitator and his or her modes
of behaviour cannot be detached from the continuing rationality
debate in the social sciences. The debate is vital, since the Burtonian
facilitator is assumed to be a scientist theorising on the basis of his
or her practical workshop activities. 137 The discussion can be seen
from many angles. It can, for example, be reduced to the question,
what does it mean to understand or explain social actions? Habermas
summarises the essence of the debate by arguing that "different
models of action presuppose different relations of actor to world;
and these world-relations are constitutive not only for aspects of the
rationality of action, but also for the rationality of interpretations
of action by, say, social-scientific interpreters". 1 38 From the point
of view of this study, it is relevant to limit the debate to two issues:
the views of common rationality or common good reasons and of the
access of a researcher to those reasons. In other words, it is
plausible to ask do we have to postulate a certain form of common
rationality to explain human action, and how does a researcher have
an access to the domain of behaviour?
The rationality debate has been advanced by Peter Winch who employs
Wittgenstein's notion of a language game. l 39 In brief, Winch
considers social action as rule-following. His thesis is that "our idea
of what belongs to the realm of reality is given us in the language
137. It is important to keep in mind Burton's methodological principle of abduction. He is
not an empiricist in a strict sense.
138. Habermas, The Communicative Theory of Action, Vol. 1, p. 102.
139. Winch, Peter, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973 (first published 1958). See also: Winch, Peter,
"Understanding a Primitive Society", in Rationality, Bryan Wilson (ed.), Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1974, pp. 78-111. Hollis and Smith, Explainin g and Understanding
International Relations, pp. 82-88.
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that we use". 14 ° The concepts we have settle for us the form of the
experience we have of the world. In other words, language in some
sense determines or constitutes what is perceived. The inevitable
conclusion which follows from Winch's argument is that truth is
relative to a language game or, rather, to a form of life from which a
language game arises. In this view, reason becomes relativised: what
counts as a reason is context-dependent. Hollis and Lukes clarify the
difference between the rationalist and relativist positions:
"The crucial point is that the giving of reasons involves a
claim that what is cited would, if true, be a good reason. In
other words it has to be objectively true that one thing is good
reason for another. Where the relativist sees only differences
in these standards for rating reasons as good, the rationalist
insists on ranking the standards." 1 4 1
For the purposes of the thesis it is sufficient to introduce the
extreme poles of the debate suggested by Hollis and Lukes. Winch's
relativist view has been already pointed out. Similarly, Ian Hacking
claims that "our discoveries are 'objective', simply because the
styles of reasoning that we employ determine what counts as
objectivity". 142 Thus, candidates for truth or falsehood have no
existence independent of the styles of reasoning that settle what it
is to be true or false in the domain in question. Therefore, we cannot
reason as to whether alternative systems of reasoning are better or
worse than ours, because the "propositions to which we reason get
their sense only from the method of reasoning employed". 143 At the
other pole, Robin Horton claims that there is a "strong core of human
cognitive rationality common to the cultures of all places on earth
and all times since the dawn of properly human social life". 1 44
140. Winch, The Idea of a..., P. 15.
141. Hollis, Martin and Lukes, Steven, "Introduction", in Rationality and Relativism,
Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. 10-11.
142. Hacking, Ian, "Language, Truth and Reason", in Rationality and Relativisrri, Martin
Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, p. 49.
143. ibid., p. 65.
144. Horton, Robin, "Tradition and Modernity Revisited", in Rationality and Relativism,
Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, p. 256. See also:
Horton, Robin, "African Traditional Thought and Western Science", in Rationality, Bryan
Wilson (ed.), London: Basil Blackwell, 1974, Pp. 131-171.
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Burton is closer to the extreme view of Horton than to that of Winch.
Burton's position is, however, not simple. If we accept Avruch's and
Black's interpretation of Burton's version of needs theory, needs lead
inevitably to irrationality. We cannot, therefore, assume any common
rationality or good reason which underlies behaviour. Unlike Avruch's
and Black's view, the interpretation of Burton's needs theory which
refers to survival value, can presuppose a certain form of rationality.
That is, behaviour is rational when it contributes to the survival of
an organism. Nevertheless, it is not justifiable to speak about
common good reason underlying behaviour, because the notion of
survival value does not necessarily imply any reasoning process. An
organism may behave 'automatically', without reasoning, in a way
that guarantees its survival.
On the other hand, Burton conceives a person to be calculating and
cost-benefit oriented in a conflict situation as demonstrated earlier.
Thus, he presupposes a common form of rationality and makes a claim
to universality. Given these presuppositions, explaining human
behaviour, even across different cultures, is possible, because
persons are seen to behave similarly (and maybe also predictably) on
the basis of their instrumental rationality in all conflict situations.
Discursive rationality, however, brings in an element of situational
rationality which opposes universalising tendencies. A discursive
design, from which discursive rationality arises, is sensitive to
different language games, and therefore, does not necessarily denote
an universal good reason. In that view, an explanation, or rather
understanding, of behaviour is, then, context-dependent.
The question about the access of the researcher to the domain of
behaviour is here restricted to the question whether our explanation
of behaviour, and especially behaviour in other cultures, is
necessarily dependent on the rules of logic as we know and use them.
It can be asked is our social inquiry inherently 'perspectival', that is,
are the perspectives of actors and observers - sets of beliefs,
attitudes and assumptions that specify how social reality is to be
understood - different? 'Perspectivism' can be formulated in either a
weak or a strong form. In a weak form, it asserts that interpretation
and explanation must make reference to the perspectives of actors. In
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a strong form, it asserts that the perspective of an interpreter
cannot be divorced from the account he or she gives. In other words,
the strong form assumes that there can be no perspective-neutral
interpretation and explanation. 1 45
As Steven Lukes notes, even weak perspectivism is incompatible with
theorising based on the notion of utility maximising. The strategic
action model which relies on the notion does not investigate the
beliefs and motivations of actors, but imputes them for predictive
and explanatory purposes. 146 It is included in the notion of utility
maximising that the "concept of the objective world - in which the
actor can intervene in a goal-directed manner - [ ... 1 must hold in the
same way for the actor himself and for any other interpreter of his
actions". 147 Habermas discusses that assumption:
"An interpreter can go beyond this subjectively purposive-
rational orientation and compare the actual course of action
with the constructed case of a corresponding objectively
purposive-rational course of action. The interpreter is able to
construct this ideal-typical case in a nonarbitrary manner
since the agent relates in a subjectively purposive-rational
way to a world that is, for categorical reasons, identical for
actor and observer, that is, cognitively and instrumentally
accessible to both in the same way."148
By employing a rational choice framework, Burton presupposes a
nonarbitrary access to the objective domain of behaviour on the part
of the researcher. Although Burton does not rely on the rational
choice paradigm in a strict sense 1 49, by postulating the utility
maximising actor, he, however, accepts implicitly many of the
underlying assumptions of the paradigm. To put it simply, as far as
rational choice theory is concerned, Burton rejects perspectivism in
145. Lukes, Steven, "Relativism in its Place", in Rationality and Relativism, Martin
Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. 301-305.
146. ibid., pp. 301-305.
147. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, P. 102.
148. ibid., pp. 102-103.
149. His explanation does not involve in theorising, for example, on true beliefs, risks,
•	 probabilities or limited information. Neither does it explain all behaviour by referring
to the paradigm.
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his explanation of behaviour. Similarly, Burton's version of needs
theory which suggests the existence of needs independently of the
perceptions of actors, i.e. 'objectively', presupposes that the
researcher has unproblematic access to the objective domain of
needs, of motivational forces. Therefore, it is assumed by Burton that
it is not necessary for the researcher while explaining behaviour of
an actor to refer either to the perspective of the actor or to his or
her own perspective.
Thus, there are two features in the Burtonian way of explaining
behaviour which bring him close to the rationalist pole of the
rationality debate. First, his version of needs theory gives needs the
status of natural laws. Since they are seen to be objective laws,
similar to those in natural sciences, there is no need to make any
reference beyond them while explaining human behaviour. Second,
Burton's explanation of the entry stage postulates an image of utility
maximising man. The view presupposes a purposive-rational actor
whose world is accessible to an interpreter. Moreover, the world is
thought to be accessible to both an actor and to an interpreter in a
same way.
There are, however, some discursive and hermeneutical elements in
Burton's explanations which indicate relativism. He argues that the
interpretations of the participants of their conflict are an important
part of a workshop. It could logically follow - although Burton does
not go this far - that these interpretations form the very core of
theorising. The view would shift the emphasis from the rationalist to
the relativist pole. Moreover, if the workshop was explained more
explicitly by Burton from the point of view of discursive designs, as
Dryzek suggests, the focus could be on culturally-bounded
communication and interactions without reference to any universal
ontological basis (e.g. needs). By developing the discursive and
hermeneutic elements of the workshop further, Burton could move
from the realm of explanation to that of understanding.15°
150. To put it simply, to explain is to find causes in the scientific manner.
Understanding, on the other hand, aims at reproducing how peop'e order their experience.
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4. 4. Concluding remarks
Summary table:
Outside the	 The entry stage	 Within the	 The facilitator
______________ workshop	 _______________ workshop	 _______________
The 'engine' of	 - needs as drives - personal util- - (needs)	 - purified mind
behaviour	 (values and	 ity maximisa- - utility max-
interests)	 tion	 imisation
- (needs)	 - pragmatic
________________ _________________ _________________ considerations _________________
The form of	 - survival value - instrumental 	 - instrumental	 - Enlightenment
rationality	 - discursive	 - discursive
- instrumental
The mode of	 - causal	 - teleological	 - teleological	 - teleological
explanation- teleological 	 _______________ _______________ _______________
The principal	 - biologically	 -	 utility-	 -	 utility-	 - Enlightener
image of man	 determined	 maximisers	 maximisers
-(communica-
______________ _______________ _______________ tive) 	 _______________
As the table above summarises, Burton's explanation of human
behaviour consists of different layers which imply different forms of
rationality, namely instrumental, discursive and Enlightenment
rationality. It can be asked which one of Burton's explanatory layers
has a priority over other layers? Avruch's and Black's answer is that
since Burton postulates biogenetic needs as an ontological basis,
needs and their irrationality form the most important layer in
relation to which the other levels are inevitably of minor importance.
The view can be widened further by claiming that the layers
postulated by Burton are logically inconsistent. If we establish our
explanations of behaviour on something irrational, on something
which is not totally in our control (e.g. needs or irrational Id ), it is
logically incoherent to establish parallel explanations which rely on
inherent human rationality (e.g. utility maximisirig or communicative
behaviour). It is, however, possible to relax the irrationality thesis
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of needs theory, and claim that needs are rational, because they
relate to the survival of the organism. That is, since needs contribute
to survival, they are fundamentally rational given the foundational
value of survival. In that case the assumption of the existence of
different forms of rationality is plausible.
As it has been demonstrated, the way Burton establishes his
explanatory models is complex. He builds up a model of a cost-benefit
oriented person whose aim is personal utility maximising. On the
other hand, he is in favour of discursive designs which aim at
expanding communication, self-reflection and consensus. The role of
the facilitator is crucial to bridge these two models: he or she, as a
purified mind, is assumed to transfer the parties from the first,
cost-benefit, to the second, discursive, realm. However, it shou(d be
emphasised that Burton himself does not articulate the move clearly.
The next part of the thesis moves into phenomenology. The aim is
through sociological phenomenology to emphasise discursive and
hermeneutical elements of problem-solving workshop conflict
resolution. By employing a phenomenological interpretation an
alternative ontological basis - which is lacking from many attempts
to challenge the Burtonian approach - can be developed. For example,
the following questions will be discussed in the second half of the
thesis: the constitution of man (e.g. through needs or social
interaction); the manner in which identities are produced in social
interaction and through culture; the most fruitful way to understand
human actions, if reference cannot longer be made to universal needs;
and an understanding of the double role of the facilitator without an
implicit reference to a purified mind.
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CHAPTER V: SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED HUMAN EXISTENCE: A
CRITIQUE OF JOHN BURTON'S IMAGE OF HUMAN 'BEING'
The previous chapter, where the rationale of the problem-solving
workshop was studied, clarified further the image of human 'being'
and nature postulated by Burton. As demonstrated, his version of
human needs theory is an inseparable part of his conflict and conflict
resolution theory. Burton establishes an 'onion model', and gives
biologically based needs priority over, for example, culture in the
structuring of human existence. This part of the thesis discusses the
social constructionist view offered by phenomenologist Alfred
Schutz. His view erects non-biological foundations for human
existence and, thereby, challenges the Burtonian biological account.
Moreover, it provides us also with conceptual tools which can be
employed to give the problem-solving workshop a phenomenological
interpretation.
In order to understand the philosophical context of phenomenology a
short study of its general features will be presented. From the point
of view of this study it is important to see how phenomenology
differs from positivist social sciences and especially from political
behavioralism. Similarly, it is vital to understand the points of
departure between such phenomenologists as Edmund Husserl and
Alfred Schutz whose philosophy is inclined towards phenomenological
sociology. Given that Schutz's main focus is on the social world, his
theories offer notions which are applicable to the study of conflict
and conflict resolution. The second part of the chapter discusses the
dimensions of the social world on the basis of Schutz's views. The
last part continues the discussion, but shifts the emphasis to the
idea of socially constructed reality, needs and identity.
Phenomenological philosophy and sociology tend to stress the
'subjectivist' view-point: the point of view of the experiencing 'I'
(consciousness) which is the starting-point of experiences, actions
and interpretations in the social world. Unlike many other
philosophical approaches, it derives from structural accounts of the
everyday experiences and world. In other words, it does not hide
behind the notion of a philosopher who is an outside observer, a
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purified mind. This feature of phenomenological literature explains
the way how the pronoun 'I' is employed in the text as a parallel to
the pronoun 'we'.
1. GENERAL FEATURES OF PHENOMENOLOGY
1. 1. Phenomenology and the theory of science
Phenomenology is described as a return to the traditional task of
philosophy, that is, to a search for wisdom and to an understanding of
the nature of the cosmos and the position of man in it. By the end of
the nineteenth century the scope of a part of philosophy became
severely limited, because the success of natural science in
describing the physical world gave rise to the conviction that there
is nothing about the physical world that cannot be investigated by
empirical means. Moreover, the acceptance of the Cartesian division
of mind and body led many philosophers to the study of 'objective
realities as they are in themselves', with the result that the
subjective factor in consciousness was ignored as irrelevant and of
no philosophic importance. A kind of philosophy developed which
attempted to treat consciousness as an empirical phenomenon, as an
objective reality, that can be investigated by the quantitative
methods of natural science.1
In the same spirit, in some approaches of the social sciences the
study of man became understood to be a genuine natural science of
individuals in society, differing in degree and not in kind from the
well established natural sciences. The centrality of empirical theory
characterised this, in many other ways heterogeneous, social science
movement. Two models of legitimate knowledge became recognised
by the 'positivist temper', as Richard Bernstein calls the essence of
the movement; namely, the empirical or natural sciences and formal
disciplines such as logic and mathematics. The focus on empirical
theories was based on the idea that once we achieve empirical
1. Stewart, David and Mickunas, Algis, Exploring Phenomenolociy. A Guide to the Field and
Its Literature, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1990 (2nd ed), pp. 4-5.
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theories in the social disciplines, these disciplines become genuine
'natural' sciences. The task of the social scientist was thought to be,
therefore, to describe and explain social phenomena as accurately as
he or she can and not to advocate normative positions. 2 Bernstein
summarises the 'positivist temper' as it manifests itself in the
social sciences of this century:
"At the core of this naturalistic interpretation is the
conviction that the aim of the social sciences is the same as
that of the natural sciences. Collecting and refining data,
discovering correlations, and formulating testable empirical
generalisations, hypotheses, and models, all have important
roles to play, but they are not sufficient to establish the
social disciplines as mature sciences. There must be the
growth of testable and well-confirmed theories which explain
phenomena by showing how they can be derived in nontrivial
ways from our theoretical assumptions. At the heart of
scientific explanation there must be discovery of and appeal to
laws or nomotogical statements."3
The naturalistic interpretation of the social sciences was, thus, and
to a certain extent still is, based on the assumption that there is a
distinction between empirical and normative theory. Moreover, it was
assumed that theory is different from praxis; theory has its own
sphere and praxis its own. The task of the social scientist was seen
to be to theorise from the point of view of a disinterested observer.
The objects in the social world were assumed to be accessible to a
study in a similar way as those in the natural world, because it was
thought that there is no qualitative difference between these worlds.
In other words, the quantitative and experimental methods of natural
science were expected to be suitable for the social sciences. For this
doctrine of science theories and laws were formulated for the sake
of prediction, which, according to the view, was an essential feature
of scientific explanation.
Some remains of the 'positivist temper' can be still found, for
example, in political behavioralism whose a priori method and
2. Bernstein, Richard, The Restructurin g of Social and Political Theory, London: Methuen
•	 & Co Ltd, 1979, pp. xi-xxiv and pp. 4-54.
3. ibid., p. 43.
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presuppositions are largely based on the ideals of the natural
sciences. However, in political behavioralism a clear distinction is
made between what is human and what is merely natural. The
starting-point for the analysis of human behaviour is the meaning the
actor attaches to his or her action. The meaning of action is studied
from the point of view of overt behaviour. Thus, the study of large
areas of the intended meanings of the actor are neglected. As Hwa Yol
Jung argues, "political behavioralism as a scientific method abandons
the relevance of the vast universe of experiential data of everyday
life simply as 'subjective' or 'private' and thus unscientific and
unempirical". 4 'Private' and motivational phenomena are reduced to
'public' and observable events or the external components of action
with the result that the intentional meaning-structure of human
conduct becomes completely rejected by political behavioralists.
Similarly, the internal structure of consciousness is interpreted
narrowly or not noted at all.5
Edmund Husserl's The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenoloy: An Introduction to Phenomenology 6 can be read as a
seminal critique of the limited and distorted interpretation of the
modern natural sciences. Husserl's point of departure is an analysis
of Galilean physics which created, according to him, the Galilean
style of sciences. The Galilean style is characterised by a cleavage
between the world as it presents itself in the perceptual experience
of everyday life and the world as it is in scientific truth and in
'reality'. According to Husserl, modern science of the Galilean style
refuses to accept the perceptual world at face value. Instead, reality
is believed to contain, embody, and conceal a mathematical structure.
The universe is seen by modern science as a construction resulting
4. Hwa Yol Jung, "A Critique of the Behavioral Persuasion in Politics: A Phenomenological
View", in Phenomenolocy and the Social Sciences, Maurice Natanson (ed.), Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, Vol. 2, 1973, p. 139.
5. ibid., pp. 138-143. For a similar criticism see also: Schutz, Alfred and Luckmann,
Thomas, The Structures of the Life-World, Vol. Il, Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1989, p. 294. From now on the abbreviation SLW, 2 will be used to refer to this
book. On behavioralism see also: Wagner, Helmut, Phenomenology of Consciousness and
Sociolo gy of the Life-World: An Introductory Study, Edmonton, Alberta: The University of
Alberta Press, 1983, pp. 11-15.
6. Husserl, Edmund, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenolooy:
An Introduction to Phenomenology, David Carr (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1970.
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from, being the correlates of and conceptualisation of a specific sort,
namely, idealisations, mathematizations, algebraizations, and
formalizations. As a consequence, the universe is thought to be
uncovered by means of mathematical notions.
Husserl's explication of the presuppositions of modern science does
not mean their denial or nullification. Rather, it means the
delimitation of their legitimate validity. He argues that the reference
to an ideal mathematical order must be eliminated from our
experience of the world and the latter must no longer be seen from
the perspective of the former. Thus, for Husserl, the mathematization
of nature implies the ever growing alienation of the universe of
physics from the world of perceptual experience. Therefore, the
restoration and reinstating of the life-world is one of his main
themes in Crisis.7
Alfred Schutz's works, on the other hand, can be read as an
advancement of Husserl's insights, which Husserl himself never
systematically developed with regard to the social sciences. In other
words, Schutz lays the phenomenological foundations of the social
sciences. 8 Schutz does not explicitly discuss the Galilean sciences,
although he agrees with Husserl's conclusions. His starting-point is a
critique of the Weberian understanding of the concept of subjective
meaning. Schutz accepts Weber's axiom that the social sciences must
be value-free. He likewise accepts Weber's methodological
individualism and his contention that social phenomena are properly
7. Gurwitsch, Aron, Phenomenolony and the Theory of Science, Lester Embree (ed.),
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974, pp. 17-19 and pp. 34-38. For a
detailed analysis of the processes of matematization, formalization and idealisation see:
ibid., pp. 33-59. See also: Husserl, Crisis, pp. 52-53 and pp. 65-66. Alfred Schutz
discusses the issue too. He writes: "The phenomena of productive subjectivity, which
alone constitute the life-world, remain closed off to the mathematical/natural-scientific
point of view for essential reasons, and the natural scientist forgets that he himself, with
his subjectivity which produces science, cannot find an understanding of himself and his
action in any objective science. Only recourse to this sphere of productive subjectivity,
which is of course made use of by natural science and by psychology which is oriented
toward the natural sciences although it is never brought to a self-understanding, can on
the one hand free mathematical natural science from the crises concerning its foundations
and on the other hand ground for a true science of man (Geisteswissenschaft )." The quote
is from Schutz's letter to Aron Gurwitsch in Grathoff, Richard (ed.), Philosophers in
Exile. The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch. 1939-1959,
•	 Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989, p. 11.
8. Bernstein, The Restructurin g of ..., pp. 135-136.
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understood in terms of ideal types. 9 However, Schutz maintains that
Weber fails to state clearly the essential characteristics of
understanding (Verstehen ), of subjective meaning, and of action. In
The Phenomenoloy of the Social World 1 0 Schutz questions the
Weberian idea that subjective meaning is attached to experience or
action and studies how lived experience gets meaning rather through
reflection. On the basis of Bergson's philosophy of life, Schutz
discovers the importance of the meaning-giving stream of
consciousness, the durée, and states that "meaning is a certain way
of directing one's gaze at an item of one's own experience". 1 1 He,
then, distinguishes subjective meaning from objective. According to
Schutz, an action or experience has only one subjective meaning, that
of the actor himself or herself. 1 2
Schutz's clarification of the Weberian understanding of the task of
the social sciences implies a challenge to the basic Cartesian
ontological and epistemological dichotomy that infects the various
forms of naturalism and empiricism. The dichotomy between
behavioralists who study what is observable and psychologists who
limit themselves to study what is mental is overcome by Schutz.
Schutz's thesis is, in Bernstein's words, that "to understand1 3 human
action we must not take the position of an outside observer who
'sees' only the physical manifestations of these acts; rather we must
develop categories for understanding what the actor - from his own
point of view - 'means' in his actions".1 4
9. Ideal types or second degree constructs, as Schutz calls them, are constructs of the
social world, action and actor produced by the social scientist in accordance with the
scientific problem he or she sets for himself or herself. They are based on the first degree
constructs of the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men living
their daily life within the social world.
10.Schutz, Alfred, The Phenomenology of the Social World, George Walsh and Frederick
Lehnert (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1 967 (originally published
1932).
11. ibid., p. 42
12. ibid., pp. 15-44.
13. Understanding has multiple meanings which, according to Schutz, must be
distinguished from each other. Understanding is: (1) the experiential form of common-
sense knowledge of human affairs; (2) an epistemological problem, and (3) a method
peculiar to the social sciences. Schutz, Alfred, Collected Papers II. Studies in Social
Theory, Arvid Brodersen (ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, p. 56. From now on
the abbreviation CP, 2 will be used to refer to this book.
14. Bernstein, The Restructurin g of..., pp. 138-139.
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Schutz, likewise Husserl, turns to the study of the everyday world to
understand the actor. He considers the everyday world to be the
social reality which the social sciences have to investigate and upon
which understanding as a method peculiar to the social sciences
needs to be founded. The way the social sciences should approach this
world is through second degree constructs (ideal types), which must
include a reference to the subjective meaning an action has for the
actor. 1 5
Although Schutz's contribution to the issue of understanding in the
social sciences is based on original thought, there is a hermeneutical
tradition in Western philosophy which discusses the topic. For
example, Wilhelm Dilthey and Heinrich Rickert argued in the turn of
this century that there is a fundamental difference between natural
science, on the one hand, and studies such as history, jurisprudence,
and economics, on the other. Dilthey maintained that the distinction
is one of content, and he insisted on using the term
Geisteswissenschaften to refer to sciences of socio-historical
phenomena. He focused on mind and especially on Eriebnis , lived
experience or immediate experience, which achieves an outward
expression. According to Dilthey, by interpreting this outward
expression in terms of what lies behind it, we come to understand
others. Understanding takes place, therefore, by reconstituting our
own lived experience in the other person. Rickert, on the other hand,
introduced the term Kulturwissenschaften. According to him, the
content of these sciences was the study of cultural products and
institutions. It is these and their meanings the cultural sciences seek
to understand, not inner psychological processes as some other
hermeneutically oriented philosophers would claim. In Rickert's view,
Kulturwissenschaften dealt with values, because it is in terms of
values we approach actuality and organise reality.1 6
15. Schutz, Alfred, Collected Papers I. The Problem of Social Reality, Maurice Natanson
(ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, pp. 57-66; p. 149 and pp. 209-210. From
now on the abbreviation CP, 1 will be used to refer to this book. See also: Gurwitsch,
Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, pp. 128-31.
16. Walsh, George, "Introduction", in Schutz, Alfred, The Phenomenoloçiy of the Social
World, George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1967 (originally published 1932), pp. xix-xx. See also: Bleicher, Josef, IJi
Hermeneutic Imagination. Outline of a Positive Critique of Scientism and Sociolooy,
London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982, pp. 52-68.
Dailmayr, Fred, "Phenomenology and Social Science: An Overview and Appraisal", in
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Three things should be emphasised from Schutz's and Weber's position
in relation to this tradition. First, Weber and Schutz claim that the
task of the social sciences is to understand the subjective meaning
of the other. However, they argue, the interpreter never comprehends
the meaning in its totality, because the other's stream of
consciousness always eludes that of the interpreter. Thus, they do
not consider understanding to be simply re-experiencing and
reconstruction of the experience of an author as Dilthey saw it to be.
Second, Schutz is in agreement with Weber that Dilthey's basic
approach is unscientific, because Dilthey's notion of understanding is
unsatisfactory, and his theory lacks the conception of ideal types as
a resource of scientific objectivity. Third, on the basis of Rickert's
discussion on values, Schutz and Weber argue that although questions
are asked in terms of a value or interest, they can be answered from
an objective, that is, scientific, point of view. 1 7
In addition to Schutz's attempt to lay the phenomenological
foundations for the social sciences and to clarify the task and
concepts of these sciences, his impact on other philosophers and
social scientists is remarkable. In the contemporary social sciences,
the impulse of Schutz's work is most prominently displayed in
ethnomethodology and recent developments in the sociology of
knowledge. For example, Harold Garfinkel's Studies in
Ethomethodology 18 studies the everyday world and what is taken for
granted by actors within it. The study is conducted by experimentally
disturbing and testing the limits of the everyday world. Peter
Berger's and Thomas Luckmann's The Social Construction of
Explorations in Phenomenoloay, David Carr and Edward Casey (eds.), The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 135-138 and pp. 146-148. Srubar, lija, "On the Origin of
Phenomenological Sociology", Human Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1984, pp. 164-170.
17. ibid. It should be strongly emphasised that although there are several similarities
between Weber's and Schutz's projects, Schutz criticises and clarifies many of Weber's
views. See a summary: Barber, Michael, Social Tvpifications and the Elusive Other,
London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1988, pp. 25-33. Schutz's account of
ideal types as a resource of scientific objectivity will be discussed in the next chapter.
18. Garfinkel, Harold, Studies in Ethnomethodoloay, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice
Hall, 1967. See also a summary of Garfinkel's views and their relation to Schutz's
phenomenology: Psathas, George, "Ethnomethodology as a Phenomenological Approach in
the Social Sciences", in Interdisciplinary Phenomenoloay, Don Ihde and Richard Zaner
(eds.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoft, 1977, pp. 73-98.
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Reality 19 , on the other hand, has a Schutzian origin in terms of its
focus on the distribution of knowledge in the life-world. The book
studies what people 'know as reality' in their everyday, non- or pre-
theoretical, lives. For Berger and Luckmann the task of the sociology
of knowledge is, in other words, to concern itself with the social
construction of reality.
1. 2. Basic concepts: intentionality, the life-world and
phenomenological reduction
According to Husserl, all conscious acts have a fundamental
directional character: they point toward some object, whether
objectively real or not. All thinking is thinking of or about something,
all remembering is remembering of something, etc. All consciousness
is, thus, consciousness of something. This is an essential feature of
intentionality. For phenomenologists, intentionality of consciousness
does not mean planned or purposeful thought as the common-sense
usage of the word may suggest. Rather, intentionality in Husserl's
sense refers primarily to the phenomenological structure of acts of
perception, in the broad Cartesian sense of the term 'perception'.
Neither are the acts of intentionality psychological events. The
structure of intentionality is purely a priori, that is, logically
necessary. The object intended (noema), as intended to, corresponds
to the objective side of intentional experience. The intentive process
(noesis), the intending as such, is a subject dimension within the
structure of the intentional act 2 ° Noesis and noema are, in other
words, the poles of the structure of consciousness which cannot be
separated from each other. As Schutz describes the connection,
"every experience is, thus, not only characterized by the fact that it
19. Berger, Peter and Luckmann, Thomas, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise
in the Sociolo gy of Knowledg e, London: Penguin Books, 1991.
20. Cox, Ronald, Schutz's Theory of Relevance: A Phenomenoloaical Critique, The Hague,
Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978, P. 61. Natanson, Maurice, "Introduction", in
Essays in Phenomenology, Maurice Natanson (ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966,
pp. 14-15. Stewart and Mickunas, Exploring Phenomenology, pp. 8-9.
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is a consciousness, but it is simultaneously determined by the
intentional object whereof it is a consciousness".2 1
Earlier in this chapter there have been references to the everyday
world of the social actor as the basis for philosophy and the social
sciences. The everyday world, the life-world (Lebenswelt ) as it is
called by phenomenologists, is encountered in everyday life, It is
given in direct and immediate experience - especially perceptual
experience and its derivatives, memory, expectation, and the like -
independent of and prior to scientific interpretation. The life-world
is the world within which we pursue all our goals and carry on all our
activities, including scientific ones. 22 Schutz describes the life-
world:
"The following considerations concern the structure of what
Husserl calls the 'life-world' (Lebenswelt in which, in the
natural attitude, we, as human beings among fellow-beings,
experience culture and society, take a stand with regard to
their objects, are influenced by them and act upon them. In this
attitude the existence of the life-world and the typicality of
its contents are accepted as unquestionably given until further
notice."23
Schutz's description brings up some fundamental elements of the
life-world. First, it is a cultural world and refers to a social group.
According to Gurwitsch, the term 'life-world' has a socio-historical
meaning: there is no life-world per se . Every concrete life-world
refers to a certain social group at a certain phase of its history.
Thus, every life-world gets its interpretation and is conceived of by
a social group whose life-world it is. 24 Second, the natural attitude
prevails in the life-world. Through the natural attitude the world
appears to us taken for granted and self-evidently real 'until further
notice'. In other words, in that attitude we do not question the
21. Schutz, Alfred, Collected Papers III. Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy, I.
Schutz (ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 4-5. From now on the abbreviation
CP, 3 will be used to refer to this book.
22. Gurwitsch, Phenomenoloav and the Theory of Science, p. 3.
23. Schutz, CP. 3, p. 116.
24. Gurwitsch, Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, p. 57.
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existence of the intersubjective life-world and its objects. 25 Third,
since the life-world is the world within which we act, within which
we can understand our fellow-men, and be understood by them, it is
our paramount reality. Fourth, we act and operate not only within the
life-world but also upon it. Thus, we modify it and it modifies our
actions by setting limits to them. As a world of action and work the
life-world is pervasively determined by a pragmatic motive. Fifth, in
the life-world we confront objects and events from the outset in
their typical character.26
The socio-historical meaning of the life-world refers also to its
intersubjective nature. Schutz states that "the world of everyday life
is from the outset an intersubjective one". 27 That is, the life-world
is shared with fellow-men, experienced and interpreted by others: it
is a world common to all of us. The life-world is also the area where
we encounter the other. Moreover, it is the area where we perform
our acts directed toward others. The life-world does not depend on
our birth or death, because it is historically based. It is historical in
terms of moral codes, economic situations, religious practices, etc.
The life-world is intersubjective also in respect of the future
generations.28
In order to understand the origins of Schutz's phenomenology and a
seminal difference between Schutz and Husserl, we need to return to
the notions of the natural attitude and intersubjectivity. 29 Although
Husserl and Schutz share the claim that we have to go back to the
25. In the natural attitude of everyday life the following is taken for granted without
question: (1) the corporeal existence of other men; (2) that these bodies are endowed
with consciousness essentially similar to my own; (3) that the things in the outer world
included in my environs and that of my fellow-men are the same for us and have
fundamentally the same meaning; (4) that I can enter into interrelations and reciprocal
actions with my fellow-men; (5) that I can make myself understood to them; (6) that a
stratified social and cultural world is historically pregiven as a frame of reference for
me and my fellow-men and (7) that therefore the situation in which I find myself at any
moment is only to a small extent purely created by me. Schutz, Alfred and Luckmann,
Thomas, The Structures of the Life-World, Vol. I, London: Heinemann, 1974, p. 5. From
now on the abbreviation SLW, 1 will be used to refer to this book.
26. ibid., pp. 3-8.
27. Schutz, pp . 1, p. 312.
28. Stewart and Mickunas, Exploring Phenomenology, p. 127. See also: Schutz, CP. 3, p.
312.
29. These writers have distinct periods in their thinking whose study is rejected in this
account of phenomenology.
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life-world to find the most fundamental ground for philosophy and
the social sciences, their approaches are different. Husserl attempts
to establish a transcendental philosophy upon a transcendental ego,
whereas Schutz rejects the Husserlian transcendental interpretation
of the problem of intersubjectivity and maintains that
intersubjectivity is a mundane problem.
In order to uncover the sphere of transcendental subjectivity Husserl
introduces a phenomenological method based on reductions. The
reductions are the device of phenomenology to go beyond the natural
attitude of man living within the world he or she accepts. The
purpose of such a technique is to reach a level of indubitable
certainty which lies beyond the realm of mere belief. The aim is, in
other words, to disclose the pure field of consciousness. The means
of conducting reductions is called 'bracketing' which implies 'putting
in brackets' the existence of the outer world, along with all the
things in it, including fellowmen, cultural objects and society.
Furthermore, our belief in the validity of our statements about this
world has to be suspended too. Thus, not only our practical knowledge
of the world but also the propositions of all the sciences dealing
with the world have to brought within brackets. Similarly, the
human being as a psycho-physiological unit has to be bracketed: I
have to suspend belief in my mundane existence as a human being
within the world. 3 1
In more technical terms, the bracketing is the methodological
suspension of what Husserl terms the 'general thesis of natural
standpoint'. That means placing in phenomenological doubt my
traditional common-sense taking for granted the very reality of the
everyday world. As a result, I now review reality with a
phenomenological attitude. This changing of the natural attitude to
the phenomenological attitude is called by Husserl 'performing the
30. It is the conscious and concrete 'I' which can perform the reduction, not an abstract
we.
31. Natanson, "Introduction", pp. 7-14. This description of the phenomenological
reduction is the most primitive. For more detailed studies see, for example: Natanson,
ibid., Schutz, CP. 1, pp. 104-109 and pp. 122-126. Vaitkus, Steven, How Is Society
Possible? Intersubiectivity and the Fiduciary Attitude as Problems of the Social Group in
Maad. Gurwitsch.and Schutz, Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kiuwer Academic Publishers,
1991, p. 138. Wagner, Phenomenojogy of Consciousness and.., pp. 40-45.
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epoché ' or 'transcendental phenomenological reduction' which
brackets the very worldliness of the ego and returns to the pure
stream of consciousness as such. What is left after this reduction is
the transcendental ego in whose constitutive activity the world
arises. 32 Steven Vaitkus describes the result of the reduction:
"Having carried out this reduction in which transcendental ego
is isolated from all references to others, it now becomes
possible to describe the constitution of the sense of 'the other'
from within this primordial sphere of ownness and, in so
doing, to demonstrate that the transcendental ego is indeed the
founding stratum upon which the constitution of
intersubjectivity is based."33
Schutz, however, asks "how can the isolated philosopher, the
nonparticipating transcendental observer who performs epoché,
mediate with someone else". 34 In other words, Schutz notes the
danger of solipsism with regard to the transcendental ego. Schutz's
conclusion concerning Husserl's reduction is that the attempt to
constitute transcendental intersubjectivity in terms of the
operations of the consciousness of the transcendental ego does not
succeed. Therefore, according to Schutz, it is clear that
intersubjectivity is not a problem of constitution which can be
solved within the transcendental sphere, but it is a problem belonging
fundamentally to the life-world. He argues that the products of the
sense determination of other subjectivities and our consciousness of
them are socially determined. Schulz's philosophical project carries
out a 'relative natural analysis' of intersubjectivity in the everyday
world by providing an analysis of the relative natural conception of
the world 35 held by the actors in everyday life. In other words, he
analyses the fundamental structures by which the actors take for
granted and produce a particular social world for themselves. He,
thus, establishes the foundation for intersubjectivity to the mundane
32. ibid.
33. Vaitkus, How Is Society Possible?, p. 138.
34. Schutz, CP. 3, p. 80.
35. The relative natural conception of the world is conception which is given in society as
an a priori to individual experience. The conception, although it is relative to a
particular socio-historical situation, appears to the individual as the natural way of
looking at the world.
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sphere. However, it should be emphasised that Schutz's suspicious
stance towards the transcendental ego does not mean that he moves
into the realm of the empirical social sciences where the focus is on
the contents of the natural attitudes of different social groups.
Rather, he is interested in seeking the a priori structures to be found
in any relative natural conception of the world.36
36. Schutz, CP. 3, p. 82. Barber, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other, p. 64.
Vaitkus, How Is Society Possible?, p. 141.
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2. DIMENSIONS OF THE SOCIAL WORLD
Schutz's constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude which
rejects the study of intersubjectivity as a transcendental problem
permits the inclusion of sociality. As mentioned, Schutz's theory does
not involve the assumption of a solipsistic ego. His notion of person
points to the intrinsically social character of consciousness. Thus,
his philosophical project points to the analysis of the dimensions of
the social world, such as intersubjectivity, interaction,
communication, social groups, institutions and language.
2. 1. Typifications, interests and systems of relevance
In the natural attitude things in the factual world are from the outset
perceived as types: my experience of the world takes place in terms
of typifications. In other words, the outer world is not experienced as
an arrangement of individual unique objects, dispersed in space and
time, but as, for example, 'books', 'lakes', 'animals', 'fellow-men'.37
Typifications are taken-for-granted, that is, I do not question them
until further notice. Typifications become problematic when my
attention is directed to some feature not included in them. Since a
type is originally formed by ignoring certain individual features not
pertinent to the situation or purpose in which or for the sake of
which it arises, a new relevant information may make it necessary to
revise, expand or form a new type. When a new typification is formed
it will be sedimented in my stock of knowledge and it will be valid
until further notice.3 8
37. Schutz claims, however, that I may take the typical apperceived object as an
exemplar of the general type, but I do not need by any means to think of, for example, the
concrete cat as an exemplar of the general concept of 'cat'. For example, the cat of my
neighbour, Jonas, shows all the characteristics which the type 'cat', according to my
previous experience, implies. But what he has in common with other cats does not concern
me. I look at him as my friend, as such distinguished from all other cats. Thus, I am,
without a special motive, not induced to look at Jonas as a mammal, an animal, an object of
the outer world, although I know that he is all this too.
38. Schutz, OP. 1, pp. 7-9 and p. 306. Schutz, OP. 2, pp. 233-234. Schutz, Alfred,
Reflections of the Problem of Relevance, Richard Zaner (ed.), New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1970, pp. 56-64. Schutz, Alfred, On Phenomenoloay and Social
Relations. Selected Writinçs. Helmut Wagner (ed.), Chicago and London: The University of
Chicago Press, 1970, pp. 116-120. Schutz and Luckmann, $LW. 1, pp. 142-146. Cox,
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Typifications, thus, represent the world to me in typical form. Four
aspects of typifications need to be highlighted. First, typifications
include expectations of the world. For example, I expect cats behave
in a typical way, and I would be surprised to find an animal which
looks like a cat but enjoys fetching sticks thrown for it. Second, my
network of typifications does not simply consider human individuals,
but it also considers their course of action patterns, their motives
and goals and the social products which originated in their actions.
Third, every typifying of objects, events and others necessarily
involves self-typification, taking on roles. Fourth, as described
earlier, typifications are stored in my stock of knowledge.
Why, then, are certain typifications selected from my stock of
knowledge to be employed in certain situations? Why am I merely
concerned with some aspects of particular typified objects? Schutz
argues that all types are in relation to the particular purpose at hand.
This purpose is, according to him, nothing but the theoretical or
practical problem. In other words, whatever types I employ to
interpret experience will depend on my practical interest and the
problem at hand. The relationship between interest and a set of
typifications is mutual. Typifications determine the interest,
because in the light of a certain set of typifications certain objects
or aspects of objects stand out for me in any experience and certain
objects or aspects will go unnoticed. Furthermore, a set of
typifications itself carries with it interests which, in turn,
determine types.39
In Reflections of the Problem of Relevance Schutz discusses in a
detailed manner interest structures or, rather, what he calls
relevance structures, and answers why certain typifications come
into play in certain circumstances. He studies why and how our
attention is focused on this or that object or aspects of them, and
how the experience of objects becomes thematic. For Schutz, even
perception involves choice, because one may choose which perceptual
Schutz's Theory of Relevance, pp. 5-10. Gurwitsch, Phenomenoloay and the Theory of
Science, pp. 115-116 and pp. 140-141.
39. Schutz, CP. 2, pp. 124-127. Barber, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other, p.
37. Cox, Schutz's Theory of Relevance, p. 9.
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elements will become thematic, and hence subject to interpretation.
Something becoming subject to interpretation does not, however,
mean that it becomes predicative: all this may happen at the pre-
predicative level. The basic concepts with regard to the systems of
relevance are 'theme' and 'field'. When something becomes a focal
theme of thought it is presented in a field, in relation to a
'background'. As a part of the field is given, for example, the
autobiographical situation which is unique to me alone, that is, the
history of my past experiences as it is sedimented in my stock of
knowledge.40
Schutz's thesis concerning relevances and typifications is that which
is relevant to a person in his or her current situation and for his or
her current purposes serves to select traits for subsumption under a
typification. Schutz distinguishes three types of relevances: topical,
interpretative and motivational. By virtue of topical relevance
something is constituted as problematic in the midst of
unstructuralized field of unproblematic familiarity. Topical
relevance is, thus, the relevance by virtue of which an object is made
a problem, made the theme or topic of thought, is segregated from the
background of unquestionable and unquestioned familiarity. Topical
relevance, therefore, brings material from the unquestioned and
marginal background, from the habitual knowledge, into the thematic
field. Topical relevance can be either imposed or intrinsic, If an
unfamiliar experience imposes itself upon me by its very
unfamiliarity, the relevance can be called imposed. On the other hand,
the relevance is intrinsic if an object becomes topically relevant to
me through voluntary attention. The categories of imposed and
intrinsic extend themselves to other relevances as well.
When something has become a theme of my thought, it needs to be
interpreted. That is, it needs to be subsumed under the various
typical prior experiences which constitute my actual stock of
knowledge at hand. In interpretative relevance an aspect of present or
previous experiences takes an importance for interpreting a new set
of perceptions. In other words, by virtue of interpretative relevance
40. Schutz, Reflections of the Problem..., pp. 3-5. Cox, Schutz's Theory of Relevance, pp.
72-72. See also: Schutz, OP. 1, pp. 9-10.
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certain typifications are selected as relevant to the interpretation of
an object or aspect of it. The selection is done on the basis of the
recognition of similarity and difference. Motivational relevance, on
the other hand, is founded on the interpretative decision for the
planning of future conduct. Motivational relevance can be in the form
of 'in-order-to' and 'because' relevances. The 'in-order-to' relevances
emanate from the already established project of action and the
'because' relevances deal with the motivation for the establishment
of the paramount project itself. The forms of relevances (topical,
interpretative and motivational) are interdependent.4 1
The systems of relevance are items of one's stock of know'edge at
hand. The stock of knowledge itself is a collection of typifications,
sedimented from previous experiences and formed according to the
relevance systems. It is made up of typifications of the common-
sense world. As mentioned, through these typifications the objects in
the life-world are perceived typically and within a horizon of
familiarity. Experiences and interpretations of the world included in
the stock of knowledge are mainly handed down from the social stock
of knowledge. In other words, knowledge included in the individual
stock is largely socially derived, distributed and approved. The stocks
of knowledge, and the systems of relevance as parts of them, are not
static. Rather, they are in a constant process of change.42
41. Schutz, CP. 3, pp. 122-132. Schutz, Reflections of the Problem..., pp. 26-30; pp.
35-36; pp. 45-52 and pp. 68-71. On relevances see also: Schutz and Luckmann, SLW.
1' pp. 182-229. For an excellent summary of Schutz's theory of relevance see: Cox,
Schutz's Theory of Relevance, pp. 72-91. Schutz's example (here simplified and
modified), originally presented by Greek sophist Carneades, suggests the following. I come
home from a pub and perceive that there is something unexpected in the corner of my
room. I think that it may be either a pile of rope or a coiled snake. Thus, the object has
become by virtue of topical relevance a theme of my thought. By virtue of interpretational
relevance I subsume this unknown object under the type 'pile of rope' instead of the type
of 'snake', because in my stock of knowledge there is the type 'rope' which corresponds
with or, rather, is relevant to this experience. The interpretational decision to choose the
type of 'pile of rope' determines my future action in a way that I go to bed and start
reading James Joyce's Ulysses instead of taking a knife and stab the object.
42. All temporal and social arrangements of subjective experience of the life-world are
fundamental elements of the stock of knowledge. The focus is here on the social
arrangements. In sum, the types of knowledge included in the stock are the knowledge of
the fundamental structures of the life-world, the routine knowledge (including skills and
useful knowledge), and the specific knowledge at hand. For a summary of these see:
Vaitkus, How Is Society Possible?, pp. 94-98. For detailed discussions on the stock of
knowledge see: Schutz, CP. 2, pp. 120-134. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 1, ch. 4. Cox,
Schutz's Theory of Relevance, p. 111. For the social nature of the stock of knowledge see:
Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 1, pp. 261-262.
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It can be tentatively argued that the study of the relevance systems
is important in the context of problem-solving workshop conflict
resolution, because they form a precondition for communication.
Schutz claims that communication presupposes the holding of
common relevance systems by the partners in the communication. He
states that "successful communication is possible only between
persons, social groups, nations, etc. who share a substantially
similar system of relevances". 43 In other words, the disparity of the
systems of relevance makes the establishment of a common
discourse impossible.
2. 2. Iritersubjective understanding
In several problem-solving conflict resolution theories the notion of
understanding is taken for granted and, therefore, not clarified. It is
assumed that an understanding of the position of the other party can
be gained in the problem-solving workshop. John Burton implicitly
establishes his notion of understanding in the idea of universal human
needs. Needs are assumed to be the common human denominator from
which the understanding of an other person derives. Intersubjective
understanding is, however, not that simple. Neither should it be
regarded as a psychological concept which denotes empathy or
feelings. In order to discuss intersubjective understanding we need to
return to the notion of the life-world.
As mentioned earlier, in the life-world I look at the world within the
natural attitude. What is characteristic to the natural attitude is
that in it I take the existence of fellow-men for granted, just as I
take for granted the existence of natural objects. Thus, I assume that
intelligent fellow-men exist as elements of the life-world.
Furthermore, I assume that the objects of the life-world are, in
principle, accessible to the experience of other persons. Schutz calls
43. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 2, p. 261. See also: Schutz, CP. 2, p. 238. Schutz, OP. 3,
p. 132. Schulz, On Phenomenolooy and Social Relations, p. 121.
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these two assumptions the fundamental axioms of the natural
attitude.4 4
The axioms rest upon two idealisations. First, the idealisation of the
'interchangeability of standpoints' consists of the idea that if I were
there, where he or she is now, I would experience things in the same
perspective, distance, and reach as he or she does. And, if he or she
was here where I am now, he or she would experience things from the
same perspective as I. Second, the idealisation of the 'congruence of
relevance systems' implies that he or she and I learn to accept as
given that the variances in apprehension and explication which result
from differences between my and his or her biographical situations
are irrelevant for our present practical goals. These two
idealisations together form, according to Schutz, the 'general thesis
of the reciprocity of perspectives'. For Schutz, the thesis is the
presupposition for a world of common objects and therewith for
communication.45
The Schutzian theory of alter ego and intersubjective understanding
gets its full meaning in the context of the discussion on the spatial
and temporal structures of the life-world. According his view, I
experience the world as spatially organised so that the place my body
occupies at a certain moment within this world is the starting-point
from which I take my bearing in space. Schutz describes body as a 0-
coordinate in the space in relation to which other objects are
perceived:
"It [my body] is, so to speak, the center 'U' of a system of
coordinates which determines certain dimensions of
orientation in the surrounding field and the distances and
perspectives of the objects therein: they are above or
underneath, before or behind, right or left, nearer or farther.
And, in a similar way, my actual 'Now' is the origin of all the
time-perspectives under which I organize the events within
44. Schutz , CP. 1, pp. 11-13. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp. 97-
99. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 2, pp. 208-209.
45. Schutz, CP. 1, pp. 11-13 and pp. 315-316. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 1, pp. 59-
61. Barber, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other, pp. 41-42. See also a case study:
Poliner, Melvin, "Mundane Reasoning", Philosophy of ihe Social Sciences, Vol. 4, 1974,
pp. 35-54.
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the world, such as the categories of fore and aft, past and
future, simultaneity and succession, sooner or later, etc."46
It is the temporally, spatially and socially structured life-world
which forms the basis for the understanding of the alter ego.
Although my body is the natural 0-coordinate around which my world
is arranged, I accept the existence of fellow-men in the everyday
world. I accept that their bodies form their 'here' and that their time
is organised around their 'now'. I also assume that they have access
to the objects of the life-world. Moreover, I assume that we can gain
sufficiently congruent relevance systems for the purposes of
practical goals in the everyday world. However, despite these
assumptions prevailing in the natural attitude, the intended
(subjective) meaning of the other is to a certain degree unreachable
to me.
In the everyday world, in the sector of it which is accessible to my
immediate experience, I do not merely experience the body of another
person as an object, but I experience it as a field of expression. As a
field of expression it expresses something about other consciousness.
In other words, through his or her expressive movements or acts 47 I
can know something about his or her consciousness and thoughts.
However, the body I perceive refers to something I cannot perceive,
to 'inwardness', to his or her inner life. This inner life is something
which transcends my immediate and direct experience. Schutz calls
this phenomenon 'medium transcendencies of the boundaries of the
life-world'. Through these transcendencies a distinction is made
between one's own and something other.48
In the natural attitude I take for granted that I can master the
medium transcendencies. In other words, the boundaries of experience
that I run into are crossable. I can cross the boundaries, for example,
with the help of indications, marks, signs and symbols as means of
conveying news from beyond the boundaries of immediate
46. Schutz, CP. 1, pp. 306-307.
47. According to Schutz's terminology, expressive movements have meaning only for the
• observer, whereas expressive acts have meaning for the actor too.
48. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW2, pp. 109-117.
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experience. 49 Signs50 , and especially language as a system of signs,
are important from the point of view of this study, because even
though essentially news-bearers, they are a precondition for
communication with other people. Given that language is a
precondition for communication, the study of it could be at the centre
of the theories of problem-solving workshop type of conflict
resolution. This is, however, not the case: the area is under-theorised
in many problem-solving conflict resolution as well as in many
mediation theories.5 1
In sum, language as a system of signs facilitates the crossing of the
boundary between fellow-men. However, although signs facilitate
intersubjective understanding, they do not make it automatic. The
subjective and occasional meanings of signs add something 'vague'
and 'uncertain' to interpretation. In other words, the interpreter never
fully discovers the subjective meaning of the speaker. Moreover, as
Schutz notes, language is neither an ahistorical nor a neutral sign
system. On the contrary, language is socially and historically
pregiven: its structures are built up intersubjectively, stored
historically and transmitted socially. Schutz writes:
"In any case, one thing ought to be clear with respect to human
society: the multiply grounded forms of communication in
social action presupposes language as a quasi-ideal system, as
the authority for clarification, appeal, and mediation. Language
is the principal means for the social construction of every
human reality; but it is also the chief medium for
transmitting a particular, hence historically and socially
already-constructed reality."5 2
49. ibid., pp. 131-147. Schutz, The Phenomenoloay of the Social World, pp. 118-126.
50. A sign has three different types of intermingled meanings. A sign (e.g. word) has an
objective meaning within a sign system (e.g. language) when it can be intelligibly
coordinated to what it designates independently of whoever is using the sign or
interpreting it. A sign has also a subjective meaning which arises when the user or the
interpreter of the sign associates the sign a certain meaning having its origin in the
unique experience in which he or she once learned to use the sign. A sign has always in it
something of the context in which it is used, that is, it has an occasional meaning. Schutz,
The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp. 124-125.
51. For an exception see, for example: Folger, Joseph and Jones, Tricia (eds.),
Directions in Mediation.Communication Research and Perspectives, Thousand Oaks,
•	 London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994.
52. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 2, p. 154.
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In this view, language is a storehouse of typifications, and it pre-
typifies the world to us. In other words, by using language we accept
certain ways to typify the world; we accept a pre-constructed
reality.5 3
Schutz's and Burton's views of understanding clearly differ. Burton
assumes that there are fundamental similarities, arising from human
needs, between people, and that these form the foundation for
intersubjective understanding. Therefore, such issues as
communication and language do not appear problematic in his theory.
Schutz's theory of intersubjective understanding, on the other hand,
points to the preconditions for communication. As argued above, we
can never fully discover the subjective meaning of the other, of his or
her experience, action and speech. However, the general thesis of the
reciprocity of perspectives implies that a sufficient understanding
for the purposes of everyday life can be gained. Moreover, language
facilitates understanding. Language as a socially constructed system
of signs which consists of typifications forms the most fundamental
element of communication.
2. 3.	 Action, social action and interaction
As demonstrated earlier, Burton's theory of conflict resolution sees
the resolution process from the point of view of the behaviour of the
individual. His emphasis is on behaviour which originates in needs and
which aims at individual utility maximisation. Schutz's theory, on the
other hand, shifts the emphasis from behaviour to action and from
action to interaction which is the domain of communication.
Schutz differentiates action from act. in his theory, the term 'action'
means human conduct devised by the actor in advance, that is,
conduct based on a preconceived project. The term 'act' designates
the outcome of the ongoing process, that is, the accomplished action.
Action, or performance as Schutz also calls it, may be covert or
overt. By 'working' he means overt actions which require bodily
53. Schutz, CF. 2, pp. 100-101.
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movements and which aim at changing of the surrounding world. What
is crucial in action is that it consists of projecting. Projecting is
anticipation of future conduct by way of 'fantasising', of placing
oneself in fantasy at a future time when the action will already have
been accomplished.54
Actions are motivated behaviour. Schutz redefines the concept of
motive by distinguishing the 'in-order-to' motive from the genuine
'because' motive. The 'in-order-to' motive means the state of affairs,
the end, which brings about the action that has been undertaken. The
'because' motive, on the other hand, refers to the point of view of the
actor and his or her past experiences which have determined him or
her to act as he or she did. For example, we may say that the motive
of a PhD student to finish his or her doctoral studies is to get a
lectureship. That is the 'in-order-to' motive. We may say also that the
student has been motivated to undertake doctoral studies, because he
or she grew up in this and that environment, had these and those
experiences at school, etc. That is the 'because' motive.
Action has, in Schutz's view, a different meaning for the actor and
for the outside observer. Since action gets its meaning through a
meaning bestowing process, through a reflective glance in the
consciousness of the actor, the meaning cannot be the same for the
actor and for the observer. 'In-order-to motive' is, according to
Schutz, an essentially subjective category and is revealed to the
observer only if he or she asks what meaning the actor bestows on
his or her action. The genuine 'because' motive, however, is an
objective category and, therefore, accessible to the observer who can
reconstruct from the accomplished act the attitude of the actor to
his or her action.55
For Schutz, examples of social behaviour are feelings of sympathy
and antipathy, erotic attitudes, and feeling-activities of all kinds. If
such experiences have the character of being previously projected
54. Schutz, CP. 1, pp. 19-20 and pp. 67-69. Schutz, The Phenomenolocy of the Social
World, pp. 57-66. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 2, pp. 6-18.
55. Schutz, CP. 1, pp. 21-22 and pp. 69-72. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social
World, pp. 25-43 and pp. 86-99. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 2, pp. 18-21.
•	 Subjective means in Schutz's terminology the meaning for the actor and objective for the
observer. Objective meaning does not, thus, refer to 'detached' or 'scientific' meaning.
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they are, according to him, social action. When social action has as
its 'in-order-to' motive the bringing-about of a certain conscious
experience in the other person it is 'social affecting'. For example, I
can originate a sign for someone else to interpret which implies that
I am affecting another by an act of communication. Interaction, on the
other hand, is based on an act of affecting another with the aim of
leading the other to have conscious experience of a desired sort. 56 In
Schutz's words:
"An interaction, then, exists, if one person acts upon another
with the expectation that the latter will respond, or at least
notice. It is not necessary that the partner reciprocally affect
the actor or even act himself. All that is required is that the
partner be aware of the actor and interpret what he does or
says as evidence for what is going on in his mind. All the
partner's subjective experience will, naturally, be modified by
his attention to the actor. Every interaction is, therefore,
based on an action of affecting another within a social
situation."57
Schutz considers social interaction to be a motivational context.
There is a reciprocal change of motives by the partners in social
interaction. In interaction I anticipate the 'in-order-to' motive of
myself to become the 'because' motive of my partner and, conversely,
he or she is prepared to regard my 'in-order-to' motive as the genuine
'because' motive of his or her behaviour. Thus, interaction invoives
mutual expectations of behaviour and reactions. However, as Schutz
notes, the intermeshing of motives does not necessarily mean
agreement of interest and goals.58
Social relations originate in social action and interaction. Schutz's
thesis is that the motivational context of interaction derives its
validity from the direct social relationship of which all other
interactions are mere modifications. In the direct relationship the
pariners are lace-to-face, their streams of consciousness are
56. Schutz, The Phenp menoloav of the Social World, pp. 144-1 55.
57. ibid., pp. 158-159.
58. Schutz, CP. 2, pp. 22-24. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social Wortd, pp. 159-
163. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 2, pp. 84-86.
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synchronised, geared into each other, and each immediately affects
the other. Schutz calls this type of direct social relationship a We-
relationship. If the face-to-face relation and the directness of
experience are essential for the We-relationship, in a They-
relationship, on the other hand, the relation is more remote, indirect,
and anonymous. In the They-relationship the other person is not
known to me in his or her vivid present. Rather, he or she is indirectly
accessible to me in the form of general types: he or she is an ideal
construct of my own. The terms 'anonymity' and 'intimacy' relate to
social relationships. Every concrete experience of others is
experienced with some degree of intimacy or anonymity. For example,
making love with my partner involves a higher degree of intimacy
than buying a stamp from a postal clerk. As Schutz seems to suggest,
the mediate They-relationship based on a hypothetical personal type
is characterised by a greater degree of anonymity than the direct We-
relationship.5 9
In the face-to-face relationship 'what you are' is continuously
available to me. In the We-relationship I can constantly check my
interpretations of what is going on in your mind by observing your
expressions and by asking you about the interpretative schemes
which you are applying to our common environment. In the process, I
can correct, expand and enrich my own understanding of you. In other
words, I do apprehend the other through typificatory schemes even in
the face-to-face situations, but as Berger and Luckmann note, these
schemes are more 'vulnerable' to interference than in 'remoter' form
of interaction. I can also modify my typifications in more anonymous
They-relationships. The modification occurs, however, only to a small
extent, and as long as the sphere of interest which determines the
use of type remains unchanged.60
59. Schutz, CP. 2, pp. 109-112. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp.
163-207. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 1, pp. 61-92. Vaitkus, How Is Societ y Possible?,
pp. 126-128. Vaitkus suggests that one can choose either intimacy or anonymity
independent of the relationship. He writes: "He [the personi is able, if he so desires, to act
quite intimately within the context of the anonymous typifications of a region or, vice
versa, to act quite anonymously within the given context of the specific typifications of a
region." ibid., p. 186. It can be argued, on the other hand, that a relationship can be so
structured that this choice does not arise. See also Druckman and Broome who use the
terms 'familiarity' and 'lack of familiarity' in the context of conflict resolution.
Druckman and Broome, "Value Differences and Conflict Resolution", pp. 571-593.
60. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 43-45. Schutz, ]Ji
Phenomenoloçiy of the Social World, p. 169; p. 171; p. 185; p. 192 and p. 204. Schutz
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Schutz argues that the face-to-face relationship is important also in
harmonising relevance structures between partners in interaction:
'In the second place, every communication with other men in the
life-world presupposes a similar structure of at least the
thematic and interpretational relevancies. This similar structure
will occupy a privileged position within the social domain
involving fellow-men in face-to-face situations because the
sector of the spatial life-world, common to partners, by
necessity makes some elements to be equal thematic relevancy
for both partners, and furthermore because the body of the
partner with his field of physiognomic expression, his gestures,
his actions and reactions discloses an interpretationally
relevant field which otherwise would not be accessible to the
same extent."6 1
Although the face-to-face relationship may impose some elements of
equal thematic relevancy for partners in the situation, experiences
which do not become problematic do not, according to Schutz, change
typifications and other relevance structures. In other words, unless
an experience is presented as a problem, it rather confirms the
efficacy of 'old' relevance structures and typifications than modify
them.62
Two preliminary conclusions can be drawn from Schutz's account of
intersubjective understanding and interaction. First, seen from the
point of view of conflict resolution, interaction, although based on
and Luckmann, SLW. 1, P. 68; P. 77 and p. 85. Barber, Social Typifications and the
Elusive Other, pp. 46-47. In the phenomenological literature based on Schutzs ideas
there are two approaches to typification and to the understanding of the subjective
motives of the actor. Richard Zaner emphasises that refraining from typifying is required
to grasp the other's subjective meaning. Maurice Natanson, on the other hand, claims that
a certain degree of typification and anonymization is needed for understanding. Vaitkus,
How Is Society Possible?, p. 87. See also: Zaner, Richard, "Theory of Intersubjectivity:
Alfred Schutz", Social Research, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1961, pp. 7t-93. Natanson, Maurice,
Anonymity. A Study in the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz, Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1986. See also Druckman's and Broome's discussion. They seem to be closer to
Zaner's position that Natanson's, although they do not employ the phenomenological
terminology. Druckman and Broome, "Value Differences and..", pp. 571 -593.
61. Schutz, CP. 3, p. 132. See also: Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 1, p.254. It should be
emphasised that equal relevancy does not imply identicality. Rather, it implies the
• congruency of relevance systems.
62. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 1, p. 226.
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the intermesh of motives, does not create common interests and
goals in the conflict resolution situation. Therefore, the study of the
processes of communication and typification as well as of the
formation of relevance systems is needed to obtain more
sophisticated conceptual tools with which we can approach problem-
solving workshop conflict resolution. Second, if all interaction is
affecting the other, as Schutz claims, the solitary and utility-
maximising ego postulated by Burton as a foundation for conflict
resolution theory is irrelevant or, at least, it is not fruitful. As
demonstrated in the previous chapter, in Burton's theory interaction
is largely reduced to the sum of choices made by each actor. His view
is not fruitful, because it does not create space for communication.
In brief, Schutz's theory brings us to the point where it is necessary
to reject the Burtonian theory of behaviour which emphasises the
solitary ego if we want to study communication, language and
interaction as a means through which shared typifications and a
common reality are created in the problem-solving workshop.
2. 4. Rationality
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Burton postulates two main
types of rationality when explaining behaviour. For him, instrumental
rationality founded on utility-maximising calculations is the most
prominent. On other hand, Burton hints at the possibility of discursive
rationality too. Schutz's account of the rationality of action differs
fundamentally from Burton's views. Schutz's main thesis is that the
everyday action may be reasonable, but not rational. People act in
everyday life on the basis of routines and rules of thumb rather than
on the basis of instrumental calculations. Schutz writes:
"We may say that a man acted sensibly if the motive and the
course of his action is understandable to us, his partners and
observers. This will be the case if his action is in accordance
with a socially approved set of rules and recipes for the
coming to terms with typical problems by applying typical
means for achieving typical ends. If I, if We, if 'Anybody who is
one of us' found himself in typically similar circumstances he
would act in a similar way. Sensible behaviour, however, does
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not presuppose that the actor is guided by insight into his
motives and the means-ends context."63
Schutz calls this type of rationality also practical rationality.
Practical rationality becomes constituted under the limiting
conditions of everyday reality. Actions based on it are, thus, rational
relative to subjective factors and everyday goals. Schutz notices
also, that a course of action can be perfectly rational from the point
of view of the actor and appear non-rational to the partner or
observer.64
Schutz justifies the 'non-rationality' 65 of everyday action by
claiming that the knowledge of the actor is always incoherent and
confused. In the stock of knowledge at hand clear and distinct
experiences are intermingled with vague conjectures and prejudices
with well-proven evidences. Motives, means, ends, causes and effects
are strung together without clear understanding of their real
connections. Furthermore, there are rules, habits and principles
whose origin and validity is beyond our control and never verified. In
other words, our knowledge in daily life is approximate and typical.
Schutz argues that in the everyday world "we are satisfied if we have
a fair chance of realising our purposes". 66 Thus, in everyday life we
have 'cookery-book' or 'recipe' type of knowledge with help of which
we rather anticipate the likelihood of events and orient ourselves in
the life-world than engage in strictly rational means ends
calculations. 6 7
63. Schutz, CP. 1, p. 27.
64. ibid., pp. 29-30. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 2, p. 58 and p. 229.
65. Schutz does not actually claim that action is irrational or non-rational. He, rather,
wants to redefine the notion of rationality. For him, rational action is "always action
within an unquestioned and undetermined frame of constructs of typicalities of the setting,
the motives, the means and ends, the courses of action and personalities invotved and taken
for granted". Thus, it is reasonable to speak about degrees of rationality or partial
rationality. Schutz, CF. 1, p. 33.
66. Schutz, CP. 2, p. 73
67. ibid., pp. 72-74. Schutz defines the 'cookery-book' type of knowledge: "This kind of
knowledge and its organization I should like to call 'cook-book knowledge'. The cook-book
has recipes, lists of ingredients, formulae for mixing them, and directions of finishing
off. This is all we need to make an apple pie, also all we need to deal with the routine
matters of daily life. [...] Most of our daily activities from rising to going to bed are of
this kind. They are performed by following recipes reduced to automatic habits or
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Given that the knowledge of the actor is of such a kind, the question
arises, is rational choice of action possible. And if we assume that it
is possible, what are the criteria for knowledge that guide rational
choice? Points of departure between the traditional rational choice
paradigm and Schutz's theory are evident. The rational choice
paradigm takes the first question for granted and tries to answer the
second. As noted in the previous chapter, for example Burton, who
employs elements from the paradigm while explaining the entry and
workshop stages, does not question the idea that the parties in
conflict are capable of instrumentally rational choices.
Schutz's answer clarifies first the criteria of the rationality of
knowledge. He argues that the rationality of knowledge presupposes
that all the elements from which the actor has to choose are clearly
and distinctly conceived by him or her. 68 The choice itself is rational
if the actor selects from all means within his or her reach the most
appropriate for realising the intended end. Thus, rational action
presupposes that the actor has clear and distinct insight into ends,
means, secondary results, alternative means to the end, relations of
the end to other possible means and different possible ends. The
complications increase when the action in question is social, that is,
when it is directed towards other people. Then clear and distinct
knowledge of the situation as defined by the partner is needed. Schutz
concludes by claiming that this ideal of rationality, rational action
and interaction is not and cannot be a peculiar feature of everyday
thought and action. He, thereby, disagrees with the rational choice
model.69
unquestioned platitudes. This kind of knowledge is concerned only with the regularity as
such events in the external world irrespective of its origin." ibid., pp. 73-74.
68. See a more detailed list of the criteria of knowledge: ibid., pp. 79-80. See also: Schutz
and Luckmann, SLW. 2, pp. 58-65.
69. Schutz, CP. 1, pp. 27-34. Schutz, CP. 2, pp. 77-80. Hartmunt Esser challenges the
interpretation that Schutz disagrees with the rational choice paradigm. Esser studies the
moment of choice in Schutz's theory of action, and notes that Schutz assumes that action
that has now become habitual, and may be categorised as sensible or reasonable, once
originated in action that was problematic, and therefore was chosen on the bases of
subjective expected utility. Esser concludes that, in fact, there is no contradiction
between Schutz's theory of action and rational choice theory. Esser, Hartmut, "The
Rationality of Everyday Behavior. A Rational Choice Reconstruction of the Theory of Action
by Alfred Schutz", Rationality and Society, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1993, pp. 7-31. See also llja
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Schutz's theory of action and rationality differs from Burton's views
of human behaviour at least in three major respects. First, Schutz
does not assume that simple instrumental, means-ends, rationality
prevails in the everyday world. His theory of choice - which Schutz
does apply, but to rare situations where the usual rules of thumb no
longer yield results that fit the expectations - is complex and takes
into account situational factors. Burton, on the other hand, does not
recognise that the workshop participation can be routine action
which does not constitute a problematic situation for the
participants. In other words, the participants do not necessarily
calculate	 utility.
Second, Schutz's emphasis is on the socially formed stock of
knowledge of the individual. Given the social construction of
knowledge, the origins of the choices and actions of the individual
are in the social world, in its interactive and communicative
processes. Schutz's main theme is not the action of the individual and
the choices made by the individual. It is, rather, how typifications
and relevances intersubjectively regulate social action, interaction
and communication. In Schutz's theory the 'because' motives of the
actors are important, whereas Burton does not give any importance to
this 'social background' of the actor. For Burton, the actor is the
solitary ego whose 'because' motives are not relevant. The Burtonian
solitary ego is not culturally and socially conditioned, rather, 1 is
largely biologically determined. Thus, there is no need, in Burton's
views, to discuss the culturally constructed interactive and
communicative processes in and through which the individual, his or
her stock of knowledge, relevance structures, typifications and
'realities' are formed.
The third point of departure derives from the second: Schutz's theory
allows the study of the social groups and their notions of rationality,
whereas Burton limits his theory to the study of the individual actor.
Due to his limited understanding of interaction, Burton dismisses the
influence of the socially approved rules on conduct. Unlike Burton's
Srubars critique of Esser: Srubar, lija, "On the Limits of Rational Choice", Rationality
and Society, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1993, pp. 32-46.
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views, Schutz's views make it possible to understand how social
groups influence, for example, decisions. According to Schutz, the
actor orients his or her action on standards which are socially
approved as rules of conduct by the in-group he or she belongs to.7°
Moreover, the following of these socially constructed standards does
not imply that they are rationally understood. Thus, the ultimate
origin of the entry into and action within the problem-solving
workshop is in socially approved conduct. This conduct is founded on
the relatively similar typifications and relevance systems of the
members of the group the participant represents.
To conclude this part of the chapter it can be claimed that several of
Schutz's themes and ideas, such as the 'because' motive, the idea that
the basis of rationality is in the social world and the notion of
socially approved standards of conduct, shift the attention to
socially and culturally conditioned human existence. The theory of
alter ego, as Schutz presents it, on the other hand, establishes the
foundations for the study intersubjective understanding and
communication in the problem-solving workshop.
70. See, for example: Schutz, CR 1, pp. 32-33. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 2, pp. 230-
231.
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3. SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED REALITY AND IDENTITY
Problem-solving workshop approaches stress that the solution of a
conflict must be based on an analysis of the needs, motivations,
hopes and fears of conflicting parties. However, a question arises are
needs, motivations, hopes and fears individual and 'subjective'
mental, or even 'objective' biological, factors or are they, rather,
intersubjective and produced in the processes of the social world. As
demonstrated, Burton discusses these issues. He derives needs and
motivations from biology and ends up emphasising the solitary actor.
Schutz, on the other hand, focuses his phenomenological analysis on
the life-world and the relative natural views of the social groups.
Following the tradition of seeing human existence as socially
constructed, as the most recent sociological terminology expresses
it, this part challenges the image of solitary ego postulated by Burton
and continues to study how social actors are constructed in and
through the social world and how they, in turn, construct their
reality, needs and identity in that world. In brief, this part argues
that human 'being' can be defined without reference to biology.
3. 1. Cultural patterns and social groups
Schutz approaches the question of socially constructed reality in
terms of cultural patterns. According to him, the cultural pattern
peculiar to a social group functions for its members as an
unquestioned scheme of reference. The cultural pattern consists of
all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation
and guidance (e.g. mores, laws, habits, customs and fashions) which
characterise or constitute any social group at a given moment in its
history. Schutz claims, that "any member born or reared within the
group accepts the ready-made standardised scheme of the cultural
pattern handed down to him by ancestors, teachers, and authorities as
an unquestioned and unquestionable guide in all situations which
normally occur within the social world". 71 The knowledge included in
the cultural pattern consists of 'recipes' for interpreting and for
71. Scbutz, CP. 2, p. 95.
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handling things in the social world. These 'recipes' work also as
guides for actions which tell what to do to gain certain results in
certain social situations. In other words, the cultural pattern
provides in its 'recipes' typical solutions for typical problems
available for typical actors.72
Any society considers itself as a little cosmos, and the maintenance
of the cosmos requires symbols to keep it together. Societies, social
groups, need their central myths, or dominating ideologies, to justify
and to establish foundations for self-interpretation. Social groups
can be distinguished in virtue of their commonly held relevance
systems from which typifications arise. Thus, typifications included
in cultural patterns vary from one social wor'd or culture to
another. 73 As Barber claims, "social conditioness is an essential
property of typifications".74
A group has a relative natural world view which is taken for granted
and commonly shared. As noted, on the basis of the relative natural
world view all subjects organise their experiences as members of the
group. Furthermore, on the basis of the view they understand the
other as a member of their group. The group has, according to Schutz,
the subjective and objective meaning. It has a subjective meaning to
a person who considers himself or herself a member of it and speaks
of it in terms of 'we'. The objective meaning is that which the group
has for outsiders who speak of its members in terms of 'they'.75
Schutz discusses the processes through which a member of an out-
group adapts himself or herself to a new group. The stranger does not
have 'tools' offered by the cultural pattern of the in-group to act or
react typically in the new group. Moreover, he or she does not know
what kind of conduct to expect from the members of the in-group.
What is missing is a 'scheme of translation' according to which the
stranger could translate and interpret the cultural pattern of his or
her own group into the new group and vice versa . Furthermore, the
72. ibid., pp. 91-105. The scheme of orientation is unquestioned 'until further notice'.
Thus, it may break down in unexpected and new situations.
73. ibid., pp. 244-245.
74. Barber, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other, p. 78.
75. Schutz, CF. 2, pp. 95-104; pp. 113-114; p. 121; p. 129, p. 227; p. 230; p. 236
and p. 255. Vaitkus, How Is Society Possible?, p. 82.
—167-
knowledge he or she has about the new group is not necessarily
adequate, because it does not provide him or her with tested 'recipes'
for behaviour. It may provide him or her with 'recipes' for
interpretation, but not with 'recipes' for action which have been tried
out in actual situations. Therefore, according to Schutz, the process
of cultural adjustment takes place through trial and error, and is
slow.76
The Schutzian account of the outsider and cultural adaptation offers
a view-point for the conceptualisation of the problem-solving
workshop. In the case of the workshop, the other party does not need
to adapt itself to the world view or culture of the other. Rather, both
parties need to find ways to encounter each other in the workshop
without one-sided adaptation. Moreover, the parties as well as the
facilitator need to find a 'scheme of translation' in order to
understand each other and to create a shared reality. Thus, the
workshop can be seen to be a place where 'strangers' meet without
well-tested 'recipes' for the interpretation of and action in the
situation, and where trial and error are a means of slow adaptation to
a shared culture.77
3. 2. Individuals, institutions and social structures
Berger's and Luckmann's analysis of socially constructed reality
focuses on the relation between the individual actor and institution
through habitualized actions, that is, actions which are repeated
frequently. Habitualization implies also that the action in question
may be performed again in the future in the same manner and with the
same economical effort. Habitualized action becomes instutionalized
"whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions
by types of actors". 78 As mentioned, the reality of everyday life
contains typificatory schemes in terms of which other people and
objects of the life-world are apprehended and dealt with. What is
76. Schutz, CP. 2, pp. 91-105.
77. Benjamin Broome uses the phrase 'third culture' to describe culture in which the
parties in conflict resolution are able to operate. The creation of such a culture is,
according to him, a precondition for successfu' probem-soving workshop conflict
resolution. Broome, "Managing Differences in Conflict Resolution", p. 104.
78. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 72.
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peculiar, according to Berger and Luckmann, to the typifications of
habitualized actions that constitute an institution is that
typifications are shared by the actors participating in reciprocal
action. Moreover, the relationship between the actor and typifications
is mutual: typifications are available to all members of the
institution in question and the institution, on the other hand, itself
typifies individual actors as well as individual actions. Thus,
institutions control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns
of action and interpretation and, thereby, participate in the creation
and definition of realities.7 9
Berger's and Luckmann's account rejects the study of organisational
or institutional structures as such, as social realities of their own.
However, although organisational structures are created in an
interplay between the actor and institution, the actor may experience
the institution possessing a reality of its own, a reality that
confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact. As long as
institutions are, according to Berger and Luckmann, constructed and
maintained only in the interaction of A and B, their objectivity
remains tenuous and changeable. The case is different when the
institution is transferred to the new generation. Then the individual
confronts a comprehensive and given reality which may not be altered
and which appears as self-evident. In other words, an institutional
world can be experienced as an objective reality.80
How, then, does the actor act as a member of an institution or
organisation? Acting as a member of an orgartisation does not differ
essentially from acting as an individual. There is something also in
the organisational world which is taken for granted by the actor: the
organisation presents him or her with a number of anonymous and
79. ibid., pp. 65-1 09. See also Roger Jehenson's application of the idea of
institutionalisation to the study of a psychiatric hospital and its shared typifications.
Jehenson, Roger, "A Phenomenological Approach to the Study of the Formal Organization",
in Phenomenolooical Socioloay. Issues and Applications, George Psathas (ed.), New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1973, pp. 219-247.
80. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, pp. 76-77. Berger and
Luckmann employ the concept of role as a mediation between the objectivated reality and
the subjective conception of it. By playing roles the individual participates in a social
world, and by internalising these roles, the same world becomes subjectively real to him
or her. It is important to note that the actor can establish a distance between himself or
herself and his or her role-playing. ibid., pp. 91-96 and p. 108.
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functional typifying schemes that are 'passively' received and that
help him or her to orient his or her behaviour and interpret the world.
In other words, the actor becomes socialised to the organisational
world too. The relationships in that world are organised on the basis
of anonymous roles which guarantee the smooth functioning of the
organisation. However, face-to-face relationships within the
organisational structure influence typifications in a way that the
actual experience the organisational member has of the other
members rarely maintains the characteristics of pure anonymity.8 1
Larger social structures (e.g. feudalism, industrial society) condition
human existence too. They offer, according to Schutz, the individual a
range of typical biographies:
"The individual experiences the social world which is already
given to him and objectivated in the relative-natural world
view, as a scale of subjective probabilities related to him, as
an ordering of duties, possibilities, and goals attainable with
ease or with difficulty. In other words, the social structure is
the rigid boundary in which his age, his life-plans, and thus his
priority structures and daily plans gain concrete form."82
Social structures are, in this view, differentiated through their
degree of freedom in the various courses of life. The individual places
himself or herself in the social structure through biographies and
typical biographies work as a means of socialisation, for the
knowledge of typical biographies, consisting of what and how type of
knowledge, is socially transmitted to the individual in different
phases of his or her life.83
In sum, reality or, rather, 'what is known as reality' is socially and
intersubjectively constructed and shared. Schutz sees the influence
of the group on the individual in terms of the cultural patterns which
form a basis for a shared reality, whereas Berger and Luckmann
emphasise institutionally defined reality. In Schutz's view, the
cultural pattern offers an unquestioned scheme of orientation in the
81. Jehenson, "A Phenomenological Approach to...", pp. 219-247.
82. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 1, p. 95.
83. ibid., pp. 94-96.
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social world. According to Berger's and Luckmann's theory, on the
other hand, the individual is influenced by the institutions which
provide him or her with knowledge and rules of conduct. Despite these
differences, they share the view that reality of an actor is defined
through knowledge which consists of typifications of the world and
which is mainly handed down to him or her by other actors belonging
to the same social group or institutional world.
Given this notion of reality, the study of conflict and conflict
resolution presupposes the study of social groups and institutions.
The way groups and institutions distribute knowledge, define reality
through shared typifications and use language are, thus, fundamental
issues. Similarly, it is seminal to study the points where
typifications break down, shared reality collapses and communication
becomes impossible.
3. 3. Needs and identities
If we accept the view that reality is socially constructed, the
notions of needs and identity get a new interpretation. The emphasis
shifts, then, from the universalist definition of needs and identity to
such questions as how the actor experiences them, what meaning they
have for him or her and how they are created.
Peter Manning's and Horacio Fabrega's study on self and body offers
analytical tools to criticise Burton's universalist needs theory from a
phenomenological point of view. They study structure and meanings in
one area of cultural practices, namely, health and illness. They claim
that social scientists tend to postulate a 'radical equalisation of the
social significance of the human body'. Manning's and Fabrega's
analysis can be applied to Burton's version of needs theory where
there is a 'radical equalisation of the social significance of human
needs'.
Manning and Fabrega claim that social scientists suppose that "since
the body is composed of universal features, it necessarily is
experienced as such; furthermore, given this 'universality', it needs
not be accounted for within any special system of propositions
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bearing on the explanation of human behavior". 84 The universalist,
and often also biological, view of body consists of seven
assumptions: (1) the body can be partitioned internally into named
organs, systems and functional relationships; (2) unless external or
internal causes intervene the body functions normally; (3) the senses
are universal; (4) diseases are universal; (5) boundaries between self
and body are nonproblematic; (6) death is a biological process that
occurs when the body ceases to function and (7) the body should be
seen by persons as a natural, objective, valuationally neutral
entity. 8 5
Similarly, the Burtonian view of human needs supposes that needs can
be partitioned into named parts such as a need for identity, a need for
security and a need for co-operation, and that there are functional
relationships between these parts. As discussed earlier, Burton's
argument is that when, for example, elites hinder needs satisfaction
conflict will result. When individuals are free to satisfy their needs,
society functions normally. Needs are universal in Burton's theory:
everybody has them. Consequently, according to Burton, deviance and
conflict are an universal and cross-culturally invariant phenomenon.
Boundaries between the self and needs are nonproblematic, in
Burton's view, because needs express themselves through and in the
self. Finally, needs should be seen as an objective and neutral entity,
because seeing them as such is the very precondition for successful
conflict resolution and avoidance of violent conflict.
Moreover, Burton assumes that needs are universally experienced as
such, that is, needs are experienced as such that variations between
persons, situations, groups, and even larger social units are of minor
empirical significance. Burton does not deny that needs are expressed
through different cultures: they may get cultural expressions. These
differences are, however, of minor importance from the point of view
of theory-formation, conceptualisation, and, finally, conflict
resolution. Thus, seen from the angle offered by Manning and Fabrega,
84. Manning, Peter and Fabrega, Horaclo, "The Experience of Self and Body: Health and
Illness in the Chiapas Highland', in Phenomenological Sociolony. Issues and Applications,
George Psathas (ed.), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973, p. 254.
85. ibid., p. 255. For a similar critical account of needs see: Smith, Gilbert, Social Need,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 66-67.
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Burton's theory, which clearly equalises the social significance of
needs, denies the social construction and production, if not
expression, of human needs.
However, needs can be seen to be produced in social practices. Needs
can be defined as a socially constructed reality which is closely
dependent on the concepts of, for example, professional practitioners.
Attention can be, then, focused on the contexts of needs and the ways
how practitioners use the concept of needs in different situations
and in different effect. 86 It should be emphasised that this view does
not deny the importance of the needs concept in social practices. It,
rather, denies its universalist understanding.
For example, in the Burtonian type of problem-solving context the
notion of needs is often employed by the facilitator to point out
common interests the participants seem to have. However, the fact
that the facilitator uses the notion should not be confused with the
idea that the participants actually have objective and universal needs
which are recognisable in the workshop. The participants may
participate in the needs discourse created by the facilitator in order
to, for example, rhetorically (by convincing and persuading) to justify
certain actions, but that should not be interpreted to prove that there
are Universal and biologically based needs independent of the milieu
in which they are discussed. 87 In other words, if the concept of needs
is employed in conflict resolution practices and in theorising on
conflict and conflict resolution, the process of its creation and its
situational nature should be reflected.
Closely related to the issue of the social production of needs is the
question of identity. As noted, Burton maintains that identity is a
need in which behaviour originates. According to Schutz, on the other
hand, identities are structured in accord with the numerous social
groups to which we pertain and that pressure us from different
directions. There is no single identity, rather, there are multiple
86. Smith, Social Need, pp. 65-85.
87. The idea of the rhetorical justification is from a study which discusses how medical
practitioners employ different frames to justify certain actions in relation to dying
patients. Perakyla, Anssi, Kuoleman monet kasvot. Identiteetin tu pttaminen kuolevpn
potilaan hoidossa (Multiple Faces of Death. The Production of Identities in the Care of the
Dying Patient), Tampere: Vastapaino, 1990.
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identities. Multiple membership in numerous groups is experienced as
a set of self-typifications. A conflict may arise within the
personality, because the endeavour to live up to the various
expectations inhering in the membership in various groups is
difficult. Despite the difficulty, the individual or, rather, his or her
identity, is not determined by the social groups, because he or she is
free to choose for himself or herself with which part of his or her
personality he or she wants to participate in group membership. 88 In
Schutz's theory, thus, there is no single coherent identity which could
be the source or the aim of behaviour as Burton suggests. Neither can
identity be denied. Its expressions can be suppressed and the ways of
confirming it can be banned, but this does not necessarily imply
deviant behaviour as Burton argues in his conflict theory.
In sum, realities are defined through and in the social groups.
Conflict is also a reality which is defined in social processes. In
other words, what counts as conflict is culturally constituted.8 9
Similarly, a problem-solving workshop is a socially constructed
reality. The participants bring into the conflict resolution situation
their definitions of reality, conflict and conflict resotution which are
mediated through socially constructed typifications. As a
consequence, in order to understand and study a conflict, the sets of
understandings about conflict held by the people involved in a dispute
are crucially important. By shifting the focus from the functional
questions of what causes conflict and what conflict accomplishes
materially and politically to the contextual and interpretative
question of how people think about conflict, we start to see the
importance of the culturally constructed interpretations of the world
for the study of conflict.9 0
88. Schutz, CP. 2, p. 254. Barber, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other, p. 60. See
also: Schutz, CP. 1, p. 14. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Realit y , pp.
194-200. Schutz's position does not imply social determinism. Although cultural
patterns offer us approved knowledge for conduct, the selection of 'recipes' for conduct to
a given situation is done by us. In other words, cultural patterns do not determine which
'recipes' we employ in a given situation, although they offer us a selection of 'recipes'.
89. See also: Black, Peter and Avruch, Kevin, "Some Issues in Thinking About Culture and
the Resolution of Conflict", Humanity and Society, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1989, p. 187 and p.
193.
90. See also: Avruch and Black, "Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings", p. 132.
Greenhouse, Carol, "Cultural Perspectives on War", in The Quest for Peace, Raimo
Vayrynen (ed.), London: Sage, 1987, p. 34.
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Culture is seen in many conflict and conflict resolution theories as
an artificial label or custom which produces simply differences
between the parties in conflict. Burton's conflict theory does not
expand the view, because, as demonstrated, culture is interpreted in
his theory in an individualistic and instrumental manner. However,
culture is vital, because, for example, the 'identity' of a person is
created through the social groups and in accordance with the cultural
patterns which prevail in the groups the person belongs to. Even the
use of language implies being influenced by the cultural pattern.9 1
This view, which denies the existence of the person independently on
the cultural patterns, challenges also the Burtonian notion of the
conflict resolution workshop as a filter through which cultural
influences can be filtered away. 92 As the next chapter will show,
with the help of the social constructionist view 'cultural influences'
can be set to the very centre of conflict and conflict resolution
theory.
91. Schutz, CR 2, p. 101.
92. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 208.
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CHAPTER VI: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION .Qf
PROBLEM-SOLVING WORKSHOP CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES
In this chapter a phenomenological understanding of conflict and
problem-solving conflict resolution is presented. Problem-solving
workshop conflict resolution is reassessed and its area of
applicability evaluated. The chapter continues the discussions
introduced in the previous chapter: it clarifies the role of relevance
structures, typifications, language and discursive rationality in
conflict and conflict resolution processes. Some new themes are
included. For example, power and politics are discussed in relation to
conflict resolution. Similarly, a great deal of attention is paid to the
double role of the facilitator. The sources of his or her expertise,
ethical conduct and theorising are explored. Given that the facilitator
is assumed to be both the third party and the social scientist, the
notion of participant observation offers a fruitful metaphor to
describe those roles. The metaphor denotes also the 'epistemological
positions' the facilitator possesses. An account of these is given in
the last part of the chapter.
1. AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFLICT
Conflicts are characterised by a break-down of shared reality. As
discussed in the previous chapter, the individual makes his or her
world through typifications, through interpretations. This does not,
however, imply solipsism: typifications are produced and distributed
in and through the processes of social interaction. Typifications are
also a foundation for 'sociality' and cooperation. In other words, a
common reality is defined through shared typifications. Maurice
Natanson maintains that to be with others is to share typifications,
to respond to them, to participate with them, and to assume that
others typify in the same way as I (or we) do. He argues that "when
such typification breaks down or is for certain reasons denied or
severely circumscribed, then we have, at least in descriptive terms,
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evidence of fundamental differences or basic prejudices". 1 If shared
typifications break down, a common reality, the undergirding
structure of shared reality, collapses. The breakdown of language and
communication is merely a symptom of 'fractured sociality'. When
breakdown is far-reaching, according to Natanson, we have some form
of anomie in the society. 2 Natanson's idea can be further developed by
claiming that anomie may take the form of conflict and, furthermore,
what finally counts as conflict is culturally constituted.
The location for conflict is over definitions of reality. Conflict
involves the struggle to impose one's definition of reality upon the
other. In other words, the question is whose description of reality is
taken seriously, and even acted upon. Since the location for conflict
is over definitions of reality, the study of power is of a great
importance for conflict analysis. However, power should not be
understood to be manifest in conflicts and visible in overt actions of
coercion and domination. Neither should it be thought to lie in
relationships and be manifest in the suppression of differences.
Rather, power should be considered to be an attribute of discourse
and manifest in the production and contestation of consensus.
Struggles to discipline and control definitions of reality involve the
play of power which takes place in 'knowledgeable practices'. These
practices of power are not negative. Neither do they necessarily give
rise to conflict. The practices of power are continuous as well as
productive, because they participate in the defining and transforming
of the social world, often without conflict. Given the notions of
conflict and power introduced, the study, not only of the sets of
understandings about conflict held by the people involved in a
dispute, but also of the machinery in and through which dominant
definitions and positions are reconstituted in both conflict and
conflict resolution practices are important for the understanding of a
c a nfl i	 3
1. Natanson, Maurice, The Journeyin g Self. A Study in Philosophy and Social Role,
Reading, Menlo Park and London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1970, p. 59.
2. ibid., pp. 58-60. For a similar view see also: Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 1, p. 255.
3. For the traditional views of power see: Lukes, Steve, Power. A Radical View, London and
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1979. For more sophisticated accounts see: Cobb and Rifkin,
"Practice and Paradox", pp. 35-62. Ashley, Richard, "Living on Border Lines: Man,
Poststructuralism, and War", in Internation p lflntertextual Relations. Postmodern
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The idea of conflict entertained differs from that of traditional
conflict theories at least in two major respects. First, it differs
from subjectivist and objectivist approaches to conflict which claim
either that conflict is caused by subjective perceptions,
misunderstandings and attitudes or by objectively recognisable, often
structural, factors. The view introduced, on the other hand, pays
attention to the interplay between the individual actor and the social
group. Definitions of reality, as well as the breaking down of these
definitions, are dependent on socially shared typifications. Second,
the approach does not postulate a universal causal explanation of
conflict. That is, it does not establish the cause or causes of conflict
(e.g. structures, human needs, communication, misperception) outside
the notion of 'fractured sociality'. Thus, there is space for situational
factors to enter into the explanation or, rather, into the
interpretation. For example, Natanson's unspecified notion of 'denied
shared typifications' implies that shared typifications may be denied
for several reasons which we, cultural analysts - to use Avruch's and
Black's expression - need to study and understand separately
depending on the case.4
It we accept the idea that 'sociality' and cooperation are based on
shared typifications and that there are 'fractured' interpretations of
reality, 'not-any-more-shared' or 'not-yet-shared' typifications, at
the centre of conflict, we need to return to the relevance systems
from which typifications arise. The systems of relevance are
important also, because they form, for example, a precondition for
communication. The native language of a given linguistic group is one
of the most important forms of relatively congruent systems of
Readings of World Politics, James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds.), Lexington:
Lexington Books, 1989, pp. 296-297. For views which discuss conflict and definitions of
reality see: Black and Avruch, "Some Issues in Thinking About Culture", p. 192. Berger
and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, pp. 70-1 09 and pp. 125-127.
4. It is important to note that Natanson's account of anomie can be given a different
interpretation, the interpretation which many traditional conflict theorists would give.
According to the traditional view, anomie is caused by, for example, unsatisfied human
needs, unjust structures, misperceptions, etc. Ultimately, we are dealing with the
question of the role of theory in social sciences and with the
•	 'universalistic/particularistic' debate as well as with the 'explanatory/interpretative'
stances to social sciences.
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relevance. Cox writes about the relevance structures and social
groups:
"In fact, to a very large measure, various groups may be
defined by the relevance systems held in common by the
members of that group. Further, the relevance systems may
function to 1) perpetuate the group, 2) polarize the group (the
in-group) from another (the out-group), and 3) even constitute
the basic 'raison d'être ' for the group itself."
He continues by giving examples:
"As examples of these, consider national loyalties, team
spirit, and religious beliefs usually contain within themselves
the urgency to perpetuate, to pass along to new members of
the group, the attitudes and feelings about the group held by
the current members. Further, there are groups, such as
political parties, iconoclastic religions, and even nations
which manifest antagonist stances toward other such groups,
this antagonism being rooted in typifications and certain
interpretative relevances of the group.[. ..]"5
Thus, the relevance systems influencing typification and
interpretation are of vital importance while studying conflict.
Applied to conflict resolution, it can be argued that it is necessary
that the resolution process deals with these by harmonising
relevance systems and (re)creating shared typifications. The question
in what kind of processes the harmonisation of relevance systems
and the creation of shared typifications take place brings us to an
understanding of conflict resolution. Underlying the idea of conflict
resolution is, thus, the assumption that relevance systems and
typifications need to be changed, a new interpretation of a reality
found, in order a form of cooperation to emerge. In other words, a new
reality needs to be 'negotiated' in the conflict resolution process.6
5. Cox, Schutz's Theory of Relevance, p. 113.
6. The idea of 'negotiated reality' is from Cohen, Raymond, "Negotiating Reality:
International Relations and the Metaphor of the Holy Sepulchre", a paper presented in the
35th Annual Convention of International Studies Association, Washington, D. C., 28 March
- 1 April, 1 994. Cohen emphasises that reality as a social construct has two interlocking
sources: the heritage of the past and negotiation. See also: Scheff, Thomas, "Negotiating
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2. AN UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEM-SOLVING WORKSHOP
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
2. 1. Face-to-face interaction
As suggested in the previous chapter, problem-solving workshop
conflict resolution can be seen to form a framework for mutual
cultural adaptation. The participants, including the facilitator, need
to find a 'scheme of translation' to produce ways to understand each
other and to create a shared reality. As also noted, the other, the
alter ego, is always elusive to us, i.e., his or her inner life transcends
our immediate and direct experience. Moreover, we never fully
understand his or her subjective meanings as he or she understands
them. However, language partly bridges the gap between 'us' and 'the
other': language as a system of signs facilitates the crossing of the
boundary between fellow-men. Similarly, in the face-to-face
situation the subjectivity of the other is available to us through a
maximum of symptoms.
Given that the problem-solving workshop can be seen to offer a
context for mutual adaptation, it needs to be studied how
typifications change in that context. Face-to-face interaction
between the conflicting parties is one of the core ideas on which
most of the problem-solving conflict resolution approaches rely. It is
assumed that when conflicting parties have a chance to meet face-
to-face in an analytical and supportive environment, it will
encourage them to change, for example, misperceptions and to
"humanize their mutual images". 7 The notion of We-relationship is,
thus, implicitly referred to in many problem-solving approaches
when the foundations of interpersonal understanding are
theoretically constructed.8
Reality: Notes of Power in the Assessment of ResponsibIlity", Social Problems, Vol. 16,
No. 1, 1968, pp. 3-17.
7. Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner", p. 76.
•	 8. For a clear statement of the importance of the face-to-face situation see: ibid., pp. 84-
85.
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However, the limits involved in understanding the problem-solving
workshop as a face-to-face encounter should be emphasised. Even in
a face-to-face encounter, it is possible to maintain an anonymous
They-relationship. 9 The participants can approach each other
through, for example, the anonymous ideal type of 'enemy' in the
workshop. It would be, therefore, premature to conclude that a
problem-solving workshop as a face-to-face encounter automatically
reduces the possibilities to found the interaction on anonymous ideal
types and, thereby, produces changes in typifications. Second,
although face-to-face situations make some elements to be equal
thematic relevancy for both partners, changes in thematic relevances
do not necessarily bring about the harmonisation of other relevance
structures. 1 0 It is easy to imagine a case where the face-to-face
encounter confirms typifications the participants hold. Third, and
most importantly, enriched and changed typifications of the
individual participants of the other participants (i.e. increased
interpersonal understanding in the workshop) do not necessarily
produce changes in the way the participants typify the conflict in
question.
In brief, the harmonisation of thematic relevances, especially if
added with enriched typifications of the other, can facilitate
interpersonal communication which can be seen to be one aim of the
problem-solving workshop. However, two questions remain. How to
broaden the area of interpersonal understanding and how to transfer
that understanding outside the workshop? Problem-solving workshop
approaches which solely encourage, for example, 'free expression of
feelings' and produce 'interpersonal understanding' are, according to
this view, not likely to facilitate the finding of a shared reality
which extends itself outside the workshop context.
9. Schutz, The Phenomenoloçiy of the Social World, pp. 192-1 94. Schutz and Luckmann,
SLW. 1, p. 64 and p. 77. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 2, p. 94.
10. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW 1, p. 226.
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2. 2. Problem-solving workshop as an attempt to find
a shared reality
Although thematic relevances harmonise in the face-to-face
situation, the problem-solving workshop needs to deal also with the
interpretative and motivational relevance structures of the
participants. As discussed earlier, unless an experience is presented
as a problem, it does not change the relevance structures. Something
becoming problematic can be either imposed or intrinsic. There are
several possibilities of a problematic situation to emerge in the
workshop context: hypothetical ideal types do not apply, the workshop
situation itself is unexpected, a problem is imposed by the
facilitator or by the other party so that something becomes relevant
and an 'old' typificatory scheme does not apply, etc. Thus, instead of
'solving problems' in the workshop, it could be described as a place
where 'something becomes problematic' for the parties. Similarly, the
encouragement of discursive rationality between the participants
may help to find a shared reality. Discursive rationality will be
discussed in the next section.
Before redefining problem-solving workshop conflict resolution it
should be emphasised that the problem-solving workshop has a
situational nature, and it does not ever capture the 'whole' conflict.
For example, the participants bring into the workshop a 'sector' of a
conflict. Although we may agree with Michael Banks and Christopher
Mitchell that the principle in the workshop type of conflict resolution
"must be that the conflict situation defines its own parties and
issues", it cannot be avoided that the participants determine the
'sector' of conflict which is represented in the workshop by defining
and interpreting the conflict and, finally, by 'negotiating' a reality in
their own manner.1 1
A new definition, a definition which is very moderate, and a task can
be given to the problem-solving workshop. The problem-solving
workshop is an attempt to find a shared reality between the parties
in conflict for the purposes at hand without causing a further break-
down of 'sociality' and cooperation. The problem-solving workshop
11. Banks and Mitchell, The Resolution of Conflict, p.27.
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deals mainly with the interpretative schemes of the participants by
giving them a chance to 'negotiate' a shared reality. The finding of a
common language game both presupposes and facilitates that.
The question how to avoid a further break-down of 'sociality' in the
workshop emerges from the definition. A shared acknowledgement of
conflict and a shared need for conflict resolution offer a foundation
for 'negotiating' a shared reality based on harmonised relevance
structures. If the parties themselves ask for problem-solving
workshop conflict resolution, their relevance structures have already
some similarities: they both acknowledge the existence of the
conflict. Furthermore, the conflict is constituted as a problem for
both of them. These shared relevance structures facilitate the
further harmonisation of relevances.
Also a problem imposed by the workshop structure can facilitate the
harmonisation. John Burton's discussion of functionalist solutions of
conflict can be interpreted to point to this idea. For example, the
question of the declining tourist industry in Cyprus may appear as a
common problem for both Turkish and Greek communities of the
island. The parties may be willing to discuss the topic in the
workshop context and try to find functionalist solutions. They may be
willing to discuss the issue despite that, for example, the causes of
the conflict may be differently constituted to them.1 2 In Dryzek's
words, "individuals can then seek consensus on what is to be done
while differing about why " • l 3
However, before the parties can even discuss a common problem,
some harmonised relevance structures are required: something
appearing as a shared problem presupposes some equal relevances.
Thus, unless the parties possess some equal relevances before the
12. The origin of this type of cooperation can be in grass-roots level interactions. For
example, Edith Miguda describes the networks created by interactions among women
between the conflicting parties in western Kenya during the 1 990s ethnic and land
clashes. Miguda, Edith, "Harnessing Internal Local Resources for Conflict Resolution and
Self-Sustaining Peace in the Face of Ethnic Violence", a paper presented in the XVth
General Conference of International Peace Research Association, Malta, 30 October - 4
November, 1994.
13. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, p. 43.
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problem-solving workshop conflict resolution attempt takes place,
it is not likely to produce desired results.
A certain degree of similarity of languages or, rather, language
games needs to be found in the problem-solving conflict resolution
process in order, at least, communication to be effective. Dryzek's
account of regulatory negotiations between representatives of the
coal industry and environmental groups in the late 1970s in the
United States describes the importance of language games:
"With a little prodding, the participants began talking in a
language new to both sides, that of welfare economics. The
overarching value implicit in this language is allocative
efficiency, which again was of little prior concern to either
side. Now a switch from the language of strategic interaction
to the language of welfare economics is perhaps little more
than the replacement of one kind of distorted discourse by
another that is equally distorted. Yet it suggests the
possibility of a reciprocal scrutiny of normative judgements,
penetrating beyond particular concerns such as profits of the
coal industry or the preservation of a hillside in Utah." 1 4
A typificatory schema is given in language. If the schema of a social
group differs from the schema of another group, it is reflected in the
languages of these groups. Although the native language of a given
linguistic group is one of the most important forms of relatively
congruent systems of relevance, Dryzek's example demonstrates how
different language games can be played with the language. Since the
relationship between language and typifications is mutual, a shared
language game enforces shared typifications founded on equal
relevance s.
The rote of the native tongue is important in the workshop context.
For example, the use of English as a dominant workshop language
cannot be justified in all cases. Since it may not be the mother
tongue of the participants, they cannot fully participate in language
games available in it. In other words, the interpretative schemes
offered by the language are less clear to the participants than those
14. ibid., pp. 47-48.
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offered by their native languages. Moreover, English may well
represent, for example, colonialism and alienation for the parties. In
some cases, on the other hand, the use of English can be justified: as
a foreign language it 'frees' the participants from the interpretative
and typificatory schemes built in their mother tongue. However, even
in that case English is not a neutral language, because it gives the
world to the parties in a certain way.
It should be emphasised that the harmonisation of relevances does
not need to rely on the finding of similarities between the conflicting
parties. At a pragmatic level, the concept of human needs serves
exactly this purpose: it helps the parties to recognise commonalities
they are assumed to share. However, it can be argued that the parties
must go 'beyond similarity' and learn 'how to deal with difference',
instead of trusting in abstract similarity. 1 5 Rather than postulating,
for example, the abstract notion of a 'need for identity', the
facilitator can direct the discussion in the workshop to the issue of
multiple and coexistent identities which are defined and emphasised
in accordance with situations. Learning to live with these as well as
with the continuous struggles and 'negotiations' in which the
identities are defined could, then, be seen to be one aim of problem-
solving workshop conflict resolution, rather than the reduction of
differences, for example, to the conception of universal human needs.
Problem-solving conflict resolution, as all forms of conflict
resolution, is a highly political activity: the problem-solving
workshop is not a 'neutral', 'non-political', space. The struggles over
the definitions of reality do not cease to exist in the workshop and,
therefore, their intrusion into it cannot and should not be artificially
prevented. In other words, the struggles over meanings and
interpretations should not be neutralised in the workshop. Since
politics is these continuous struggles, it cannot be argued, as Banks
and Mitchell argue, that the workshop "is not a commitment to
anything political at all". 1 6 On the contrary, since the workshop
15. Se also: Broome, "Managing Differences in...", pp. 104-105. International Alert,
"Conflict Resolution and Training in the North Caucasus and Georgia", a report of the
•	 Piatigorsk seminar (June 6 - 19 1993), P. 7.
16. Banks and Mitchell, The Resolution of Conflict, p. 63.
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produces definitions of reality and, thereby, creates versions of a
world, it is a political process, commitment to politics.
The workshop facilitator participates in the political processes by
asking questions, making summaries and shaping the grounds on
which agreement and disagreement can take place. Therefore, the
language of the facilitator plays an important role. The psychological
language and vocabulary (e.g. emotions, fears, hopes and concerns)
which the facilitator may use refer to individuals and their
intrapsychic processes, rather than to communication patterns and
interpersonal processes. As Cobb and Rifkin argue, "rather than
reduce adversarial communication patterns, the mediator's
psychological vocabulary contributes to maintain problematic
patterns, obscuring the process of the production of consensus in
sessions". 1 7 In other words, the psychological language allows the
political processes and struggles over meanings and interpretations
to go unchecked: the psychologised vocabulary dismisses the
struggles and 'negotiations' over intersubjective reality by giving
priority to individual psychological processes. The facilitator should,
therefore, be at least aware of the language he or she employs and
avoid the 'psychologisation' of issues.
2. 3. Discursive rationality in the workshop
As argued, everyday action may be reasonable, but not rational.
Action in everyday life is often based on routines and rules of thumb
rather than instrumental utility estimations. There are, however,
other rationalities too. All rationalities are products of traditions
and, therefore, historically and culturally constituted. In other
words, a rationality does not transcend particular traditions.
Furthermore, human beings are capable of different forms of
rationality (e.g. instrumental, practical, discursive), but certain
structures or frameworks of action encourage certain forms of
17. Cobb and Rifkin, "Practice and Paradox", p. 60. Cobb and Rifkin demonstrate in their
study on more than 30 mediation sessions of community mediation programmes in
western Massachusetts how the use of psychological language contributes to the
•	 marginalization of the other disputant and to the reconstruction the story of the other
party as dominant. ibid., pp. 35-62.
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rationality. For example, the biography of the army officer in the
20th century modern army may encourage instrumental rationality at
the cost of discursive rationality. Similarly, the conduct of modern
warfare may have a logic which imposes the pursuit of instrumental
rationality.
Discursive rationality is fundamental in the context of problem-
solving conflict resolution, because it can contribute to the
prevention of the further breakdown of 'sociality' and facilitate the
finding of a shared language game. Discursive rationality ultimately
celebrates plurality. John Dryzek writes:
"In sum, differences across contexts, traditions, opinions, and
paradigms of personhood are profound and perhaps
ineliminable. But debates among partisans are not only
possible but also more or less communicatively rational. And
rational consensus is no empty hope." 1 8
The type of rationality which is needed in the problem-solving
workshop deals with the typificatory and interpretative schemes of
the participants. That mode can be found in discursive rationality
whose main domains are, because of its dialectic and procedural
nature, both intersubjective understanding and typificatory and
interpretative schemes. Since the workshop, as argued, is an
encounter where mutual cultural adaptation can take place, probem-
solving workshop conflict resolution consists of discurs've
possibilities. Through discursive rationality a consensus across
cultural and interpretative differences can be gained, a consensus
which does not arise from instrumental rationality. As Dryzek states,
"important social problems are pervaded by conflicting values, whch
instrumental action cannot resolve". 1 9 Similarly, conflicts are
permeated by unshared typifications of reality and, therefore,
instrumental rationality which appeals mainly to individual utthty
maximising does not necessarily contribute to their resolution.
18. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, p. 19.
19. ibid., p. 53.
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If a substantially shared background of community norms does not
exist in the workshop, "participants can still reach consensus based
on reasoned disagreement, by striving to understand the cultural
tradition and/or conceptual framework of the other participants".2°
In other words, in discursive designs and through discursive
rationality an understanding of the cultural and conceptual
framework of the other party as well as a shared language game can
be achieved. This type of understanding advances 'sociality' and
cooperation, because it presupposes an openness to the harmonisation
of relevance structures through a dialogue. The facilitator can, thus,
encourage discursive rationality by helping the participants to
overcome their instrumental rationality and instrumental
expectations of the workshop outcome. The overcoming can be
facilitated by focusing on the preconditions and nature of this type of
rationality and by avoiding strategic 'means-ends' as well as
psychologised language games.
Discursive rationality does not refer to either universal consensus or
the uniformity of the typifications of the participants. It, rather,
refers to a limited area of dialectic situations where intersubjective
understanding and attempts to find a shared reality are in question.
Moreover, as the reassessment of the problem-solving workshop
states, the area of this type of rationality is ultimately limited to
the problems at hand. In other words, it arises primarily from the
reasoning for the purposes of a particular task at hand. This task may
be 'practical', but it may be as well a question of, for example,
ethical principles. The problems dealt with in the workshop context
may be generalizable, but they are not universal. Similarly, the
consensus which possibly emerges in the workshop does not derive
from universal reason or transcendental intersubjectivity: it derives
from the issues which are discussed.
2. 4. Re-entry
Most problem-solving approaches are based on the assumption that
something can be transferred, in one way or another, from the
20. ibid., p. 42.
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workshop to a context outside it, to the 'world of political decision-
making'. The issue is often reduced to a discussion on the political
status of the participants. However, the crucial issue is, rather, how
the harmonised relevance structures which are gained in the
workshop context are transferred outside the workshop. It cannot be
assumed that these structures are either lasting or automatically
transferred. In other words, the relevance structures may be
harmonised only for the purposes of the workshop. They may also be
inapplicable to the world outside the workshop, especially if they
create simply interpersonal understanding. In this view, the issue of
re-entry does not pose a psychological problem of how the
participants adapt themselves back to their own environment without
'embarrassment'. 21 Rather, it poses a question of the importance of
the relevance structures.
As argued, the importance of the relevance structures is not solely
dependent on the status of the participants. It is, rather, dependent
on the issues through which a shared reality is achieved. If the issues
discussed relate to the 'real' problems of the conflicting parties and
a shared language game is created to deal with these, the relevances
are more likely to be transferred than, for example, in the case where
personal feelings are focused on in the workshop. Moreover, if the
changes in the relevances do not extend to the level of motivational
relevances, they are unlikely to produce new patterns of action.
Re-entry can be approached also from the angle of the individual and
his or her knowledge. An individual is a 'carrier of social groups' and
his or her stock of knowledge is largely socially derived. However,
individual experiences can be intersubjectively and socially
sedimented. In other words, experiences of individuals can be
incorporated in a common stock of knowledge, and if objectivated in
a sign system (e.g. language) these experiences can be transmitted
from one generation to the next, and from one collectivity to
another. 22 Language is fundamental in the process of transmission:
"Language objectivates the shared experiences and makes them
available to all within the linguistic community, thus
21. See: Banks and Mitchell, The Resolution of Conflict, pp. 136-137.
22. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 85.
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becoming both the basis and the instrument of the collective
stock of knowledge. Furthermore, language provides the means
for objectifying new experiences, allowing their incorporation
into the already existing stock of knowledge, and it is the
most important means by which the objectivated and
objectified sedimentations are transmitted in the tradition of
the collectivity in question."2 3
This insight seems to encourage to transmit changed typifications
from the workshop structure to the tradition of the collectivity in
question. It, thus, challenges the extreme rule of secrecy supported
by many problem-solving approaches.
The evaluation of the workshop success can be done in two spheres:
in the workshop or outside it. The facilitator may hastily conclude
immediately after the workshop that the harmonisation of some
relevance structures took place, because, for example,
communication was more effective in the end of the workshop than in
the beginning. On the other hand, the success can be measured
sometime after the workshop in the sphere of political decision-
making where there may not be any major changes. Moreover, the
participants can see the importance of the workshop differently than
the facilitator.
In sum, in order to cooperate with our fellow-men in the social world
we need to find shared definitions of the situation in question The
sources of shared definitions are in cultural patterns, institutons
and structures as well as in 'negotiations'. Actors do take
interpretations of reality for granted, but man's being in the world is
also characterised by continuing 'negotiations' of these definitions.
Human beings or reality as such are neither conflictual nor
harmonious. The processes of definition are guided by rules,24
Cultural patterns guide the 'negotiation' processes by offering
interpretative and actional frames. Also typical biographies provide
individuals with guiding principles and rules: individuals live up the
23. ibid., pp. 85-86. See also: Schutz and Luckmann, SLW. 1, p. 278; PP. 285-286 and
pp. 292-299. Jehenson, "A Phenomenological Approach to...", p. 234.
24. See, for example: Gonos, George, "Situation' versus 'Frame': the 'Interactionist' and
the 'Structuralist' Analyses of Everyday Life", American Sociolo g ical Review, Vol. 42, No.
6, 1977, pp. 854-867.
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social biographies provided by structures, and these biographies
consist of rules how to 'negotiate' and communicate in typical
S it u at i 0 n s.
Given that cooperation is based on a joint definition of the situation
which is often 'negotiated', there is no absolute resolution of a
conflict. Problem-solving conflict resolution is, rather, conflict
transformation. In it conflict is transformed into 'negotiations' of
reality which are founded upon discursive interest and rationality.
Through and in the transformation process the parties can find shared
typifications and forms of cooperation for the purposes at hand.
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3. FACILITATOR: AN ETHICAL PARTICIPANT WITH A
THEORETICAL INTEREST
The facilitator is often assumed to have two roles in the problem-
solving workshop: an expert mediator and a social scientist. Some
theorists speak about 'action research' which comprises these two
elements. Kelman describes the double role of the facilitator:
"While we have not emphasized formal research procedures,
however, we are very much engaged in research. Indeed, it is
our role as researchers that provides the rationale and
legitimacy of our action involvement and that allows
representatives of conflicting parties to interact with each
other under our auspices in ways that deviate from the norms
generally governing their relationship. Our research interest,
moreover, cannot be feigned because we would lose credibility
very quickly. We must be genuinely interested in learning about
conflict in general and about the particular conflict at hand;
we must demonstrate this interest and show what we have
learned from our action research program through publications
[ ... 1 and other means. Thus, our action requires involvement in a
research program just as our research requires involvement in
action program."25
Burton, on the other hand, emphasises that the workshop facilitator
is an 'outside observer in a scientific role'. Neither of these
descriptions of the position of the facilitator are satisfactory.
Kelman's view implicitly derives the expertise of the facilitator
from his or her academic status. Burton's phrase points to the
scientific objectivity as a source of expertise and to the outside
nature of the position of the facilitator as a source of legitimacy.
However, it can be argued that the facilitator is an ethical
participant with a theoretical interest whose position arises from
three sources: ethicality, participant observation and theorising.
25. Keiman, Herbert, "Interactive Problem Solving: The Uses and Limits of a Therapeutic
Model for the Resolution of International Conflicts", in The Psychodynamics of
International Relationships, Vamik Volkan, Joseph Montville and Demetrios Julius (eds.),
Vol. 2, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991, p. 149.
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3. 1. Facilitator and ethical expertise
Burton assumes that the facilitator has a superior knowledge of the
causes and processes of human behaviour compared to the knowledge
of the participants. In other words, the expertise of the facilitator is
derived from a particular type of knowledge. What is, then,
considered to be good and ethical facilitative conduct? The idea of
impartiality or neutrality is employed in many mediation theories to
refer to good conduct: impartial behaviour is thought to be ethical
behaviour from the part of the mediator. 26 On the other hand, there
are attempts to define a set of rules for desirable behaviour. The
most elaborate work is Burton's Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict. A
Handbook which sets a detailed list of principles of ethical conduct
for the problem-solving workshop facilitator. 27 Burton justifies the
need for rules:
"Ethics used in this context has more of a function connotation
than a moral one. There are rules to be observed that are
designed to ensure success. It is the possibilities of failure
because rules were inadequate or were not observed that
draws attention to the ethics of intervention."28
Despite this call for rules, the source of good facilitative conduct in
Burton's conflict resolution theory can be ultimately found in his
theory of human needs. Since the facilitator, according to Burton, has
distinctive knowledge of human needs and human behaviour related to
needs satisfaction, his or her conduct is ethical when it is geared
towards the recognition and satisfaction of needs of all the parties
in conflict. Facilitative behaviour may take different forms, but the
fundamental justification of it as well as the yardstick for the
measurement of its ethicality can be found in the equal and free
satisfaction of human needs. In brief, human needs are employed as an
26. It is important to note that not all writers support the idea of neutrality, but it
forms, however, one of the core metaphors of mediation theory. See also: Cobb and Rifkin,
"Practice and Paradox".
27. For a handbook see also: Banks and Mitchell, The Resolution of Conflict. A call, on the
other hand, for the 'institutionalisation and professionalisation' of problem-solving
workshop conflict resolution is presented in: Fisher, "Developing the Field of...".
28. Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, p. 27.
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universal tribunal, as ultimate maxims, of ethical behaviour by
B u rto n.
However, it can be argued that the expertise of the facilitator
derives from skill acquisition, and that ethical conduct follows a
similar structure as skill acquisition. 29 The underlying assumption
is, thus, that the conduct of the facilitator can be approached from
the point of view of the decisions which are made when he or she
faces moral problems; moral problems such as what is good and
ethical conduct in a particular situation. The facilitator responds, in
this view, to situations in a manner which involves ethical
participation. Ethical expertise is seen to be a desired 'quality', a
desired way of behaviour, from the angle of the facilitator.
This type of expertise is needed in the problem-solving workshop
context, because, as argued, the problem-solving workshop is
situational by nature. Edward Azar's evaluation of the limitations of
the 'Maryland workshops' of conflict resolution in Lebanon illustrates
the need for situational conduct and ethics. The example shows how a
handbook cannot answer demands which arise from a workshop
situation itself. Azar writes about the workshops:
"During both sets of meetings we concentrated on domestic
political issues to the exclusion of regional political and
economic development issues. This was fine as far as it went,
but we exhausted the usefulness of analyzing these issues
prior to the end of the second forum. Our concern was with
avoiding discussion about issues that the participants, and the
groups they represented, could themselves do nothing or little
about."3°
The result was:
29. This section is based on an application of: Dreyfus, Hubert and Dreyfus, Stuart,
"Towards a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise", Human Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1991,
pp. 229-250. Only direct quotes from the text are footnoted. The article is levelled
against the views which maintain that the highest level of moral maturity consists in
judging actions according to abstract and universal principles.
30. Azar, Edward, "The Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict", in fl
Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Vamik Volkan, Joseph Montville and
Demetrios Julius (eds.), Vol. 2, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991, p. 107.
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"There was agreement that the outside actors created
problems, but no analysis was made of what the proper role
was of these countries in Lebanon. The participants became
impatient with the progress, and although they left feeling
good about each other as individuals, they did not feel good
about the prospects for resolving conflict. This might not have
been the case had we incorporated discussion and analysis of
substantive and perhaps even technical issues into the two
forums."3 1
Skill acquisition consists of five stages: novice, advanced beginner,
competence, proficiency and expertise. At the stage of the novice the
skill acquisition is based on recognising context-free rules for
determining actions. This level is characterised by a 'handbook type
of knowledge'. The stage of the advanced beginner includes
incorporating situational aspects to instructional maxims. With an
increasing competence at the third stage, the performer learns to
choose a "plan, goal or perspective which organizes the situation and
by the examining the small set of features and aspects that he has
learned are relevant given that plan, the performer can simplify and
improve his performance". 32 This stage consists of also an
'emotionally involved experience of the outcome', because the choice
and successful completion of a goal can be frustrating.
Proficiency as the fourth stage is characterised by stopping
reflecting on problematic situations as a detached observer. At thUs
stage a plan, goal or perspective is noticed rather than looked for. A
proficient performer, thus, sees what needs to be done, but must
decide how to do it. An expert performer, on the other hand, knows
how to perform the action without calculating and comparing
alternatives. The stage of the expertise is largely based on intuition,
not on analysis and comparison of alternatives. The expert does not
solve problems. Neither does he or she reason. Rather, he or she
spontaneously does what has normally worked.
This five stage model can be applied to the skill acquisition of
facilitative conduct. A beginner tries to follow the rules available,
31. ibid., p. 107.
32. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "Towards a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise", p. 233.
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whereas an expert performs the actions needed without deliberation
of either rules or a plan, goal or perspective. Learning through
experience is a basis of the expertise of the facilitator. Thus, the
expertise, in this view, does not arise from a superior knowledge, it
rather arises from learning and acquiring skills by performing.
Ethical comportment, on the other hand, is a form of expertise and
follows, as argued, a similar structure as skill acquisition. An
ethical expert behaves depending on the situation without appealing
to rules and maxims. The greater the expertise, the rarer the need for
deliberation. In other words, principles and theories serve only for
early stages of learning: an expert ethical response to a situation is
not grounded on them. In problematic situations, the expert
deliberates rather about the appropriateness of his or her intuitions
than abstract principles:
"Yet, as we have seen, principles can never capture the know-
how an expert acquires by dealing with, and seeing the
outcome of a large number of concrete situations. Thus, when
faced with a dilemma, the expert does not seek principles but,
rather, reflects on and tries to sharpen his or her spontaneous
intuitions by getting more information until one decision
emerges as obvious."33
Expert performance in ethics is doing what those who already are
accepted as ethical experts do and approve. Therefore, there is an
element of convention which derives from the community of the
ethical experts. However, being a master, according to this view.
means also responding to the unique situation 'out of a fund of
experience in the culture'. Reaching a stage of maturity does not mean
transcending tradition. Rather, it implies leaving behind the rules of
conventional morality for a new contextualisation, for being more
open to the contextual properties of moral dilemmas. In a case of
ethical disagreement, two experts should be "able to understand and
appreciate each other's decisions. This is as near as expert ethical
judgements can or need come to impartiality and universality".34
33. ibid., p. 244.
34. ibid., p. 242. Compare this idea also with the notion of discursive rationality.
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Ultimately, "there is no final answer as to what the appropriate
response in a particular situation should be". 35 A single individual
and situations he or she responds to are constantly changing, and his
or her responses become constantly more refined. A sign of maturity
is not reflective detachment from an unique situation to universal
principles. On the contrary, maturity means being able to learn from
experiences, use what one has learned, stay involved and refine one's
intuitions.
In sum, the ethical conduct of the facilitator does not need to rely on
the maxim of impartiality, a set of rules or the idea of universal
human needs. It, rather, can rely on an openness to different and
variable contexts, on an openness to 'relativise' each situation.
Sensitivity to uniqueness and difference means ethical expertise.
This is, however, not to say that rules and maxims may not be needed
in the context of problem-solving-workshop conflict resolution. They
may be needed, for example, to clarify the idea of the workshop for
the participants or to offer instructive advice for an inexperienced
facilitator. However, rules should not be understood to be universal
maxims according to which the facilitator should guide his or her
conduct independent on the situation.
3. 2. Participant observation
The face-to-face relationship is reciprocal between the two or more
partners, whereas in direct social observation the relationship is
one-sided. In the face-to-face relationship I can verify my
assumption that my experiences correspond to those of the other
person by directly appealing to an object of the external world which
is common to both of us. This is not possible in direct social
observation. If it is done, the nature of the relationship changes. The
change is described by Schutz:
"But in any direct social observation carried on outside a
social relationship, my interpretation of another's behavior
cannot be checked against his own self-interpretation, unless
35. ibid., p. 246.
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of course I exchange my role as an observer for that of a
participant. When I start asking questions of the person
observed, / am no longer a mere observer."36
In direct social observation the observer does not influence the
behaviour of the observed. Neither does the interchange of motives
take place. However, in some occasions the observer can be in an
advantaged position. When observing two participants in interaction
he or she can be aware of the whole interactional situation, whereas
the participants themselves tend to be only aware of each other. It
may even happen that the observer is acquainted with the
interpretative schemes of one participant better than his or her
partner.37
The problem-solving facilitator is not an outside observer. Rather, he
or she is a participant in a communicative situation. The facilitator
participates in the workshop situation by facilitating communication,
offering theoretical insights and keeping discussion within an
analytical framework. Moreover, the participation constitutes the
context of his or her theorising. The facilitator may occasionally
adopt the role of the observer, but the type of observing is not
accurately grasped in the Burtonian notion of 'scientific observer',
which denotes, as demonstrated, a 'purified mind'. A more fruitful
metaphor to describe the facilitator and his or her position in the
workshop can be found in the conception of 'participant observer'. The
metaphor can be employed to describe the active and participant
position of the facilitator in the workshop without a reference to
epistemological commitments. On the other hand, it can be seen to
imply certain epistemological stances.
Participant observation is traditionally understood to be a
methodological device to conduct anthropological and sociological
field work. Although participant observation has this specific and
limited meaning which implies a research method, the notion brings
up questions and discussions which are also vital in the problem-
solving workshop context. Moreover, given that the facilitator is a
36. Schutz, The Phenomenoloçiy of the Social World, pp. 173-1 74. Schutz's own italics.
37. ibid., pp. 172-176.
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part of an 'action research programme', the epistemological
implications of this participation are difficult to dismiss.
Participant observation is conventionally defined in a following
manner:
"For our purposes we define participant observation as a
process in which the observer's presence in a social situation
is maintained for the purpose of scientific investigation. The
observer is in a face-to-face relationship with the observed,
and, by participating with them in their natural life setting, he
gathers data. Thus, the observer is part of the context being
observed, and he both modifies and is influenced by this
context. The role of participant observer may be either formal
or informal, concealed or revealed; the observer may spend a
great deal or very little time in the research situation; the
participant-observer role may be an integral part of the social
structure or largely peripheral to it."3 8
Participant observation is characterised by two distinctive features.
First, the status of the investigator of being an outside agent is
reduced to a minimum. Second, the emphasis is on dialogue.
Participant observation is dialectical in that the 'subject' and 'object'
of the research remain in communicative contact. Moreover, the
observer becomes socialised to a certain extent into the life-world
of the research 'objects'. 39 Similarly, the active behaviour of the
facilitator displaces his or her role as an outside agent. His or her
research activities derive from this active participation where the
facilitator is inevitably to a certain extent socialised to the worlds
of the participants in the workshop, if not to their entire life-worlds.
Moreover, the facilitator is, as noted earlier, in a communicative
contact with the participants, with the 'objects' of the research.
38. Schwartz, Morris and Schwartz, Charlotte, "Problems in Participant Observation,
in Issues in Participant Observation. A Text and Reader, George McCall and J. L. Simmons
(eds.), Reading, Menlo Park, London, Don Mills: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
1969, p. 91.
39. Bleicher, Josef, The Hermeneutic Ima g ination, p. 143. See also: Reinhartz, Shulamit,
On Becoming a Social Scientist. From Survey Research and Participant Observation to
Experiential Analysis, San Francisco, Washington and London: Jossey-Bass Publishers,
1979, pp. 155-157.
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The symbolic interactionist tradition claims that the ability of the
researcher to perform and to be accepted as a member of the life-
world of the 'objects' indicates that he or she knows and can analyse
the ways in which 'objects' perform their activities. On the other
hand, it can be argued that the social scientist is concerned with
understanding and explanation and, therefore, the socialisation into
the ways the 'objects' perform their activities is not enough for the
search of the formal or invariant properties of human activities.40
Furthermore, in the case of the problem-solving workshop the
participants often expect the facilitator to take a professional role;
a role which limits his or her socialisation to the world of the
parties.
As a field work method, participant observation is often described by
using the notion of 'surrender-and-catch'. It is assumed that field
work begins with a 'surrender' of a social researcher to his or her
subject matter so that the difference between subject, act and
object disappears. This is thought to imply total suspension of the
received notions concerning subject matter, method and theory. In
other words, 'surrender' means not to select. 'Catch', on the other
hand, is assumed to be a new conceiving or new conceptualising of
the result of 'surrender'. At the stage of 'catch', the researcher tries
to find out what he or she has 'caught' and returns from the
prescientific sphere to the scientific sphere. In the scientific domain
the researcher, then, proceeds with the help of the conceptual and
methodological tools offered by his or her own science.41
The idea of 'surrender' refers to the possibility of an 'empty mind', of
tabula rasa . However, as argued in the introduction of the thesis, the
precondition for all understanding is in foremeanings and prejudices,
not in an 'emptied mind'. Moreover, it is not possible to purify one's
mind from these, because they are an ontological condition of man's
40. Psathas, George, "Approaches to the Study of the World of Everyday Life", Human
Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1980, p. 14.
41. Wagner, Helmut, "Between Ideal Type and Surrender: Field Research as Asymmetrical
Relation", Human Studies. Vol. 1, No. 2, 1978, pp. pp. 154-1 56. It should be emphasised
that the idea of 'surrender-and-catch' as it is introduced here is based on a simplified
reading of Kurt Wolff's original idea. See also Wolff's critique of Wagner's article: Wolff,
Kurt, A Very Brief Commentary on Helmut R. Wagner's 'Between Ideal Type and
Surrender", Human Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1978, pp. 165-166.
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'being-in-the-world'. A person trying to understand a text must be
sensitive to the text's quality of newness. Sensitivity involves
neither neutrality in the matter of the object nor the extinction of
one's self, but the conscious assimilation of one's own fore-meanings
and prejudices. Similarly, the familiar horizons of the interpreter are
an integral part of the event of understanding any alien object: his or
her prejudices open up an object. The idea of hermeneutical circle,
thus, emphasises that all understanding inevitably involves in
prejudices, which can be, however, critically reflected.42
The facilitator enters into the workshop with his or her prejudices.
These fore-meanings are bound to change when the past and present
meet with in the situation. If the facilitator aims at theorising on
the bases of his or her workshop experience, his or her fore-meanings
consist of, for example, his or her understanding of that particular
field of science he or she identifies himself or herself with, i.e., its
concepts and theories. Thus, giving them up, suspending the notions
concerning the subject matter and theories is not, in this view,
possible as the notion of 'surrender' suggests.
3. 3. Theorising and the sources of objectivity
The problem-solving workshop facilitator is a participant who has a
theoretical interest and who, on the other hand, has "already
contributed, as a participant in interaction, to establishing the
context of action that he then analyzes as an object".43 The issues of
obtaining data and the validity and 'objectivity' of data arise in a
following manner:
"If we conceptually enrich the first-level models of action to
the point where interpretation and understanding appear as
basic features of social action itself, the question of how the
interpretative accomplishments of the social-scientific
observer are connected with the natural hermeneutics of the
everyday practice of communication, of how communicative
experiences can be transformed into data, can no longer be
42. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 238-239 and p. 263.
43. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, p. 125.
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trimmed down to the size of a technical subproblem in
research."44
The topic can be approached from the angle of view-points too. The
social world is given us in a complex system of perspectives. There
is, however, a fundamental difference between my interpretation of
my own subjective experiences and my interpretation of the
subjective experience of someone else. Although the social sciences
try to determine what an action means to the actor, they are
undertaken from the view-point of an observer.45
Several positions can be claimed in relation to the question of the
sources of scientific objectivity. John Burton's discussion on the
issue can be described as 'modified positivist' standpoint. Alfred
Schutz's answer, on the other hand, illustrates a hermeneutical
stance. Although his answer to the quest for objectivity may not be
fully satisfactory, it discusses in a highly sophisticated manner
several vital ontological and epistemological issues of science.
Similarly, the relativist position advocated by some
ethnomethodologists, and the genealogical method employed by post-
structuralists introduce topics which are important also to problem-
solving workshop theorising.
For Burton, the scientist has a corrective function. The role of the
scientist is, according to him, to find explanations that better fit
modern conditions and problems. A paradigm shift in social sciences
in general, and in International Relations in particular, is needed,
because 'vague thinking' based on false assumptions and imprecise
meanings influence reality and cause harmful policies and
dysfunctional conflicts. The epistemological problems faced by the
social scientist are, according to Burton, threefold: how to construct
imaginative hypotheses through abduction, how to produce corrective
hypotheses through deduction and how to test hypotheses. He admits
the limits of hypotheses testing and argues that there can seldom be
verification; there are, rather, processes of falsification. The
44. ibid., p. 120.
45. Schutz, The Phenomenol pay of the Social World, p. 8. Barber, Social Tvpifications and
the Elusive Other, p. 31.
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ultimate task of the scientist is, according to him, to offer
'objective' and 'non-ideological' viewpoints on which the construction
of universal laws of human behaviour can rest.46
According to Schutz, on the other hand, the social scientist obtains
his or her data through understanding meanings, meanings which are
created by actors in the life-world. 47 The social scientist
encounters symbolically prestructured objects on the basis of which
he or she, then, constructs the 'objective' reality within which the
science operates. Theorising belongs essentially, in Schutz's view, to
the 'sub-universe of science' which differs from everyday life. In the
'scientific sub-universe' the theorising self is solitary: it has no
social environment and it stands outside social relationships.
Moreover, in it the social scientist adopts a scientific attitude.
Schutz describes the attitude and its implications:
"This attitude of the social scientist is that of a mere
disinterested observer of the social world. He is not involved
in the observed situation, which is to him not of practical but
merely of cognitive interest. It is not the theatre of his
activities but merely the object of his contemplation. He does
not act within it, vitally interested in the outcome of his
actions, hoping or fearing what their consequences might be
but he looks at it with the same detached equanimity with
which the natural scientist looks at the occurrences in his
laboratory."4 8
In brief, when theorising the scientist detaches himself or herself
from his or her biographical situation within the social world. He or
46. See, for example: Burton, Deviance. Terrorism and War, pp. 29-30. Burton, "The
Role of....", pp. 77-78. Burton, "World Society and Human Needs", p. 57. Burton,
Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 19-20; pp. 30-33; p. 44 and pp. 256-257.
47. The following account of Schutz's ideas is based on: Schutz, OP. 1, pp. 5-7; pp. 34-
36; pp. 40-44; pp. 245-255. Schutz, OP. 2, pp. 17-19. On the world of science see
also: Schutz, Reflections of the Problem of Relevance, pp. 258-262. Schutz fl
Phenomenolopy of the Social World, ch. 5. Bernstein, The Restructuring of..., pp. 152-
156. Cox, Schutz's Theory of Relevance, ch. VI. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative
Action. Vol. 1, pp. 121 -1 24. See also critiques of Schutz: Cox, Schutz's Theory of
Relevance, pp. 21 8-228. Bernstein, The Restructurinu of..., pp. 167-169. Valone,
James, "A Critical Theory of Knowledge and the Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz", Cultural
Hermeneutics, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1976, pp. 199-215.
48. Schutz, CF. 1, p. 36.
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she enters into the world of science which constitutes its own frame
with pre-organised knowledge. In other words, the scientist shifts
himself or herself into the relevance systems of science.
All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in
scientific thinking, involves, according to Schutz, constructs, that is,
a set of abstractions, formalizations, idealisations, etc. An everyday
actor uses the common-sense constructs to orient himself or herself
and to act in his or her life-world. The scientific constructs, on the
other hand, form a general model of a sector of the social world
which is constructed from the point of view of the scientist and his
or her particular problem under scrutiny. These 'second degree
constructs' do not, therefore, refer to unique acts of an unique
individual occurring within an unique situation.
The scientific model of the social world creates, according to Schutz,
'puppets' with artificial consciousness. When observing social action
or interaction the scientist constructs patterns of typical action.
Then he or she coordinates to these typical 'course-of-action
patterns' a personal type, a model of a typical actor whom he or she
imagines to possess a fictitious consciousness. This type of model of
the actor does not have biography nor history, because it is placed to
a situation by the scientist. Furthermore, the "puppet and his
artificial consciousness is not subjected to the ontologica!
conditions of human being". 49 In such an artificial model of the
social world, for example, pure rational acts, choices from rational
motives, are possible, because all the difficulties the real actor has
in the life-world can be eliminated by the scientist.
Schutz maintains that the social sciences deal in an objective way.
with the subjective meaning of human action. However, the question
arises how it is possible to gain valid knowledge through scientific
models if they are based on the 'subjective creativity' of the
scientist? In order to be objective, according to Schutz, the models
postulated by the social scientist must conform to the canons of
verifiability and testability set by the scientific community. Schutz
refers to three postulates which restrict the construction of models.
49. ibid., p. 41.
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The 'postulate of logical consistency' states that the constructs
designed by the scientist have to "be established with the highest
degree of clarity and distinctness of the conceptual framework
implied and must be fully compatible with the principles of formal
logic". 50 The 'postulate of subjective interpretation' enables the
scientist to discern what is distinctive about the models that are
appropriate for an adequate social theory. The 'postulate of adequacy',
on the other hand, maintains that the model of social action created
by the scientist must be constructed in such a way that the act
indicated by the model would be understandable for the actor himself
or herself in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life.
As demonstrated in the fourth chapter, the Burtonian scientist is
assumed to have nonarbitrary access to the objective domain of
behaviour. Moreover, the perspective of the interpreter is supposed to
be similar to the perspective of the actor. Schutz's account of
science challenges Burton's view. For Schutz, the scientist does not
have nonarbitrary access to the world and meanings of the actors. The
scientific constructs as second degree constructs offer access, but
they are neither equal nor similar to the constructs created by the
actors in their life-worlds. Moreover, according to Schutz, the
subjective and objective meanings never fully coincide. Thus, the
scientist can never grasp the meanings of the actors as these
meanings appear to the actors themselves. it is, however, important
to keep in mind that Schutz does not underestimate the task and value
of science. Rather, he reassesses its realm in relation to the
everyday world.
Burton's utility-maximising actor can be considered to offer a
scientific model. His theory of conflict and conflict resolution as
well as his 'need-man' can, thus, be seen to be one possible model and
'puppet' created by a theorist. However, if evaluated according to the
criteria of objectivity suggested by Schutz, it may be the case that
Burton's model does not fulfil them. Moreover, both the criteria and
the whole notion of scientific objectivity can be disputed.
50. ibid., p. 43.
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The argument presented by, for example, some ethnomethodologists
who challenge the idea of objectivity can be summarised in a
following manner. Social research and theorising can be seen to count
only as one particular form of life alongside of others. Theoretical
work may be distinguished like, for example, religion and art, by its
reflexivity, but that does not imply objectivity. Theorising takes
place in the sphere of the life-world as any other activity and,
therefore, interpretative (social) sciences can give up the claim to
produce objective knowledge at all. There are, thus, no criteria of
truth and validity outside the domain in which theorising is carried
out. The constructs of the social sciences have the same status as
the everyday, first degree, constructs of lay members, because they
too are bound to a social context and values. In other words, the
validity standards of science are just as particular as any other
types of criteria of validity that function in other departments of
life.5 1
The most recent phase of this 'post-empirist' movement employs the
genealogical method to demonstrate that knowledge does not simply
reflect or represent the world. Rather, in this view, there are
discourses of knowledge whose success derives from their
connections with networks of power. It is argued that in all societies
power-knowledge functions to produce some forms of truth and to
disqualify others. In modern society the production of truth has taken
a disciplinary and normalising form. Genealogy offers a reading of the
effect of present social practices which does not claim to correspond
either to the everyday understanding of being in those practices nor
to a deeper repressed understanding. Genealogy does not, like
hermeneutical approaches, seek a frame of analysis that shows how
the behaviour of various actors can be recovered if we know their
cultures or fields of meanings. It, rather, seeks to distance us from
the various linguistic practices that give us objects, subjects and the
51. For a summary see: Habermas The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 1, pp. 126-
130. See also, for example: Blum, Alan, "Theorizing", in Understanding Everyday Life.
Toward the Reconstruction of Sociolo g ical Knowledge, Jack Douglas (ed.), London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971, pp. 301-319. Feyerabend, Paul, Against Method. Outline
of an Anarchist Theory of Knowled ge, London: Verso, 1980. McHugh, Peter, "On the
Failure of Positivism", in Understandin g Everyday Life. Toward the Reconstruction of
Sociolog ical Knowledge, Jack Douglas (ed.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971, pp.
320-335.
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more general valuing within which they function. Thus, the question
of the sources of and the whole quest for scientific objectivity
appear in the light of historical discourses for post-structuralists.52
All these epistemological stances are available for the facilitator
who studies problem-solving workshop conflict resolution. He or she
can approach the topic from the angle of the meanings held by the
persons involved in a conflict and in a conflict resolution attempt.
That is the approach explicitly advocated in this thesis. The
facilitator can also take part in abstract 'model-building' as Burton
suggests. The researcher can, on the other hand, study problem-
solving workshop conflict resolution practices, such as the practice
of neutrality. In that case the focus is on neutrality as a discursive
practice that may, for example, function to obscure the workings of
power in mediation. 53 Similarly, the emphasis can be, for example,
on patriarchal relations which are reproduced in the power relations
of conflict and problem-solving conflict resolution. 54 This type of
post-structuralist approach is also hinted at in the thesis when the
political nature of conflict resolution and the elements of power are
discussed. Rather than seeing the hermeneutical and post-structural
positions as opposite to each other, this chapter has tried to
demonstrate points at which these could coincide.
52. See, for example: Dreyfus, Hubert, "Beyond Hermeneutics: Interpretation in Late
Heidegger and Recent Foucault", in Interpretin g Politics, Michael Gibbons (ed.), Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 203-220. Foucault, Michel, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History",
in Interpretin g Politics, Michael Gibbons (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 221-
240. Shapiro, Michael, Readin g the Postmodern Polity . Political Theory as Textual
Practice, Minneapolis, Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.
53. See: Cobb and Rifkin, "Practice and Paradox".
54. See: Northrup, "Getting to Maybe".
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PRACTICAL
IMPLICATIONS
John Burton's conflict resolution theory assumes the origin of
conflict to be in such human needs as identity, participation and
security. Burton claims that people will pursue those needs
regardless of the consequences to themselves or a system.
International conflicts arise from the failings of domestic systems
to provide for the needs of people. Given that the origin of conflict is
in basic human needs, preconditions for conflict resolution, on the
other hand, can be found in the analytical differentiation of needs
from interests, in the improvement of communication between the
parties in conflict and in the alterations of structures and
institutions which hinder the processes of needs satisfaction. Burton
considers problem-solving workshop conflict resolution to be the
best means for the creation of such preconditions.
Burton's conflict resolution theory is founded on a version of human
needs thinking. Burton gives needs priority over other characteristics
of human 'being'. He assumes that basic needs form a fundamental
stratum of the person which acts as the motive of behaviour. In his
view, needs are thought to be equal to drives whose demands seek
satisfaction at any cost subject only to minor constraints. Burton's
theory implies universal and biologically founded human nature and,
thereby, it offers ways to defuse contextualism. For example,
contextualism is defused by considering problem-solving conflict
resolution to be applicable and suitable for all cultures.
Burton does note the existence of cultural values, but he assumes
them to motivate behaviour in a limited sense. According to him, the
preservation of values may lead individuals, for example, to defend
their identity, but it is eventually the pursuit of needs that is the
reason for the formation of such valuable entities as identity groups.
Since culture is of a minor importance in Burton's conflict theory and
since it is thought to be an unimportant element of human 'being', it
is not taken seriously into account in his conflict resolution theory
and the practices it implies. Moreover, the emphasis on shared needs
leads conflict resolution to look for similarities between the parties
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in conflict rather than encouraging the parties to accept and live
with differences, the border between 'us' and 'them'.
Burton's focus is on the individual actor whom he assumes to behave
in an instrumental and utility-maximising manner, especially in
situations of choice. In other words, while the social actor is
expected to be 'conditioned' by the satisfaction of his or her needs, he
or she is thought to be engaged in continuous calculations about the
expected utility of various options and outcomes of behaviour. When
Burton applies this notion of rational choice to his conflict
resolution theory, he takes the sociocultural context of conflict and
conflict resolution again for granted. He does not recognise, for
example, the existence of 'culturally bound' utilities. Moreover, given
that the focus is on the individual actor and that the individual is
assumed to employ instrumental reasoning, the conception of
interaction becomes largely reduced to the sum of choices made by
each actor in Burton's conflict resolution theory.
There are elements of discursive rationality in Burton's conflict
resolution theory, but they are not fully developed. For example,
Burton considers the problem-solving workshop to be an attempt to
scrutinise the nature of the relationship of the parties in conflict by
the parties themselves. According to him, it is fundamental for this
mode of conflict resolution that the analysis of the relationship
takes the form of facilitated dialogue. He, thus, hints at the
possibility of discursive rationality through which a consensus
across cultural and interpretative differences is achieved. However,
this view of communicative and culturally conditioned human 'being'
is not explicitly discussed in Burton's conflict resolution theory
which ultimately derives from a biological and universal 'model of
man'.
As mentioned, Burton's problem-solving conflict resolution theory
focuses on the individual actor. Furthermore, he does not clarify the
nature of the relationship between the individual and the social
group. In Burton's view, needs belong fundamentally to the individual,
not to the group. Neither do needs derive from the social world; their
origin is in biology. A question arises as to whether the utility
maximising and 'needs-conditioned' individual represents the group or
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is he or she considered, rather, to be an atom-like and solitary unity
in the problem-solving workshop. Although Burton claims that the
problem-solving workshop operates at the level of intergroup
conflict and that the individual participant transfers something from
the workshop to the world of political decision-making, the
relationship between the individual actor and the social group
remains ambiguous.
However, an understanding of conflict and conflict resolution can be
built upon a 'social constructionist' image of human 'being' which
takes into account the organic relationship between the individual
and social group. There is, thus, no need to appeal to the existence of
universal human needs in order to understand and practice problem-
solving workshop conflict resolution. Phenomenological sociology and
its picture of the person suggest a theoretical language for the
conceptualisation of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution.
They offer a language which arises neither from soclo-biology nor
psychology.
According to phenomenological sociology, we experience the world in
terms of typifications. Why certain typifications come into play in
certain circumstances is determined by relevance structures. Our
typifications and relevance structures are sedimented in our stocks
of knowledge, which are socially derived and approved. As members
of social groups, we accept the ready-made standardised schemes of
the cultural patterns of these groups as unquestioned guides for
interpreting of and acting in the social world. Social groups can be
distinguished in virtue of their commonly held systems of relevance
from which typifications arise. Moreover, social groups have relative
natural world-views which are also taken for granted and shared by
the members of the groups. Social groups and institutions participate
in 'creating' and defining realities for individuals: through
intersubjective typifications and shared world-views realities, 'what
is known as reality', are defined.
Applied to conflict resolution, the participants bring into the conflict
resolution situation their definitions of reality, conflict and conflict
resolution which are influenced, if not determined, by socially
constructed typifications. The problem-solving workshop facilitator
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may create, for example, a 'needs-discourse' in order to point out
similarities and produce a shared ground for the discussions between
the parties. However, that should not be taken to imply or prove the
existence of 'universal basic human needs' which are independent of
the situation. Rather, needs are dependent on the milieu in which they
are discussed and, moreover, what ultimately counts as a 'basic need'
is culturally constituted. Given the fundamentality of the social
world and cultural pattern, the problem-solving workshop is not a
filter where culture is filtered away, or put aside, as Burton argues.
On the contrary, the dimensions of the social world continue to exist
in the workshop. The workshop is a place where a cultural encounter
takes place, and where the socially and culturally produced border
between 'we' and 'they' can, therefore, be reflected, not abolished.
Conflicts are characterised by a break-down of shared reality. Being
and cooperating with others presuppose shared typifications through
which a shared reality is defined. If typifications break down or are
denied the society faces anomie which may take the form of conflict.
Applied to problem-solving conflict resolution, it is necessary that
in the problem-solving workshop the participants can engage in
'negotiations' in which typifications and relevance structures can be
harmonised. The problem-solving workshop is, thus, an attempt to
find a shared reality between the parties in conflict. It deals mainly
with the interpretative schemes of the participants by offering them
a framework for 'negotiations over realities'. The finding of a
common language game both presupposes and facilitates the finding
of a shared reality.
One of the main tasks of the facilitator is to advance discursive
rationality. Despite the differences of, for example, traditions and
cultures, dialogue across them is possible. Since the workshop deals
mainly with the interpretative frameworks of the parties, discursive
rationality can contribute to the finding of a shared reality. In
cultural encounters where there is a need to find a shared reality and
cooperate despite fundamental differences, a common reality does
not arise from instrumental cost-benefit calculations. Rather, it
arises from an 'openness to dialogue' and discursive mode of
rationality.
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Do the Burtonian and 'social constructionist' images of human 'being'
and nature, then, condition conflict resolution practices in the
context of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution? Since the
theoretical introductory talks and other theoretical inputs provided
by the facilitator are an essential element of problem-solving
conflict resolution, the idea of human nature held by the facilitator
is directly fed into the conflict resolution process. In other words, by
typifying and conceptualising conflict in a certain manner and by
emphasising and rejecting certain theories of conflict and conflict
resolution, the facilitator projects his or her understanding of human
'being' onto the resolution process. Moreover, the choice of
facilitative techniques and procedures reflects that understanding
too. The facilitator contributes to the creation of a conflict
resolution discourse in the workshop and, thereby, he or she
participates, for example, in the shaping of the 'horizon of
expectation' of a successful and desirable mode of resolution. In more
general terms, the facilitator contributes to the constitution of
conflict and conflict resolution for the workshop participants.
The conceptual and theoretical framework suggested in the thesis has
practical implications which can be summarised in ten points:
(1) It is desirable that the parties in conflict ask themselves for
problem-solving conflict resolution, because it implies that their
relevance structures have already some similarities. In other words,
the conflict is constituted as a problem for them and their 'horizons
of expectation' include the notion of peaceful resolution of their
conflict. If the relevance structures have enough points of
convergence, the parties may be willing to discover solutions for
their problems, despite the fact that the causes of the conflict may
be differently constituted for them. The problem-solving workshop
also provides an outside recognition of the conflict and its parties,
and that can have an empowering effect particularly on the party
which perceives itself to be in a disadvantaged position.
(2) It is also desirable that the facilitator trains the participants in
the ideology of this type of conflict resolution before the workshop
begins. Training minimises the risk that the participants have false
and empty hopes of the workshop, and builds up more 'realistic'
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expectations. During the training sessions the limits of problem-
solving workshop conflict resolution should be emphasised. The
parties should know that the workshop deals mainly with
interpretative frameworks, and that it is fundamentally an attempt
to find a shared reality between them. It should be also accepted that
the parties may not need this particular form of conflict resolution.
(3) Although the isolated location of the workshop brings the
participants away from the 'reality' of their conflict and although
this itself may harmonise their relevance structures, the political
nature of the workshop exercise should not be forgotten or hidden.
The struggles over the definitions of reality continue in the
workshop, and it should not be artificially neutralised from them. The
conflict becomes constituted and defined in certain ways in the
workshop and, therefore, the workshop 'negotiates' and creates
'versions of reality'. The facilitator participates in these
constitutive processes by delivering theoretical talks, asking
questions, making summaries and shaping the grounds on which
agreement and disagreement take place.
(4) The facilitation team should have a shared agenda, and it should
be well aware of it. The individual facilitators have their images of
successful problem-solving workshop outcomes as well as of human
nature and 'being'. If the pictures vary, it is reflected in the ways the
facilitators both conceptualise the conflict and choose facilitative
techniques and procedures. For example, a workshop which aims at
analysing 'basic human needs' requires different mediation techniques
than a conflict resolution attempt which intends to negotiate a set of
'practical action principles'. Similarly, the facilitative techniques
which steer the participants towards discursive rationality differ
from those which advance instrumental rationality. Discursive
rationality presupposes an understanding of the possibility and
fruitfulness of dialogue, whereas instrumental rationality
presupposes a context of strategic action which can be created, for
example, by encouraging the parties to negotiate on their utilities.
Although the workshop is always situational by nature, a shared
conceptual and theoretical framework among the facilitators brings
in a structural element to the mediation process.
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(5) One of the most essential parts of the facilitative techniques
employed in the problem-solving workshop is the theoretical talks
delivered by the facilitator. In them the facilitator expresses his or
her conceptualisations and understandings of conflict and creates a
basis for a common discourse, for a common point of reference. The
facilitator should, for example, emphasise the intersubjective nature
of our ways to perceive conflict. Similarly, he or she should discuss
the role of cultural patterns in shaping our interpretations of the
world. Moreover, the characteristic of language as a container of
typifications and the importance of the finding of a shared language
game should be focused on in the theoretical inputs of the facilitator.
Also the ideas that realities are 'negotiated' and that a shared reality
can be found through dialogue should be introduced. By doing this, the
facilitator steers the parties towards discursive rationality.
The goal of the workshop the facilitator has in mind should be 'going
beyond similarity' and learning 'how to live with difference'. The
purpose should not be the neutralising of the border between 'we' and
'they' nor the reduction of differences to abstract similarities. The
facilitative team should be capable of reflecting the ideological and
political task it is committed to. It should be also capable of
controlling the language games it employs. For example, the team
should avoid psychological language games which reject the
recognition of the struggles and 'negotiations' over reality and the
play of power by emphasising an analogy between the psychological
processes of the individual and the 'political' processes of the group.
(6) A strength of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution
compared with many other forms of conflict resolution lies in the
discursive potentiality the workshop provides for the parties in
conflict. The potentiality should be fully utilised in the workshop
context. The workshop gives the parties a chance to express their
own typifications and interpretative frameworks of the conflict. In
other words, in the workshop they can present as well as 're-
negotiate' their typifications, definitions of realities. This is vital,
because a set of shared typifications is a precondition for the
mapping out of cooperative options.
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However, since the conflict is often constituted in different ways
even among one party, the workshop does not grasp the whole
conflict. For example, a conflict may be constituted differently for
grass-roots people, intellectuals and political decisions-makers.
Thus, a 'sector' (or 'sectors') of the conflict is represented and
interpreted in the workshop. Even the so-called 'contingency models'1
of conflict resolution are not able to answer the challenge put
forward by the notion of the 'sectors of conflict'. Contingency models
postulate for conflict a life-cycle, in the form of the stages of
conflict, during which different forms of conflict resolution, and
especially third party interventions, are thought to be effective. The
idea of 'sector', on the other hand, suggests that different 'sectors' of
the conflict, which ultimately represent the various patterns the
conflict is constituted, may require different forms of conflict
resolution. For example, farmers living in a border area, may require
functionalist arrangements with farmers living on the other side of
the border. The arrangements may presuppose pragmatic rationality
which can be advanced in pragmatically-oriented conflict resolution
attempts. At the same time, a political decision-making 'sector' may
require a form of conflict resolution which engages the participants
in a dialectic examination of multiple group-identities. The tasks of
the third party are clearly different in these cases.
(7) Instead of conflict resolution, it is better to refer to conflict
transformation in the problem-solving workshop. There are conflict
transformations in which struggles over, for example, identities are
continued by new means. These transformations may become
constituted for the parties in conflict as a 'resolution'. By means of
the problem-solving workshop conflict can be transformed into
'negotiations over reality' which are founded on discursive interest
and discursive rationality.
(8) Re-entry does not pose a psychological problem: it poses a
question of the importance of relevance structures and of the
transfer of these structures outside the workshop context. The over-
emphasis put on interpersonal and psychological understanding in the
workshop does not necessarily facilitate the return of the
1. See chapter II, p. 33.
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participants to their own communities. Rather, if the issues
discussed in the problem-solving workshop are perceived to be 'real'
from the point of view of the parties themselves, the changed
relevances are likely to be transferred outside the workshop.
(9) Follow-up should be a part of the workshop. The following up
process could include, for example, the linking of the various
'sectors' of the conflict with each other and with the parallel forms
of conflict resolution attempts.
(10) The research agenda and possibilities opened up by the position
of the participant observer of the facilitator should be fully explored.
The position of the participant observer is advantaged, because it
gives a means to study the understandings of the conflict held by the
people engaged in it. In other words, it is possible to study what
conflict means to the parties and how it is constituted for them.
Moreover, the position gives means to study how, for example, ethnic
identities are formed in the processes of conflict and conflict
resolution and how the dominant definitions of ethnicity are
reconstituted through and in conflict resolution processes. These
research questions demand new, qualitative, methodological devices,
whose development has been, however, largely neglected by the




Abell, Peter, Denzin on Rational Choice Theory', Rationality and Society, Vol. 2, No. 4,
1990, pp. 495-499.
Alevy, Daniel, Bunker, Barbara, Doob, Leonard, Foltz, William, French, Nancy, Klein,
Edward and Miller, James, 'Rationale, Research, and Role Relations in the Stirling
Workshop", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1974, pp. 276-284.
Anstee, Margaret, "Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy, A Test Case for U. N. Peacekeeping",
International Relations, Vol. Xl, No. 6, 1993, pp. 495-511.
Appley, Dee and Winder, Alvin, T-Groups and Therapy Groups in a Changing Society,
London, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973.
Ashley, Richard, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War", in
Internationaltlntertextual Relations. Postmodern Readin g s of World Politics, James Der
Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds.), Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989, pp. 259-321.
Avruch, Kevin and Black, Peter, "A Generic Theory of Conflict Resolution: A Critique",
Negotiation Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1987, pp. 87-100.
, "Ideas of Human Nature in Contemporary Conflict Resolution Theory",
Negotiation Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1990, pp. 221-228.
, "The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution", Peace and Chag, Vol. 16,
No. 1, 1991, pp. 22-45.
, "Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: Problems and Prospects",
in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application, Dennis Sandole
and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press,
1993, pp. 131-145.
Avruch, Kevin, Black, Peter and Scimecca, Joseph (eds.), Conflict Resolution: Cross-
Cultural Perspectives, New York, Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1991.
Azar, Edward, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Aldershot: Dartmouth,
1 990.
- 217
, "The Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict", in T h e
Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Vamik Volkan, Joseph Montville and
Demetrios Julius (eds.), Vol. 2, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991, pp. 93-116.
Banks, Michael, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory", in Conflict in World
Society. A new perspective on international relations, Michael Banks (ed.), Brighton:
Wheatsheaf, 1984, pp. 3-21.
(ed.), Conflict in World Society. A New Perspective on International
Relations, Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984.
, "Four Conceptions of Peace", in Conflict Management and Problem Solving:
From Interpersonal to International Applications, Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-
Staroste (eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1987, pp. 259-274.
Banks, Michael and Mitchell, C. R., The Resolution of Conflict. A Handbook on the
Analytical Problem Solvin g Approach, Fairfax, Virginia: George Mason University,
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 1993.
Barakat, Halim, "Alienation: A Process of Encounter between Utopia and Reality", jjj
British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 20, 1969, pp. 1-10.
Barber, Michael, Social Tvpifications and the Elusive Other, London and Toronto:
Associated University Press, 1988.
Bay, Christian, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral
Literature", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 59, No. 1, 1965, pp. 39-51.
, "Taking the Universality of Human Needs Seriously", in Conflict: Human
Needs Theory, John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 235-256.
Bendahmane, Diane and McDonald, John, Jr., (eds.), Perspectives on Negotiations. Four
Case Studies and Interpretations, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service
Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1 986.
Benne, Kenneth, Bradford, Leland and Lippitt, Ronald, "The Laboratory Method", in L
Group Theory and Laboratory Method, Leland Bradford, Jack Gibb and Kenneth Benne
(eds.), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964, pp. 15-44.
218 -
Bercovitch, Jacob, Social Conflicts and Third Parties. Strategies of Conflict Resolution,
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.
, "A Case Study of Mediation as a Method of International Conflict
Resolution: the Camp David Experience", Review of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3,
1986, pp. 43-65.
, "International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies and
Conditions of Successful Outcomes", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1986, pp.
155-168.
, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations", in
Mediation in International Relations. Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, Jacob
Bercovitch and Jeffrey Rubin (eds.), Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 1992,
pp. 1-29.
Berger, Peter and Luckmann, Thomas, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in
the Sociology of Knowledge, London: Penguin Books, 1991.
Bernstein, Richard, "Introduction", in John Dewey, On Experience. Nature, and Freedom,
Richard Bernstein (ed.), Indianapolis, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1960,
pp. ix-xlvii.
The Restructurin g of Social and Political Theory, London: Methuen & Co
Ltd, 1979.
Berry, Christopher, Human Nature, London: Macmillan, 1986.
Black, Peter and Avruch, Kevin, "Some Issues in Thinking About Culture and the
Resolution of Conflict", Humanity and Society, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1989, pp. 187-194.
Blake, Robert, Shepard, Herbert and Mouton, Jane, Managing Intergroup Conflict in
Industry, Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, 1964.
Bleicher, Josef, Contemporary Hermeneutics. Hermeneutics as Method. Philosophy and
Critique, London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.
, The Hermeneutic Imagination. Outline of a Positive Critique of Scientism
and Sociology, London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley: Routhledge & Kegan Paul, 1982.
- 219-
Blum, Alan, "Theorizing", in UnderstandinaEveryday Life. Toward the Reconstruction of
Sociolog ical Knowledge, Jack Douglas (ed.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971, pp.
301-319.
Boehringer, G. H., Bayley, J., Zeruolis, V. and Boehringer, K., "Stirling, The Destructive
Application of Group Techniques to a Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 18, No.
2, 1974, pp. 257-275.
Bolles, Robert, Theory of Motivation, New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1967.
Bradford, Leland, Gibb, Jack and Benne, Kenneth, "Preface", in T-Group Theory and
Laboratory Method, Leland Bradford, Jack Gibb and Kenneth Benne (eds.), New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1 964, pp. vii-x.
, "Two Educational Innovations", in T-Group Theory and Laboratory
Method, Leland Bradford, Jack Gibb and Kenneth Benne (eds.), New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1964, pp. 1-14.
Broome, Benjamin, "Managing Differences in Conflict Resolution: The Role of Relational
Empathy", in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Inte g ration and Application, Dennis
Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), Manchester and New York: Manchester University
Press, 1993, pp. 97-111.
Brown, Chris, "International Theory: New Directions?", Review of International Studies,
Vol. 7, No. 3, 1981, pp. 173-185.
Brubaker, Rogers, The Limits of Rationality. An Essay on the Social and Moral Thou g ht of
Max Weber, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, "An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict",
American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, 1980, pp. 917-931.
Burns, James MacGregor, "Wellsprings of Political Leadership", The American Political
Science Review, Vol. LXXI, No. 1, 1977, pp. 266-275.
Burton, John, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and the United Nations", Australian Outlook,
Vol. 15, No. 1, 1961, pp. 73-87.
- 220 -
, Peace Theory. Preconditions of Disarmament, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1962.
, International Relations. A General Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1965.
, "Conflict as a Function of Change", in Conflict in Society, Anthony de
Reuck and Julie Knight (eds.), London, J. & A. Churchill, 1966, pp. 370-401.
, ystems. States. Diplomacy, and Rules, London: Cambridge University
Press, 1968.
, Conflict and Communication. The Use of Controlled Communication in
International Relations, London: Macmillan, 1969.
, "Resolution of Conflict", lnternationa Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1,
1972, pp. 5-29.
, "Theory and Reality", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.
4, No. 3, 1975, pp. 251-262.
, "Functionalism and the Resolution of Conflict", in Functionalism. Theory
and Practice in International Relations, Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), London:
University of London Press, 1975, pp. 238-249.
, "The Dynamics of Change in World Society", Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1976, pp. 64-79.
, Deviance. Terrorism and War, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.
, "The Râle of Authorities in World Society", Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1979, pp. 73-79.
, Dear Survivors, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982.
, Global Conflict. The Domestic Sources of International Crisis, Brighton:
Wheatsheaf, 1984.
- 221
, "World Society and Human Needs", in International Relations. A Handbook
of Current Theory, Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1985,
pp. 46-59.
, "About Winning", International Interactiojia, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1985, pp.
71-91.
, "The Facilitation of International Conflict Resolution", in Research in
Social Movements. Conflict and Chan g e, Luis Kriesberg (ed.), London: Greenwich,
Connecticut, Vol. 8, 1985, pp. 33-45.
, "The History of International Conflict Resolution", in international
Conflict Resolution. Theory and Practice, Edward Azar and John Burton (eds.), Brighton:
Wheatsheaf, 1986, pp. 40-55.
, "The Means to Agreement: Power or Values?", in Perspectives on
Negotiation. Four Case Studies and Interpretations, Diane Bendahmane and John McDonald,
Jr., (eds.), Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U. S.
Department of State, 1986, pp. 229-241.
, "The Procedures of Conflict Resolution", in International Conflict
Resolution. Theory and Practice, Edward Azar and John Burton (eds.), Sussex, Boulder:
Wheatsheaf Books, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986, pp. 92-116.
, "The Theory of Conflict Resolution", Current Research on Peace and
Violence, Vol. IX, No. 3, 1986, pp. 125-130.
, Resolvin g Deep-Rooted Condlict. A Handbook, London and New York:
University Press of America, 1987.
, "Three Qualities of a Secure Nation", in Solutions for a Troubled World,
Mark Macy (ed.), Boulder, Colorado: Earthview Press, 1987, pp. 239-248.
, World Society, Lanham: University Press of America, 1987 (originally
published: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
, "International Conflict Resolution and Problem Solving", in Conflict
Manaoement and Problem Solvin g : From Interpersonal to International Applications,
- 222 -
Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1987, pp.
251 -258.
, "Conflict Resolution as a Function of Human Needs", in The Power of
Hujm pn Needs in World Society, Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati (eds.), Boulder and London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, pp. 187-204.
, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, London: Macmillan, 1990.
, "International Relations or World Society?", in Classics in International
Relations, John Vasquez (ed.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990 (2nd ed)
(originally in Burton, John, Groom, A.J.R., Mitchell, C. R. and de Reuck, Anthony, Ih
Study of World Society: A London Perspective, Pittsburgh: International Studies
Association, Occasional Paper No. 1, 1974).
, "Unfinished Business in Conflict Resolution", in Conflict: Readings in
Management & Resolution, John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds.), London: Macmillan,
1990, pp. 328-335.
(ed.), Conflict: Human Needs Theory, London: Macmillan, 1990.
, "Conflict Resolution as a Political System", in The Psychodynamics of
International Relationsh[ps, Vol. 2, Vamik Volkan, Julius Montville and Demetrios Julius
(eds.), Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991, pp. 71-92.
Burton, John and Dukes, Frank, Conflict: Practices in Mana gement. Settlement &
Resolution, London: Macmillan, 1990.
Burton, John, Groom, A.J.R., Light, Margot, Mitchell, C. R. and Sandole, Dennis, Britain
Between East and West, Aldershot: Gower Press, 1984.
Burton, John and Ramsden, Hedda, "Order and Change", in International Relations. A
Bibliography, A. J. R. Groom and C. R. Mitchell (eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1978, pp.
128-139.
Burton, John and Sandole, Dennis, "Generic Theory: The Basis of Conflict Resolution",
Nagotiation Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1986, pp. 333-344.
- 223 -
Carnevale, Peter and Pruitt, Dean, "Negotiation and Mediation", Annual Review of
Psychology, Vol. 43, 1992, pp. 531-582.
Coate, Roger and Rosati, Jerel, "Human Needs in World Society", in Power of Human Needs
in World Society, Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati (eds.), Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1988, pp. 1-20.
Cobb, Sara and Rifkin, Janet, "Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in
Mediation", Law and Social Inquiry - Journal of the American Bar Foundation, Vol. 16,
No. 1, 1991, pp. 35-62.
Cohen, Raymond, Ne gotiating Across Cultures. Communication Obstacles in International
Diplomacy, Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991.
"Negotiating Reality: International Relations and the Metaphor of the Holy
Sepulchre", a paper presented in the 35th Annual Convention of International Studies
Association, Washington, D. C., 28 March - 1 April, 1994.
Cohen, Stephen, Kelman, Herbert, Miller, Frederick and Smith, Bruce, "Evolving
Intergroup Techniques for Conflict Resolution: An Israeli-Palestinian Pilot Workshop",
Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1977, pp. 165-189.
Colosi, Thomas, "A Model for Negotiation and Mediation" in International Ne gotiation. Art
and Science, Diane Bendahmane and John McDonald, Jr., (eds), Center for the Study of
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1984, pp. 15-33.
Connolly, William, Identity/Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox,
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991.
Coser, Lewis, The Functions of Social Conflict, Glencoe, Illonois: The Free Press, 1956.
, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, New York: The Free Press,
1967.
Cot, Jean-Pierre, International Conciliation, London: Europa Publications, 1968.
, "Critical Remarks on John Burton's Paper on Resolution of Conflict with
Special Reference to the Cyprus Conflict", International Studies Quarterl y , Vol. 16, No. 1,
1972, pp. 31-39
- 224 -
Cox, Ronald, Schutz's Theory of Relevance: A Phenomenolo p ical Critique, The Hague,
Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.
Curie, Adam, Makin g Peace, London, Tavistock Publications, 1971.
Dallmayr, Fred, 'Phenomenology and Social Science: An Overview and Appraisal", in
Explorations in Phenomenology, David Can and Edward Casey (eds.), The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 133-166.
Dawkins, Richard, The Selfish Gene, Oxford, New York; Oxford University Press, 1989
(2nd ed).
de Mare, P. B., Perspectives in Group Psychotherapy. A Theoretical Background, London:
Alien & Unwin, 1972.
de Reuck, Anthony, "Controlled Communication: Rationale and Dynamics', The Human
Context, Vol. Xi, No. 1, 1974, pp. 64-80.
, "A Theory of Conflict Resolution by Problem-Solving", in Conflict:
Readings in Management and Resolution, John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds.), London:
Macmillan, 1990, pp. 183-198.
Denise, Theodore, "The Concept of Alienation: Some Critical Notices", in Alienation:
Concept. Term. and Meanings, Frank Johnson (ed.), New York and London: Seminar Press,
1973, pp. 141-160.
Denzin, Norman, "Reading Rational Choice Theory", Rationality and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2,
1990, pp. 172-189.
, "The Long Good-bye: Farewell to Rational Choice Theory", Rationality and
Society, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1990, pp. 504-507.
Der Derian, James, On Diplomacy. A Genealogy of Western Estranciemeni, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1987.
Deutsch, Morton, "Conflict and Its Resolution" in Conflict Resolution: Contributions of the
Behavioral Sciences, Clagett Smith (ed.), London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971,
pp. 36-57.
- 225
, "Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and
Cultural Influences", in New Directions in Conflict Theory. Conflict Resolution and
onflict Transformation, Raimo Vayrynen (ed.), London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage
Publications, 1991, PP. 26-56.
Dirven, René and Paparotté, Wolf, "Introduction", in The Ubiquity of Metaphor, René
Dirven and World Paparotté (eds.), Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing
Company, 1985, pp. vii-xix.
Doob, Leonard (ed.), Resolving Conflict in Africa. The Fermeda Workshop, New Haven,
London: Yale University Press, 1970.
, "A Cyprus Workshop: An Exercise in Intervention Methodology", Lb
Journal of Social Psycholo gy, Vol. 94, 1975, pp. 161-178.
Doob, Leonard and Foltz, William, "The Belfast Workshop, An Application of Group
Techniques to a Destructive Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 17, No. 3,
1973, pp. 489-512.
Dreyfus, Hubert, "Beyond Hermeneutics: Interpretation in Late Heidegger and Recent
Foucault", in Interpretin g Politics, Michael Gibbons (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1987, pp. 203-220.
Dreyfus, Hubert and Dreyfus, Stuart, "Towards a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise",
Human Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1991, pp. 229-250.
Druckman, Daniel, "Four Cases of Conflict Management: Lessons Learned", in
Perspectives on Negotiation. Four Case Studies and Interpretations, Diane Bendahmane and
John McDonald, Jr., (eds.), Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service
Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1986, pp. 263-288.
, "An Analytical Research Agenda for Conflict and Conflict Resolution", in
Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Inte g ration and Application, Dennis Sandole and
Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press,
1 993, pp. 25-42.
- 226
Druckman, Daniel and Broome, Benjamin, "Value Differences and Conflic Resolution,
Familiarity or Liking?", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1991, pp. 571-
593.
Dryzek, John, Discursive Democracy: Politics. Policy, and Political Science, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Eco, Umberto "Horns, Hooves, Insteps, Some Hypotheses on Three Types of Abduction", in
The Sian of Three. Dupin. Holmes. Peirce, Umberto Eco and Thomas Sebeok (ed.),
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983, pp. 198-220.
Edwards, Ward, "Utility, Subjective Probability, Their Interaction and Variance
Preferences", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1962, pp. 42-51.
Elster, Jon, "Introduction", in Rational Choice, Jon Elster (ed.), London: Basil Blackwell,
1986, pp. 1-33.
Eshete, Andreas, "Appraisal by an Ethiopian" in Resolvina Conflict in Africa, Leonard
Doob (ed.), New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970, pp. 85-1 03.
Esser, Hartmut, "The Rationality of Everyday Behavior. A Rational Choice Reconstruction
of the Theory of Action by Alfred Schutz", Rationality and Society, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1993,
pp. 7-31.
Feyerabend, Paul, Against Method. Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledcie, London:
Verso, 1980.
Fisher, Ronald, "Third Party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of
Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolutjn, Vol XVI, No. 1, 1972, pp. 67-94.
, "Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup Conflict Resolution",
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1983, pp. 301-334.
, "Developing the Field of Interactive Conflict Resolution: Issues in
Training, Funding and Institutionalization", a paper presented at the 14th Annual
Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Helsinki, Finland,
July 1-5, 1991.
- 227 -
Fisher, Ronald and Keashly, Loraleigh, "The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and
Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention", Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1991, pp. 29-42.
Folger, Joseph and Jones, Tricia (eds.), New Directions in Mediation. Communication
Research and Perspectives, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994.
Foltz, William, 'Two Forms of Unofficial Conflict Intervention: The Problem-Solving and
the Process-Promoting Workshops", in Unofficial Diplomats, Maureen Berman and
Joseph Johnson (eds.), New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, pp. 201-221.
Foucault, Michel, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", in Interpretin g Politics, Michael
Gibbons (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 221-240.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and Method, London: Sheed and Ward, 1979 (2nd ed).
Galtung, Johan, "The Basic Needs Approach", in Basic Needs. A Contribution to the Current
Debate, Katrin Lederer (ed.), Cambridge, MA.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Ham;
Konigstein/Ts: Verlag Anton Ham, 1980, pp. 55-125.
Garfinkel, Harold, Studies in Ethnomethodology, Englewood Gliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall,
1967.
Geertz, Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays, London: Fontana Press,
1993.
George, Jim, "International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of
the Third Debate", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, pp. 269-279.
Ghosh, Pradip (ed.), Third World Development: A Basic Needs Approach, Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984.
Gonos, George, "Situation' versus 'Frame': the 'lnteractionist' and the 'Structuralist'
Analyses of Everyday Life", American Sociological Review, Vol. 42, No. 6, 1977, pp.
854- 86 7.
Goodman, Nelson, Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1978.
- 228
Grathoff, Richard (ed.), Philosophers in Exile. The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and
Aron Gurwitsch. 1939-1959, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1989.
Greenhouse, Carol, "Cultural Perspectives on War", in The Quest for Peace, Raimo
Vayrynen (ed.), London: Sage, 1987, pp. 32-47.
Groom, A. J. R., "No Compromise: Problem-Solving in a Theoretical Perspective",
International Social Science Journal, Vol. XLIII, No. 1, 1991, pp. 77-86.
Groom, A. J. R. and Webb, K., "Injustice, Empowerment, and Facilitation in Conflict",
International Interactions, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1987, pp. 263-280.
Gurwitsch, Aron, Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, Lester Embree (ed.),
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
Habermas, Jurgen, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of
Society, Vol. 1, London: Heinemann, 1984.
Hacking, Ian, "Language, Truth and Reason", in Rationality and Relativism, Martin Hollis
and Steven Lukes (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. 48-66.
Hamill, James, "Angola's Road from under the Rubble", The World Today, Vol. 50, No. 1,
1994, pp. 6-1 1.
Hill, Barbara, "An Analysis of Conflict Resolution Techniques, From Problem-Solving
Workshops to Theory", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1982, pp. 109-
138.
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955
(originally published 1651).
Hogarth, Robin and Reder, Melvin, "Introduction: Perspectives from Economics and
Psychology", in Rational Choice. The Contrast between Economics and Psycholo g y, Robin
Hogarth and Melvin Reder (eds.), Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,
1987, pp. 1-23.
Hollis, Martin, Models of Man. Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- 229 -
, "The Self in Action", in John Dewey Reconsideid, R. S. Peters (ed.),
London: Routledge & Kegan Pau!, 1977, pp. 56-75.
, The Cunning of Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge Universiry Press, 1987.
Hollis, Martin and Lukes, Steven, "Introduction", in Rationality and Relativism, Martin
Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, PP. 1-20.
Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve, Explaining and Understandin g in International Relations,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
Holsti, K. J., "Paths to Peace? Theories of Conflict Resolution and Realities in
International Politics", in International Conflict Resolution, Ramesh Thakur (ed.),
Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1986, pp. 105-132.
Horton, Robin, "African Traditional Thought and Western Science", in Rationality, Bryan
Wilson (ed.), London: Basil Blackwell, 1974, pp. 131-171.
, "Tradition and Modernity Revisited", in Rationality and Relativism,
Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. 201-260.
Husserl, Edmund, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenolociy: An
Introduction to Phen p menolo gy , David Carr (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1970.
Hwa Yol Jung, "A Critique of the Behavioral Persuasion in Politics: A Phenomenological
View", in Phenomenol pay and the Social 5cienc, Maurice Natanson (ed.), Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, Vol. 2, 1973, pp. 133-173.
lkIO, Fred, How NationNegotiate, New York: Harper & Row, 1964 (reprinted 1985).
Illich, Ivan 'Needs", in The Development Dictionary. A Guide to Knowledge as Power,
Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), London: Zen Books, 1992, pp. 88-1 01.
The Independent, 26 November 1994.
—230---
International Alert, "Conflict Resolution and Training in the North Caucasus and Georgia",
a report of the Piatigorsk seminar (June 6 - 19 1993), London: International Alert,
1993.
, "Conflict Resolution and Training in the North Caucasus and Georgia", a
report of the Nalchik seminar (November 14-27 1993), London: International Alert,
1993.
lsard, Walter, Understanding Conflict and the Science of Peace, Cambridge and Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992.
Israel, Joachim, Alienation. From Marx to Modern Sociolocy, Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
1971.
Jabri, Vivienne, "The Western Contact Group as Intermediary in the Conflict over
Namibia", in New Approaches to International Mediation, C. R. Mitchell and K. Webb
(eds.), Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 102-130.
, Mediatin g Conflict. Decision-Making and Western Intervention in
Namibia, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990.
Jehenson, Roger, "A Phenomenological Approach to the Study of the Formal Organization",
in Phen pmenolog icpl Sociology. Issues and Applications, George Psathas (ed.), New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1973, pp. 219-247.
Johnson, Frank, "Alienation: Overview and Introduction", in Alienation: Concept. Term.
and Meanings, Frank Johnson (ed.), New York and London: Seminar Press, 1973, pp. 3-
25.
Journal of Peace Research, Special Issue on International Mediation, Jacob Bercovitch
(ed.), Vol. 28, No. 1, 1991.
Journal of Social Issues, Special Issue on the Mediation of Social Conflict, Kenneth Kressel
and Dean Pruitt (eds.), Vol. 41, No. 2, 1985.
Kelman, Herbert, "The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution", in
Communication in International Politics, Richard Merritt (ed.), Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 1972, pp. 168-204.
- 231
, "Foreword", in Conflict in World Society. A new perspective on
international relations, Michael Banks (ed.), Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984, pp. xvii-xx.
, "Interactive Problem-Solving: a Social-psychological Approach to
Conflict Resolution", in Conflict: Readin gs in Management & Resolution, John Burton and
Frank Dukes (eds.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 199-215.
, "Interactive Problem Solving: The Uses and Limits of a Therapeutic Model
for the Resolution of International Conflicts", in The Psychodynamics of International
Relationships, Vamik Volkan, Joseph Montville and Demetrios Julius (eds.), Vol. 2,
Lexington, Mass.: Lexingron Books, 1991, pp. 145-160.
, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner", in Mediation in
International Relations. Multiple Approaches to Conflict Mana gement, Jacob Bercovitch
and Jeffrey Rubin (eds.), Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 1992, pp. 64-96.
Kelman, Herbert and Cohen, Stephen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop: A Social-
Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International Conflicts", Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 1976, pp. 79-90.
, "Reduction of International Conflict: An Interactional Approach", in Iii
Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, William Austin and Stephen Worchel (eds.),
Monterey: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1979, pp. 288-303.
Kolb, Deborah, "To Be a Mediator: Expressive Tactics in Mediation', Journal of Social
Issues, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1985, pp. 11-26.
Kriesberg, Louis, Social Conflicts, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-HaIl, 1982 (2nd ed).
Lachs, Manfred, "International Law, Mediation, and Negotiation", in Multilateral
Negotiations and Mediation. Instruments and Methods, Arthur Lall (ed.), New York:
Pergamon Press, 1985, pp. 185-195.
Lakin, Martin, Experiential Groups: The Uses of Interpersonal Encounter. Psychotherapy
Groups. and Sensitivity TrainjjiQ, Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press, 1972.
Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark, Metaphors We Live By, Chicago and London: The
University of Chicago Press, 1980.
- 232 -
Lakos, Amos, International Negotiations; A Bibliograpjy, Boulder, London: Westview
Press, 1989.
Laue, James, "The Emergence and Institutionalisation of Third Party Roles in Conflict", in
Conflict Manacement and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications,
Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1987, pp.
1 7-29.
Lawler, Peter, 'Pragmatism, Existentialism, and the Crisis in American Political
Thought", International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XX, No. 3, 1980, pp. 327-338.
Lawler, Peter, "Peace Research and International Relations: From Convergence to
Divergence", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.15, No. 3, 1986, pp.
367-390.
Lessnoff, Michael, Social Contract, London: Macmillan, 1986.
Levi, A. M. and Benjamin, A., "Jews and Arabs Rehearse Geneva: A Model of Conflict
Resolution", Human Relations, Vol. 29, No. 11, 1976, pp. 1035-44.
Lisk, Franklyn, "Conventional Development Strategies and Basic Needs Fulfilment",
International Labour Review, Vol. 115, No. 2, 1977, pp. 175-191.
Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988 (originally published 1689).
Lockyer, Andrew, "Traditions' as Context in the History of Political Theory", Political
Studies, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, 1979, pp. 201-217.
Louch, A. R., Explanation and Human Action, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1966.
Luard, Evan (ed.), The International Regulation of Frontier Disputes, London: Thames and
Hudson, 1970.
Lukes, Steve, Power. A Radical Viw, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1 979.
, "Relativism in its Place", in Rationality and Relativism, Martin HoUis
and Steven Lukes (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. 261-305.
233 -
Manning, Peter and Fabrega, Horacio, "The Experience of Self and Body: Health and Illness
in the Chiapas Highland", in Phenomenol paical Sociology. Issues and Applications, George
Psathas (ed.), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973, pp. 251-301.
Maslow, Abraham, Motivation and Personality, New York: Harper & Row, 1970 (3rd ed).
McDonald, John, Jr. and Bendahmane, Diane (eds.), Conflict Resolution: Track Two
Diplomacy, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U. S.
Department of State, 1987.
McHugh, Peter, "On the Failure of Positivism", in Understandin g Everyday Life. Toward
the Reconstruction of Sociological Knowled ge, Jack Douglas (ed.), London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1971, pp. 320-335.
Merry, S., "Disputing Without Culture", Harvard Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 8, 1987,
pp. 2057-2073.
Miguda, Edith, "Harnessing Internal Local Resources for Conflict Resolution and Self-
Sustaining Peace in the Face of Ethnic Violence", a paper presented in the XVth General
Conference of International Peace Research Association, Malta, 30 October - 4 November,
1994.
Mitchell, C. R., "Evaluating Conflict", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1980,
pp. 61-75.
, Peacemakin g and the Consultant's Role, Westmead: Gower, 1981.
, 'Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic Questions about
Basic Human Needs Theory", in Conflict: Human Needs Theory, John Burton (ed.), London:
Macmillan, 1990, pp. 149-176.
, "Ending Conflicts and Wars: Judgement, Rationality and Entrapment",
International Social Science Journal, Vol. 127, No. 1, 1991, pp. 35-55.
, "The Process and Stages of Mediation, Two Sudanese Cases, in Making
War and Waging Peace, David Smock (ed.), Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of
Peace, 1993, pp. 139-159.
234 -
, "Conflict Research", in Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to
Theory, A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), London and New York: Pinter Publishers,
1994, pp. 128-141.
Mitchell, C. R. and Nicholson, Michael, "Rational Models and the Ending of Wars", Journal
of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1983, pp. 495-520.
Mitchell, C. R. and Webb, K. (eds.), New Approaches to Inlernational Mediation,
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1 988.
Mitrany, David, A Workin g Peace System, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966.
----, The Functional Theory of Politics, London: Martin Robertson, 1975.
Mizruchi, Ephraim, "An Introduction to the Notion of Alienation", in Alienation: Concept,
Term, and Meanin g s, Frank Johnson (ed.), New York and London: Seminar Press, 1973,
pp. 111-124.
Moore, Barrington, Jr., injustice. The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, New York: M.
E. Sharpe, 1978.
Moore, Christopher, The Mediation Process. Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict,
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1 991.
Nader, Laura, "Some Notes on John Burton's Papers on 'Resolution of Conflict",
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1972, pp. 53-58.
, "Harmony Models and the Construction of Law", in Conflict Resolution:
Cross-Cultural Perspectives, Kevin Avruch, Peter Black and Joseph Scimecca (eds.),
New York, Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1991, pp. 41-59.
Natanson, Maurice, "Introduction", in Essays in Phenomenoloay, Maurice Natanson (ed.),
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 1-22.
--, The Journeyin g Self. A Study in Philosophy and Social RoI, Reading,
Menlo Park and London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1970.
, Anonymity. A Study in the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz, Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1986.
- 235 -
Neufeld, Mark, "Interpretation and the 'Science' of International Relations", Review of
Inlern ptionaLStudies, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1993, PP. 39-61.
Nicholson, Michael, Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Nobel, Jaap (ed.), The Comin g the Age of Peace Research. Studies in the Development of a
Discipline, Groningen: Styx Publications, 1991.
North, Robert and Willard, Matthew, "The Post-Behavioural Debate: Indeterminism,
Probabilism and the Interaction of Data and Theory", in Conflict in World Society. A new
perspective on international relations, Michael Banks (ed.), Brighton: Wheatsheaf,
1984, pp. 22-38.
Northrup, Terrell, "Getting to Maybe: The Uneasy Partnership Between Conflict Theory
and Feminist Theory", a paper presented at the 35th Annual Convention of International
Studies Association, Washington, D. C., 28 March - 1 April 1994.
Nudler, Oscar, "Human Needs: A Sophisticated Holistic Approach", in Basic Needs. A
Contribution to the Current Debate, Katrin Lederer (ed.), Cambridge, MA.: Oelgeschlager,
Gunn & Ham; Konigstein/Ts: Verlag Anton Ham, 1980, pp. 131-150.
Oakeshott, Michael, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, London and New York:
Methuen, 1984.
Olson, William and Groom, A.J.R., International Relations Then and Now. Origins and
Trends in Interpretation, London: HarperCollins Academic, 1991.
Oppenheim, A. N., "Psychological Processes in World Society", in Conflict in World
Society. A new perspective on international relations, Michael Banks (ed.), Brighton:
Wheatsheaf, 1984, pp. 112-127.
Parsons, Talcott, The Structure of Social Action, New York: The Free Press, 1967.
Pater, Hasu, "Zimbabwe's Mediation in Mozambique and Angola", in Mediation in Southern
Africa, Stephen Chan and Vivienne Jabri (eds.), London and Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1 993, pp. 117-141.
—236
Perakyla, Anssi, Kuoleman monet kasvot. Identiteetin tuottaminen kuolevan potilaan
hoidossa (Multiple Faces of Death. The Production of Identities in the Care of the Dying
Patient), Tampere: Vastapaino, 1990.
Peters, R. S., The Concept of Motivation, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul and New York:
Humanities Press, 1958.
Plato, Statesman, J. B. Skemp (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952.
Pollner, Melvin, "Mundane Reasoning", Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 4, 1974,
pp. 35-54.
Price, Richard, "Interpretation and Disciplinary Orthodoxy in International Relations",
Review of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1994, pp. 201-204.
Pruitt, Dean and Rubin, Jeffrey, Social Conflict. Escalation. Stalemate, and Settlement,
New York: Random House, 1986.
Psathas, George, "Ethnomethodology as a Phenomenological Approach in the Social
Sciences", in Interdisciplinary Phenomenolooy, Don Ihde and Richard Zaner (eds.), The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, pp. 73-98.
, "Approaches to the Study of the World of Everyday Life", Human Studies,
Vol. 3, No. 1, 1980, pp. 3-17.
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
Reinhartz, Shulamit, On Becomin g p Social Scientist. From Survey Research and
Participant Observation to Experiential Analysis, San Francisco, Washington and London:
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1979.
Renshon, Stanley, "Human Needs and Political Analysis: An Examination of a Framework",
in Human Needs and Politics, Ross Fitzgerald (ed.), Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press,
1977, pp. 52-73.
Ricoeur, Paul, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, John Thompson (ed.), Cambridge,
London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne and Sydney: Cambridge University Press and
Paris: Editions de Ia Maison des Sciences de I'Homme, 1 981.
- 237 -
Rorty, Richard, "Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey", The Review of
Metaphysics, Vol. XXX, No. 1, 1976, pp. 280-305.
, Consequences of Pragmatism, Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1982.
Rose, Steven, Lewontin, R. C. and Kamin, Leon, Not in Our Genes: Biology. Ideology and
Human Nature, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985.
Ross, Marc, The Culture of Conflict. Interpretations and Interests in Comparative
Perspective, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993.
, The Management of Conflict. Interpretations and Interests in Comparative
Perspective, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993.
Rothman, Jay, Bringing Conflict Resolution to Israel: Model-Building, Training and
Institutionalization", in Practising Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies, Jay Rothman
(ed.), Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew
University, 1993, pp. 1-15.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality", in Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, G. D. H. Cole (trans.), London: J. M. Dent &
Sons Ltd, 1973 (originally published 1755), pp. 27-113.
, The Social Contract, Maurice Cranston (ed.), London: Penguin Books,
1968 (originally published 1762).
Roy, Ramashray, "Three Visions of Needs and the Future: Liberalism, Marxism, and
Gandhism", in Power of Human Needs in World Society, Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati
(eds.), Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, pp. 59-76.
, "Social Conflicts and Needs Theories", in Conflict: Human Needs Theory,
John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 125-148.
Rubenstein, Richard, "Basic Human Needs Theory: Beyond Natural Law", in Conflict:
Human Needs Theory, John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 336-355.
Rubin, Jeffrey, "Introduction", in Dynamics of Third Party Intervention. Kissin g er in the
Middle East, Jeffrey Rubin (ed.), New York: Praeger, 1981, pp. 3-43.
- 238 -
Sandole, Dennis, "Introduction", in Conflict Management and Problem Solvinçi: From
Interpersonal to International Applications, Dennis Sandole and lngrid Sandole-Staroste
(eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1987, pp. 3-12.
Sandole, Dennis and van der Merwe, Hugo (eds.), Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice.
Integration and Application, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press,
1993.
Schacht, Richard, Alienation, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971.
Scheff, Thomas, "Negotiating Reality: Notes of Power in the Assessment of
Responsibility", Social Problems, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1968, pp. 3-17.
Schmidt, Herman, "Peace Research and Politics", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 5, No.
3, 1968, pp. 217-232.
Schutz, Alfred, Collected Papers I. The Problem of Social Reality, Maurice Natanson
(ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.
, Collected Papers II. Studies in Social Theory, Arvid Brodersen (ed.), The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
, Collected Papers Ill. Studies in Phenomenolo p ical Philosophy, I. Schutz
(ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
, The Phenomenolociy of the Social Would, George Walsh and Frederick
Lehnert (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967 (originally published
1932).
, On Phenomenoloay and Social Relations. Selected Writin g s. Helmut
Wagner (ed.), Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
, Reflections of the Problem of Relevance, Richar Zaner (ed.), New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1970.
Schutz, Alfred and Luckmann, Thomas, The Structures of the Life-World, Vol. I, London:
Heinemann, 1974.
- 239 -
, The Structures of the Life-World, Vol. II, Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1989.
Schwartz, Morris and Schwartz, Charlotte, "Problems in Participant Observation", in
Issues in Participant Observation. A Text and Reader, George McCall and J. L. Simmons
(eds.), Reading, Menlo Park, London, Don Mills: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
1969, pp. 89-104.
Scimecca, Joseph, "Self-reflectivity and Freedom: Toward a Prescriptive Theory of
Conflict Resolution", in Conflict: Human Needs Theory, John Burton (ed.), London:
Macmillan, 1990, pp. 205-218.
Sebeok, Thomas (ed.), The Tell-Tale Sion. A Survey of Semiotics, Lisse: The Peter de
Ridder Press, 1975.
Seeman, Melvin, "On the Meaning of Alienation", American Sociological Review, Vol. 24,
No. 6, 1959, pp. 783-791.
Shapiro, Michael, Readin g the Postmodern PoTity. Political Theory as Textual Practice,
Minneapolis, Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.
Simon, Herbert, "Rationality in Psychology and Economics", in Rational Choice. The
Contrast between Economics and Psycholooy, Robin Hogarth and Melvin Reder (eds.),
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 25-40.
Simpson, Chris, Teace or War?", African Report, Vol. 39, No, 2, 1994, pp. 55-57.
Sites, Paul, Control: The Basis of Social Order, New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., 1973.
, "Legitimacy and Human Needs", in Conflict: Readin g s in Manag ement and
Resolution, John Burton and Frank Dukes (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 117-144.
, "Needs as Analogues of Emotions", in Conflict: Human Needs Theory, John
Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 7-33.
Skemp, J. B., "Introduction", in Plato, Statesman, J. B. Skemp (trans.), London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952, pp. 13-111.
Smith, Gilbert, Social Need, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
- 240 -
Smith, John, Purpose and Thou g ht: The Meanin g of Prag matism, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1978.
Smith, M. Brewster, "Metapsychology, Politics, and Human Needs', in Human Needs and
Politics, Ross Fitzgerald (ed.), Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press, 1977, pp. 124-141.
Smith, Steve, 'Paradigm Dominanace in International Relations: The Development of
International Relations as a Social Science", Millennium: Journal of International Studies,
Vol. 16, No. 2, 1987, pp. 189-206.
Springborg, Patricia, The Problem of Human Needs and ihe Critique of Civilisation,
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981.
Srubar, llja, "On the Origin of Phenomenological Sociology', Human Studies, Vol. 7, No.
2, 1984, pp. 163-189.
, "On the Limits of Rational Choice", Rationality and Society, Vol. 5, No. 1,
1993, pp. 32-46.
Stewart, David and Mickunas, Algis, Explorin g Phenomenoloay. A Guide to the Field and Its
Literature, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1990 (2nd ed).
Streeten, Paul, "From Growth to Basic Needs", Finance and Development, Vol. 16, No. 3,
1979, pp. 28-31.
Streeten, Paul and Burki, Shahid, "Basic Needs: Some Issues", World Development, Vol. 6,
No. 3, 1978, pp. 411-421.
Taylor, Paul, "Introduction", in David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Po'itics,
London: Martin Robertson, 1975, pp. ix-xxv.
, "Functionalism: the Approach of David Mitrany", in Frameworks for
International Co-operation, A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), London: Pinter
Publishers, 1990, pp. 125-138.
Thompson, John, "Editor's Introduction", in Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, John Thompson (ed.), Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne
- 241 -
and Sydney: Cambridge University Press and Paris: Editions de Ia Maison des Sciences de
IHomme, 1981, PP. 1-26.
Touval, Saadia, "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations", iii
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1975, pp. 51-69.
Touval, Saadia and Zartman, I. William, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory", in
International Mediation in Theory and Practice, Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman
(eds.), Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 7-17.
Trigg, Roger, Understandin g Social Science, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985, pp. 171-
172.
UNITAR Research Reports, "Social Psychological Techniques and the Peaceful Settlement
of International Disputes", Doob, Leonard (ed.), No. 1, 1970, New York.
United Nations, "The United Nations and the Situation in Angola, May 1991-June 1994",
New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1994.
Vaitkus, Steven, How Is Society Possible? Intersubjectivitv and the Fiduciary Attitude as
Problems of the Social Group in Mead. Gurwitsch. and Schutz, Dordrecht, Boston, London:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
Valone, James, "A Critical Theory of Knowledge and the Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz",
Cultural Hermeneutics, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1976, pp. 199-215.
van Weigel, B., "The Basic Needs Approach: Overcoming the Powerty of Homo
oeconomicus", World Development, Vol. 14, No. 12, 1986, pp. 1423-1434.
Vasquez, John, The Power of Power Politics. A Critique, New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 1983.
, The War Puzzle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Venanclo, Moises and Macmillan Carla, "Portuguese Mediation of the Angolan Conflict in
1990-1991", in Mediation in Southern Africa, Stephen Chan and Vivienne Jabri (eds.),
London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993, pp. 100-116.
242
Volkan, Vamik, Montville, Joseph and Julius, Demetrios (eds.), The Psychodynamics of
International Relationship, Vol. 2, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991.
von Mangoldt, Hans, 'Arbitration and Conciliation" in Judicial Settlement of International
Disputes, Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, Max Panck Institute for Comparative Public Law
and International Law, 1974, pp. 417-552.
Wagner, Helmut, "Between Ideal Type and Surrender: Field Research as Asymmetrical
Relation", Human Studies. Vol. 1, No. 2, 1978, pp. 153-1 64.
, Phnomenolo pv of Consciousness and Sociology of the Life-World: An
Introductory_Study, Edmonton, Alberta: The University of Alberta Press, 1983.
Walker, R. B. J., Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Wall, James, Jr., "Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research", Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1981, pp. 157-180.
Wallensteen, Peter and Axell, Karin, "Conflict Resolution and the End of the Cold War,
1989-93", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1994, pp. 333-349.
Walsh, George, "Introduction", in Schutz, Alfred, The Phenomenology of the Social World,
George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1967 (originally published 1932), pp. xv-xxix.
Watt, E. D., "Human Needs, Human Wants, and Political Consequences", Political Studies,
Vol. XXX, No. 4, 1982, pp. 533-543.
Webb, Keith "Structural Violence and Definition of Conflict", in World Encyclopaedia of
Peace, Vol. 2, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986, pp. 431-434.
, "Science, Biology, and Conflict", Paradigms, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1992, pp. 65-
96.
Weber, Max, Max Weber. Selections in Translation, W. G. Runciman (ed.) and E.
Matthews (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
Wehr, Paul, Conflict Regulation, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979.
- 243 -
Winch, Peter, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973 (first published 1958).
, "Understanding a Primitive Society", in Rationality, Bryan Wilson (ed.),
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974, pp. 78-111.
Wittman, Donald, "How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach", Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1979, pp. 743-763.
Wolff, Kurt, "A Very Brief Commentary on Helmut R. Wagner's 'Between Ideal Type and
Surrender", Human Studies. Vol. 1, No. 2, 1978, pp. 165-1 66.
Yarrow, C., Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1978.
Young, Oran, The Intermediaries. Third Parties in International Crisis, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1967.
"Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.
XVI, No. 1, 1972, pp. 51-65.
Young, Paul, "Physiological Drives", in International Ensyclopedia of the Social Sciences,
Vol. 4, 1968, pp. 275-280.
Younghusband, Eileen (ed.), New Developments in Casework. Readings in Social Work,
Vol. II, London: Allen & Unwin, 1966.
Zaner, Richard, "Theory of Intersubjectivity: Alfred Schutz", Social Research, Vol. 28,
No. 1, 1961, pp. 71-93.
Zartman, I. William, "Alternative Attempts at Crisis Management: Concepts and
Processes", in New Issues in International Crisis Mana g ement, Gilbert Winham (ed.),
Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 199-223.
Zartman, I. William and Touval, Saadia, "Conclusion: Mediation in Theory and Practice",
in International Mediation in Theory and Practice, Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman
(eds.), Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 251-268.
244 -
----, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics", Journal
of Social Issues, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1985, pp. 27-45.
- 245
